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ABSTRACT
This study examines women's changing political participation
in Jordan, focusing on the interplay between three major
factors: Islam, the state, and feminism. The analytical
framework is intended to enable the contribution of each
factor to the development of women's political participation
to be assessed. A detailed comparative analysis tracing
women's political experiences and their overall political-
legal status throughout the Arab world is also presented.
Field research and interviews with Jordanian activists and 70
women at the grassroots level were conducted in Jordan to
supplement and highlight women's views on political, social,
legal, economic, and other key issues. The field research
demonstrates that women seek changes in Jordanian laws that
will further enable them to improve their participation in
politics and in public life.
Strategies to enhance women's political participation in
Jordan are presented, thus providing a link between the
reality of women's political status and what can be done to
empower them politically. The study concludes that the
analytical framework adopted constitutes a useful tool for
explaining women's political participation as it has developed
in Jordan in the contemporary era.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION, STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, METHODOLOGY, 
AND THE OUTLINE OF THE STUDY. 
1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In the Arab countries, most studies on the role of women have
concentrated on their role in the labor force, and the
relationship between women and Islam (especially the question
of the veil) . 1 However, there has been negligible research on
the role of women in politics.
So far, the absence of women in politics in the Arab
countries has been taken for granted. This is especially true
in Jordan, one of the Arab countries where the absence of
women in politics has not been studied in much detail.
The low participation of Jordanian women in the electoral
process and the weak support for women candidates appears, on
the surface, to confirm the Western stereotype of Arab women
as apolitical. An example of the low participation was the
1989 election in Jordan when women were allowed to participate
in national elections for the first time. What appeared to be
a momentous breakthrough for Jordanian women turned out
differently from what had been expected. Despite the fact
that there were 12 women candidates, no women were elected.
In the election of 1993 one woman won one of the three seats
reserved for the Circassian minority. But overall, what the
Jordanian elections suggest is that political change initiated
from the top, via the modern state, can only be successful if
there is a sufficient groundswell of support at the lower
levels of society.
The primary objective of this study is to examine the
changing political status and political participation of
Jordanian women during the contemporary era. It is useful to
examine the factors influencing women's political
participation and test how these may or may not apply in
Jordan.
A number of related hypotheses will be explored in this
study. They are:
Time available for women to participate in politics 
Hypothesis 1: As women are able to have others take care of
their children, they have more time to spend doing other
things-including participating in politics.
The role of education
Hypothesis 2: As the education rate of Jordanian women
increases their political participation will increase.
The role of women in the labor force 
Hypothesis 3: As Jordanian woman enter the labor force, they
will be more interested in politics and will increase their
political participation [this hypothesis assumes that if women
are economically free they will protect their interests as
working women, and that an economically independent woman is
more likely to take independent political decisions].
2
Women's organizations 
Hypothesis 4: As women's organizations bring issues about
women to the government, and into public attention, this will
help increase women's participation.
The state as agent of change 
Hypothesis 5: The state plays a key role in promoting women's
political participation. [The state can, for example,
give women the right to vote. The state allows (or can
forbid) women to be candidates for public office. As the
state empowers women with regard to political participation,
women respond accordingly, and increase their political
activity].
The legal framework 
Hypothesis 6: Some laws discriminate against women, and women
feel they are not a part of the political process.
The personal status laws and social life 
Hypothesis 7: The personal status laws restrict a woman's
private life, and as a result discourage public activities
such as political participation.
This study examines all of the hypotheses listed above. These
hypotheses will be tested empirically, as described below.
(P.12)
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2. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
2.1 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Political participation, according to Sidney Verba is "the
legal activities by private citizens that are more or less
directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental
personnel and/or the actions they take n .' This definition
includes only legal activities, and excludes riots and
demonstrations. Myron Weiner on the other hand, defines
political participation as "voluntary action, successful,
organized or unorganized, episodic or continuous, employing
legitimate, or illegitimate methods intended to influence the
choice of public policies". 3 Weiner excludes government
activities from this definition. For example, organizations
or attending mass rallies under government order are excluded.
He also excluded elections with single candidates because the
citizen has no choice in the selection of public officials.
In evaluating women's political participation in Jordan,
this study uses a broad definition of political participation.
Most studies of women's political participation have
concentrated on traditional assessments of women's voting
patterns. Jordanian women have a low level of participation
in formal conventional politics, such as voting and campaign
activities, which, if considered alone, would suggest that
women are apolitical. In Jordan, however, as in other Arab
countries, women's participation can be seen in less
conventional politics than voting or activities in electoral
campaign, at the grass-roots level. Other forms of
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participation include the activities of women in liberation
movements, ad hoc politics, and women's associations, whether
official or unofficial. The latter associations can be seen
as institutions that have advanced women's political
participation, and are relatively organized and permanent.
They usually appear to be apolitical. But in fact they may
empower women through charitable and social service functions,
and at the same time play a role in bringing women's issues to
the attention of politicians and the public. In this study,
political participation is defined as political activity,
including informal and indirect action, and any activity
intentionally to influence the making of public policy. The
study will not focus on formal activity like voting. It
recognizes as political participation involvement in ad hoc
political campaigns that are relatively short-lived, such as
food riots, and anti-war demonstrations (such as over the Gulf
war), which are directed against the political authorities and
may be illegal or violent.
2.2 THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON WOMEN'S STATUS 
The study gives particular attention to the influence of
public policy on women's status. The constitutions of most
Arab countries, including Jordan, provide that all citizens
are equal in their public rights and duties, and specify that
people are equal before the law', but the reality may be
different. In Jordan, women are under the authority of two
contradictory laws. The first is a public law which does not
distinguish between citizens on the basis of sex or religion,
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and gives them human and civil rights. The personal status
laws on the other hand, do not give men and women equal
rights. They give a man the right to divorce his wife
immediately if she goes against his orders. Also in the 100
days after the divorce, a husband has the right to ask his
wife to return to the marriage. This right is known as the
bavt al-ta'ah (house of obedience). If she refuses, she will
lose her rights to a hundred days' alimony. The husband also
has the right of polygamy.
This study will consider how Jordanian laws have affected
women's status, and the potential for change through law. The
law can deny Jordanian women the right to property and income,
but it can also direct public resources in ways that improve
women's status - for example integrating women into
development plans.
The research for this study has taken into account the
primary focus on the interplay among three major discourses
affecting women's political participation in Jordan: Islam,
the state, and feminism.
2 . 3 ISLAM
Islam will be considered not as a set of abstract beliefs
concerning relations between individuals and a putative divine
being, but as an ideological system that enjoins and
legitimizes forms of social practice. Politically, this study
will view the personal status laws in Jordan as laws emanating
from the shari' -ah that affect women's political participation.
6
2 . 4 suvrE 
Arab states after independence must be seen in the context of
the historic expansion of state power. The state took
increasing control over economy, education, and health. Of
equal importance were forms of state intervention in the realm
of personal relations, particularly in family structures and
practices, and in the wider processes of social and economic
transformation.
2 . 5 FEMINISM
In the Arab world, the earliest articulation of women's
feminist consciousness is widely considered to have been in
the 1890s with the rise of women's journalism and salon
debates. The new awareness was not yet called feminism; in
fact the term "feminism" was not used in Egypt until the early
1920s. This study uses the definition of feminism given by
Margot Badran "feminism is broadly construed to include an
understanding that women have suffered forms of subordination
or oppression because of their sex, and an advocacy of ways to
overcome them to achieve better lives for women, and for men,
within the family and society".6
CONCLUSION
This study examines how the interaction of three major factors
- Islam, state power, and the feminist movement - has shaped
the political participation of Jordanian women.
7
The study neither attacks nor justifies the existing
situation, but rather analyses. No attempt is made to compare
the role of Middle Eastern women with that of women in the
West or elsewhere.
3. REVIEW OF =MUD RESEARCH ON MOM ' S POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION IN JORDAN
There is a lack of social science literature on female
political participation in Jordan. Nonetheless, the available
literature, however flawed or incomplete, enables one to
generate or test hypotheses on women's political
participation. This section will briefly discuss the work
that the researcher has been able to locate.
In the journal Dirasat Hilmi Sari suggests in his study
-
"Dawr wasa'll al-ittipal fi al-suluk al-intkhabi: Dirasah
-
tahliliyah fi susylaajya al-ittisal fr al-mujtama' al-Urduni"
(The role of communication in the election procedures:
Analytical study in sociology of communication in the
Jordanian society) that women in Bedouin areas are less
interested in elections than either settled rural or urban
women. However, he does not give sufficient explanation as to
why Bedouin women have had less interest in elections than
their rural or urban counterparts. He also argues that mass
media played an insignificant role in the 1989 elections,
compared to direct personal communication among citizens.' He
suggests that in future candidates should put more emphasis on
personal communication.
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-An article by 'Abd al-Majid al-'Azzam "Ittijahat 'ayinah
-
mukhtarah min al-mujtama' al-Urduni nahwa al-musharakah al-
siyasiyah: Dirasah maydaniyah" (Opinion of selected sample
from Jordanian society toward political participation: field
study) also in Diiasat, uses a sample of which only twenty
percent are female. He justifies this because, in Jordanian
culture, "the men do not let their wives fill the
questionnaire". 8 If he is correct, then the question remains,
what is it about Jordanian culture that inhibits women from
participating in and even discussing politics?. To say that
one's sample is sufficient because the culture inhibits
interviewing, as al-'Azzam does, particularly when one is
studying political attitudes, only complicates the issue of
what types of political participation are legitimate, and
whether those women who did fill out al-'Azzm's questionnaire
were either betraying their husbands or were in some other way
unusual.
Al-'Azzam's problems are compounded by his poor questions
design. First, he uses a questionnaire, and not person-to-
person interviews. Second, many of the questions are poorly
worded, and there are no questions asked only to women. While
the study does not purport to be solely on Jordanian woman, it
is important to ask certain questions solely to women,
especially when one considers the cultural norms which al-
'Azzam describes.
The Research Department of Jordan's Parliament conducted
a study "Al-mar'ah al-Urduni wa al-intkhabat al-niyabyah"
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(Jordanian women and parliamentary elections) from April 15 to
May 14, 1993. The objective of the study was to find out why
many Jordanian women did not participate in the 1989 election,
and to assess how many would participate in the 1993 election.
The study used equal numbers of men and women, and the 1025
respondents were a representative cross-section of Jordan.'
Their research conclusions were not especially, convincing as
two of their conclusions (5 and 6) contradict each other,
their conclusions were:
1. More people would vote in 1993
2. 78.44% opposed the quota system that guarantees
seats for women in Parliament
3. The media plays the major role in elections
4. Voters prefer women candidates who are outspoken
5. More women would be elected
6. Most people consider women candidates to be
unsuitable
7. The official program to increase women's
participation is effective
This shows there are still major barriers to women's political
participation in parliamentary election.
Another study in 1993 by Mousa Shtawi and Amal al-
-	
-
Daghstani was entitled "Dirasah miydaniyah hawla musharakat
al-mar'ah al-Urduni fi al-hayat al-siyasiyah" (Analytical
study about participation of Jordanian women in political
life). The objective of this study was to investigate the
roles of Jordanian women in social and political life. The
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study sought to examine the attributes of both men and women
politics, to analyze the political participation of women and
the obstacles to their participation, to determine the
position of women and their role in society, and to assess the
role of political institutions.
The data was collected between July 26 and August 6,
1993. The sample was drawn from two Department of Census
"replicates"; every replicate includes 50 areas spread over
Jordan. The researchers randomly chose a block from every
area, 22 families from every block and one or two persons over
19 from each family. The sample contained 2,050 people: 1,018
males and 1,032 females.n
Their research findings were that:
1. Men have more opportunity to participate in politics
than women
2. Voters chose male candidates on their merit not on
their sex
3. Half the sample said there were obstacles facing
women in politics
4. Many women did not have enough time to participate
in election
5. Many people did not accept women working in politics
6. Many people believe that the legislation on women's
issues is fair
7. Most people used T.V. to find out about the election
While these two studies (that of the Research Department
-
of the Jordanian Parliament and that of Shtawi-Daghstlni) deal
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with Jordanian women, there are no specific questions directed
toward women and both have designed their questionnaires for
both men and women. Also, the studies use no theoretical
framework or hypotheses. In addition, there are no questions
about the personal status laws.
4. PROCEDURE 
4.1 INTERVIEWS WITH LEADING JORDANIAN WOMEN
Several informal interviews were conducted with women
activists in Jordan. These are presented in Chapter Five, but
the women are not part of the sample.
4 . 2 THE SAMPLE 
The focus of this study is Jordanian women and I have chosen
to limit my interviews to Jordanian women. The study is also
limited to urban women, in Amman. According to the Department
of Statistics in 1991, the number of people living in Amman
stood at 1,328,200, accounting for 34.2 per cent of the total
population of Jordan (3,888,000).il
The lack of census data and archive material about women
made generating an interview sample difficult. Rather than
hoping a random sample gives sufficient numbers in each
category, I decided to employ my personal network to find a
set of interviewees which was heterogeneous along class,
education and ethnic lines. The goal was to interview
Jordanian women with different educational, social and ethnic
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backgrounds, and varying ages. The sample consists of 70
women. In term of social class, women from each of the
following categories were interviewed:
1. professionals - especially women in medicine,
dentistry, law, journalism, and engineering;
2. businesswomen who own and/or manage medium-to-
large-scale enterprises;
3. government bureaucrats who work in top
positions in the ministries of Education, Health, or
Social Affairs;
4. government bureaucrats who work at lower levels in
the Education, Health, or Social Affairs ministries;
5. government bureaucrats who work as clerks or
secretaries;
6. women working as janitors or maids; and
7. housewives who are married to men working in each of
the above-named occupations.
4.3 COLLECTION OF DATA
While I limited myself to interviews in Amman, it seemed
important to interview women who live in different
neighborhoods in Amman. The study draws on a personal network
as the basis for meeting selected individuals. The following
paragraph explains this technique in greater depth.
There are inherent difficulties in convincing Jordanian
women to be interviewed. Responding to interviews of the sort
carried out in this project is not common. To stand on a
street corner and ask women to take a few minutes to answer
13
questions about politics would be virtually impossible.
Gaining trust is an important part of the interview process.
I began by interviewing people I knew, specifically female
lawyers whom I had befriended over the past decade. After
interviewing them, I asked them if they could suggest other
persons who they knew. I specifically asked them not to
suggest persons who would be likely to give me any particular
answers. Rather, I sought women who would agree to being
interviewed. It is my belief that asking interviewees to name
potential interviewees was the preferred way to expand my
interview base, and more importantly, to gain the trust of
those whom I wished to interview.
4.4 THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire included closed-ended questions suitable to
easy codification and open-ended questions where women were
encouraged to express freely their opinions without the
observer leading or limiting their answers. This technique
was designed to gather as much information as possible.
The study used formal, structured interviews, with all of
the individuals in the sample.
4.5 THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
The questions were not precoded, since it was impossible to
predict the patterns of responses; but such data still had to
be coded before any analysis would be undertaken.' My
analysis of the interview data attempts to prove or disprove
the hypotheses described earlier. Rather than simply provide
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statistical data about the interviews, my analysis will be
more descriptive and contextual. My goal is to explain, not
describe, why and how women participate. (The full
questionnaire is given in Appendix 1).
5. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter One is an introduction. It states the problem, the
methodology, and the outline of this study.
Chanter Two presents the framework of the theoretical study of
women's political participation. This chapter discuses the
three major factors - Islam, the state, and feminism - which
have affected the status of women and their political
participation.
Chanter Three examines the history of women's political
participation in the Arab World and discusses the historical
legacy of women's roles such as the feminist movement in the
early twentieth century in the Arab world, specifically in
Egypt, Algeria, and Palestine. In this discussion, the
feminist movement will be viewed as part of the national
liberation movement. The study also examines the post-
colonial regimes' policies that affected women. It considers
the reform of the personal status laws in Egypt, Algeria,
Tunisia and Yemen. It also examines the struggle of women in
Bahrain and Kuwait for more progressive laws, such as the
right to vote.
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Chapter Four examines women's roles in Jordanian society, the
development of political institutions, education, the labor
force, and laws. First, we will examine Jordanian society --
Bedouin women, women in villages, and women in urban areas.
Second, we discuss how the development of the Jordanian
political system affects women. Third, we examine Jordanian
women's associations -- whether official or unofficial -- and
how these associations have advanced women's participation.
Last, we consider changes in women's level of education, their
role in the labor force, treatment under the laws, and
activities in politics.
Chapter Five uses the results of field research to evaluate
Jordanian women's opinions. This chapter will assess the
validity of the study's hypotheses.
Chapter Six summarizes the main themes of the study, gives
strategies for empowering women to pursue political roles in
Jordan, and suggests some directions for future research.
6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis seeks to contribute to a better understanding of
why women hold few public positions of power or influence in
the Arab World. The situation is taken for granted by most
people rather than examined and explained. I will highlight
the strategies that women could pursue to enhance their
political roles in Jordan and other Arab countries. It will
thus provide a link between the reality of women's political
16
status and what can be done to empower them politically.
7. NOTES ON THE TRANSLITERATION 
The transliteration for the Arabic words in this study is
based on the Library of Congress Romanization System.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
1. For labor force see Hij -a-b, 1988; for women and Islam see
Keddie, 1979, 1992; Ahmed, 1992.
2. Verba, (1978). p. 46-47.
3. Weiner, (1971). p. 164.
_
4. Al-Sa'dawi, (1988). p. 9.
5. Kandiyoti, (1991). p. 9.
6. Badran, (1991). p. 202.
7. Sri, (1991). p. 287, 292.
8. Al-'Azzam, (1991). p. 184.
9. Research Center, (1993). p. 27-31.
10. Shtawi and Daghstani, (1993). p. 2.
11. Al-Hawamdeh, (1992). p. 3.
12. Ibid.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF WOMEN'S 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
INTRODUCTION
Through different periods, the Arab states have generated
contradictory discourses and policies regarding women. The
state has characteristically imposed its own agenda, and in so
doing, has attempted to manipulate the status of women to suit
its own political ends. To combat the state's opportunistic
approach, feminists have developed their own forms of
political participation. In the early twentieth century, the
feminist movement called for better education for women,
believing that education would lead to an improvement in their
social status. After independence most of the Arab countries
integrated women into the labor force and most Arab countries
gave women the right to vote. This phase is characterized by
women asking for more political participation. In the last
decade, many Arab women have called for greater "cultural
loyalty," and hence have resumed wearing the veil as a
statement of cultural pride.
In this chapter, I will discuss the three major factors -
- Islam, the state, and feminism - which have affected the
status of women and their political participation. At the
outset, it should be noted that "official Islam" has been
controlled by the state; the official Islamic establishment
has had to negotiate with the state. However, fundamentalist
Islam has confronted the state by a show of Islamic strength
in the area of gender relations. To avoid confrontation the
state has adopted conservative family laws. Also, the recent
phenomenon of veiling women in most Arab countries is a
manifestation of the adoption of conservative values,
exemplified by revivalist thinkers as a form of Islamic
toughness.
The veil is not a mere article of clothing. There are
two contradictory aspects of veiling: it can signify women's
protest against a situation that threatens their identity and
status; or it can signify women's acceptance of a view of
women as sexually untrustworthy and needing to be bound to the
home.
Below, my analysis of the political structure of the
state in the Arab countries will show that the impact of oil
has changed the geopolitics of these countries, and that this
has affected the position of women. I will examine the
effects of international influences such as those exerted by
the International Monetary Fund, and the effects of the United
Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985).
1. PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAM
In the West, Islam has been viewed as the major element in the
oppression of Arab women. In examining Islam and comparing it
with other religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and
Hinduism, it is clear that most other religions contain some
form of discrimination against women. Hence, it is not Islam
alone that oppresses women.
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Islam has had "progressive" tendencies within it
throughout history. For example, in pre-Islamic societies,
most tribes were patriarchal. Some of these societies
practised female infanticide (killing girls at birth because
of their gender). With the coming of Islam this practice was
prohibited: and Quranic verses condemned infanticide.' In his
teachings, the Prophet Muhammad defended the rights of women.2
Islam thus had some socially revolutionary aspects at its
beginnings. However, when its revolutionary phase was over
and Islam had become part of the established social order, it
was then used to defend the ruling class and thus the
patriarchy.
Throughout history, religion has been used as a tool of
convenience by governments and politicians to justify
particular positions. Islam has often been adapted to suit
current political tides. In Egypt under the 1952 regime,
Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir tried to introduce socialist measures and
laws. The Islamic clerics were quick to pick verses from the
sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and from the Qur'an which
would accord with a socialist system. 3 Islamic clerics backed
socialism because the government was adopting it. When Egypt
abandoned socialist policies in favor of capitalism and
relations with imperial powers, Islamic clerics began to quote
verses from the Our';r1 to show that Islam was in favor of
capitalism, profits, laissez-faire, "freedom of the
individual", and so on.'
In the early 20th century in Arab countries, as formal
schooling for both boys and girls spread, the issue of women
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in society became a widely debated topic in the upper classes.
It was conducted within the large argument of reforming
society as a whole in order to adjust the principles of
religion to the needs for modernization. The liberal Islamic
reformists of the nineteenth century, such as Rifa'ah al-
Tahtawi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Muhammad 'Abduh believed/
that there was a need for education so that Muslims could
adjust to the modern world.' The questions posed by these
reformists remain relevant today.
Rif "al'ah al-Taht;mj was one of the first nineteenth-/	 /
century reformists to write about the need for the education
of women. In 1899, the mufti of Egypt, Muhammad 'Abduh, and
his follower the writer Qasim Amin also called for this. The
liberal nationalists followed Amin's arguments. These liberal
nationalists believed that, if a society in the Arab world was
to modernize itself, such a society would have to borrow from
European societies those elements which strengthened Western
cultures: democratic governments, individual rights, and
equality of rights under the law for all citizens, including
women.' The liberal nationalists used Western political
concepts in association with quotations from the Qur'an, in an
attempt to meld these Western political concepts into an
Islamic framework.'
On the other hand, conservative nationalists believed
that the only way an Arab society could survive the attack of
Western values was by preserving its traditions. Indeed, many
conservative nationalists believed that foreign colonialists
had encouraged women's liberation. These conservatives viewed
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women's liberation as an attack on the core of Islamic
culture: the family. Saudi Arabian rulers, clerics and
politicians were the most conservative on this issue, arguing
that the West used the issue of women's liberation to attack
the fundamental structures of Arab society.' It is my
contention that the conservative view was echoed in Jordan, as
Jordanians engaged in similar debates over whether the
infiltration of the women's liberation movement was designed
to undermine the basic pillars of the society.
1.1 ISLAM IBMD STATE 
It is instructive to further examine the application of Islam
within Arab society. My aim here is to present only the
-
general characteristics of fundamentalist fikrah (thought) and
'actidah (ideology), which most Sunni Islamist movements of the
Arab world have come to share. These characteristics are
mostly drawn from the teachings of al-Banna, Qutb, Mawdudi,
Hawwa, Faraj, and al-Utaybi.' Islam is viewed as a total
system of belief, universally appropriate to all times and
places, including heaven. Unlike Christianity, the separation
of din (faith) and the dawlah (state) is inconceivable. Hukm
am/
(rule) is inherent in Islam; the Qur'an gives the law, and the
state implements the law.'
•••n 	 ••n
The bases of Islam are the Qur'an and the sunnah - the
practices of the Prophet Muhammad, and the al-khulafa' al-
-
-
rashidin (four caliphs). Islam is defined as the ultimate
truth. Muslims' primary duties in life are 'ibadt,
(obedience to God), and the spreading of Islam.' The aim of
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the good Muslim should be the establishment of Allah's
sovereignty over the whole of mankind. Thus, in order to
establish the authority of God, all people must apply his law
shari'-ah.
The main argument is over whether the shari'a'h is the
center of an Islamic order and government which controls
society, or simply a set of norms and values that regulate
human life. The latter interpretation leads to the pivotal
f=110
distinction between al-as' or al-thabat - the untouchable and
immutable core, which is defined by God - and the al-far' or
al-mutaqhvir (flexible), which has human reason at its core,
following the rules of i'tihad (interpretation of Islamic
jurisprudence)." However, Muslim scholars generally agree
.	
ithat the sharl'ah s simultaneously comprehensive and
flexible, and is suited to all times and places.
The Egyptian scholar 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq in his 1925 book
Al-Islam wa asl al-hukm (Islam and the Roots of Government),
w
maintained that Muhammad was not a politician but a prophet.
Further, he claims that Islam should have nothing to do with
politics because it is a religion and not a state.' Gudrun
Kramer points out that the separation of religion, and state
is grounded in Islamic fiqh (legal theory), which separates
the 'ib;d;.t -- a person's bond with his or her God
(essentially the five pillars of Islam the profession of
faith, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and the pilgrimage) --
from the mu'amalat, which covers all other aspects of
economic, political and family life." While the 	  is
es.
timeless, the mu'amalat can be adapted to the changing
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conditions of duration and place. Hence, spirituality brings
nas (people) to the shari'ah (Islamic Laws).' Thus, argue
Kramer, there are two separate spheres of concern: one hinges
on the spiritual and the other on material concerns.
Spiritual concerns are based on the Qur'an and the Prophet
Muhammad's practice and sayings, and material concerns are
governed by the al-'ulaM' and al-fucTah-a' (Muslim theologians
-
and jurists) who interpret the shari'ah, from which the
personal status laws originated.
An opposite hypothesis to 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq is proposed
by the conservative 'ulama' and the Muslim Brothers. They
state that for the shari'-ah to be exercised requires social
organization and a state. Further, government and politics
_
are part of the mu'amalat which is to work for the collective
good of the people. Under Islamic convention proposed by the
'ulama. ' and Muslim Brotherhood, although the state is
considered to be central to Islamic law, its form and
organization are declared to be secondary to Islam. 16 This
appears to suggest that the acceptance of non-Islamic values
is possible, as long as it does not lead to ignoring or
violating Islamic values.
1 . 2 THE FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT 
The 1970s and 1980s are considered to be the years of the
"Islamic revival"." This phenomenon included a return to the
basic foundations of the Islamic faith as seen by
fundamentalists. However, the fundamentalist movement did not
stress a return to the "pure" lifestyle of the Prophet
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Muhammad. In fact, the fundamentalist movements in various
Arab countries attempted to integrate new practices such as
technology and industrialization in order to strengthen their
relevance to modern life. Thus, the ideological orientation
of contemporary Islamist movements has been influenced by
modern sociopolitical programs, such as socialism and
capitalism.
It is important to mention that Islam is not a single,
stagnant entity; there are a number of factors influencing it
as indicated by 'Ali El-Kenz:
1) The religious element is intervening more and
more in the morphisms of collective identity that
determine the social actors. Compared with the 1960s
there is an unmistakable "reactivation" of the
religious dimension that participates increasingly
in the social movement. 2) The weight of the
religious element is increasing everywhere, but much
more rapidly as one moves away from the production
sphere. It reaches its maximum in two spaces: that
of the role of women in society and that of
legitimacy of political power. 3) From these two
observations one may conclude that religious
discourse, present and expanding everywhere though
in differing manners, is tending toward hegemony.
It transverses all the social categories (the
transversal hypothesis) and elicits responses from
all domains of collective activity: economic,
social, cultural, etc. 4) But a still more detailed
observation of the field shows that the religious
element differs according to the society's large
groups and embraces, like any ideology, the broad
lines of the society's "horizontal" structure.'
There are three divisions within Islam recognized by El-Kenz.
The first is popular Islam, which is weakly linked to textual
interpretation of the accumulated scriptures, but is open to
social change. He calles this "Islam as a language of
practical life", the common Islam into which the bulk of the
people are integrated.' The second division is official
Islam, in which the 'ulama (theologians) perform all
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interpretations of Qur'anic Law or hadith. The 'ulam; are
drawn primarily from the middle class, who include many
teachers and public servants. The third Islam is political
Islam, and political groups usually require formal
membership. 20 The three groups co-exist under Islam. The bulk
of analyses of the "rise" of Islam in current Arab societies
assign only slight relevance to the two first divisions
mentioned above, instead focusing their concern on political
Islam. According to El-Kenz the failure or breakdown of
national development led to the awakening of political Islam.
Soon, it developed into mass parties. El-Kenz offers some
useful explanations that in concentrating primarily on
political Islam we neglect religion's other roles: as social
practice, part of daily life. Hence, we muddle the political
dynamism of beliefs based on religious foundations. Also
-
Muhammed 'Aid al-Jabri says that the "rise of Islam as the
solution" is the result of development, urbanization and mass
education. He analyses the theree generations involved: 1)
The elites who participated in independence movements which
were influenced by the West, and were interested in improving
education and mobilizing citizens. 2) The revolution rulers
with their central planning and industrialization of the
country. 3) The fundamentalists who say that the failure of
the revolution to achieve its promises led to the rise of
Islam as the solution.'
The identity of Arab societies is often seen as the most
pressing problem facing the Arab countries. According to
Fatimah Mernissi, Muslim fundamentalism is a declaration of
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identity in the face of rapid social change threatening
existing government relations, and a reaction to the
peripheral problems formed by colonialism, new technology,
consumerism and economic dependency. 22 Fundamentalists are
trying to limit women's rights in an attempt to preserve their
familiar culture in the midst of great turbulence.
Fundamentalists call for the return to the veil, as there are
many women who do not wear the veil. Indeed, fundamentalists
and non-fundamentalists hold sharply conflicting views, and
this puts the relation between Islam and women's rights back
in the forefront.
1.3 THE USES OF VEILING 
The veil is the obvious sign of the Islamic revival. The word
"veil" in English is loosely used to refer to a wide variety
of head and face coverings. In Saudi Arabia, for example,
women use a gauze-like type of black material that covers the
face and body called 'ab7israh. Younger women in the rest of
the Gulf cover their hair and body but leave their faces free,
and some girls are gradually letting the 'ab;.srah slip to their
shoulders as a first step towards removing it. Women of the
older generation in the Gulf use a leather mask to hide the
face - a type of veil that is dying out. Some Arab women in
North Africa use the traditional type of veil there, a white
light weight sheet covering nearly all the face and body. In
the rest of the Arab countries, older women feel more
comfortable with a scarf covering their hair; and there are
many women who never Wear a veil or imagine wearing it.
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The fundamentalists have introduced the "Islamic
headdress", the hi . ab, which covers the women's hair with a
0
scarf that is ordinarily white, leaving the face exposed. The
whole body is usually covered with a loose dress in dark
colors, with buttons from top to bottom. Women typically wear
Western clothes beneath this dress, which they take off, along
with the scarf, when they are in the company of women only.
In order to make sense of the veil as a social phenomenon
one needs to inspect other types of women's dress that are
distinguishable from the veil. Those women who have gradually
modified their dress, from non-veiled to veiled, are in
general the urban lower and middle classes. Professionally,
they work as civil servants, school teachers, secretaries in
private enterprise, bank employees, nurses or university
students. They are usually young, in their twenties and early
thirties.
Previously, the veils that women wore were black and
covered the face and body. This is the type of veil that Huda
Sha'rawi removed in 1923. This garment could only be afforded
by the upper classes and it was a sign of seclusion and
restriction. In contrast, the Islamic headdress of today is
used by university students and by women who work. It makes a
statement that tells the public, particularly the male public,
that a woman has left the house to study and work.
Arlene Macleod states that many women who wear veils are
educated, working, and modern. They have abandoned Western
dress and turned to the long dresses and head-scarfs of the
muha'abah (covered woman). She argues that women are
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determined to resolve gender inequality. Women are engaged in
a struggle to resist the limitations of power, an action she
has called "accommodating protest".' She points out that the
new veiling in Cairo is not a section of traditional culture
or a response to customary patterns, but a form of "hegemonic
politics in a modernizing environment".0
Macleod agrees with itimL. Mernissi that infitah (Anwar
al-Sadat's economic opeining) encouraged consumerism.
Families of the lower-middle class pushed women into the
workplace to gain extra income. But both women and men
believe that women belong in the home, where their natural
order of business is caring for the husband and children and
managing the household. One woman in an interview by Macleod
in Cairo, said that wearing hi . ab gave her freedom at work and
that the hi . a.b makes a statement that, "I am a Muslim woman,
and that I am here working because my family needs my help,
not for myself....I am here because I love my family and we
need some things for our home". Another women stated that
"When I wear this dress, men will respect me", and a third
said "The hijab is a protection from annoying people on the
street....I don't have to worry that men in the cafe or on the
street are talking about me every day as I pass".'
Nevertheless, veiling presents a double standard; it both
signifies women's protest against a situation that threatens
valued identity and status, and it signals women's acceptance
of a view of them as sexually untrustworthy and naturally
bound to the home. Thus, the veil conveys a woman's desire to
accommodate as well as resist. 26
 Use of the new veils thus
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inevitably links protest with accommodation.27
In recent decades, the wearing of Islamic dress has shown
a broad increase. In fact, it appears that Western dress is
associated with secularism and feminism, acceptable only to
the urban middle class. On the other hand, Islam and veils
are associated with the grass-roots level. The new dress code
is neither a return to the old customs nor a demand for
complete freedom but an expression of the "new" Islamic woman.
In this way the veil represents a cultural identity and
the demands of women to acquire equality through employment;
but at the same time it signifies acceptance of the legitimate
exercise of power by males.
2. PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE 
To improve our understanding of the relationship between the
state and women's political participation, and the
implications of development for both the state and women, we
must first define the state. The state can be defined "as
government, as the ruling class, as a bureaucratic, coercive,
and legal order, or as a normative order".' There are three
dominant theoretical approaches to the state in the social
sciences: Liberal-pluralist, Marxist, and Statist. I will
discuss these approaches briefly to define the nature of the
state in the Middle East.
The pluralist approach views government as the mediator
between competing social and economic interests. The state,
presumably, is ignorant to gender. Theoretically, under the
liberal-plural view, women should have equal opportunity in
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the politics of allocation. The challenge for women is to get
access to control over decision making."
Marxist theory, on the other hand, argues that the state
is the apparatus of the dominant capitalist class. There is
some disagreement between classic and modern schools of
Marxist thought as to their interpretation of the role of the
state. In Engel's classic interpretation, the state adopts
the role of mediator in class conflict. The state is
capitalist, trying to manage with natural contradictions (even
if it means resisting the capitalist class) in order to
maintain the viability of the capitalist state. Classical
Marxists were interested in the way in which the division of
labor within the family was linked to the growth of private
property and ultimately to the subordination of the people.'
In the structural Marxist view, on the other hand, the state
does not attempt to regulate relations between classes. Both
groups were assuming that with the abolition of capitalism
there would be equality for women and men.
The Statist approach is based on Weberian theories. Max
Weber, in his analysis of the state, argues that the state
serves to define and legitimate norms.
In contrast to the Liberal-pluralist and Marxist
approaches to the state, the Statist approach places
greater emphasis on institutional constraints, both
formal and informal, on individual behavior...Actors
in the political system, whether individuals or
groups, are bound within these structures, which
limit, even determine, their conceptions of their
own interest and their political resources.'
Weber's analysis of the structural functions of state
apparatus defines the institutions of society as an organic
unit which integrates both individuals and groups into the
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state structure. In addition, Weber says that the state
demonstrates
an administrative and legal order subject to change
by legislation, to which the organized activities of
the administrative staff, which are also controlled
by regulations, are oriented. This system of order
claims binding authority, over the members of the
state, the citizens....n
The state becomes a compulsory institution in the formalised
order of society, and via the exercise of the legal framework
the state legitimizes its role.
For this study, I have chosen a Statist approach because
it takes into account how individuals and communities resist
or cope with the expansion of state power. There is a strong
emphasis on the nature of state-society linkages. This
enables us to analyze the role of women without ranking them
as simply an uninfluential group or pushing gender into the
background.
The state often issues conflicting policies regarding the
role of women within society in order to respond to both
internal and external threats and opportunities. During
periods of conflict or instability a state may call upon women
to seek an active role within society and will legislate in
order to see this successfully accomplished. These provisions
may be repealed during periods of economic growth or
stability.
The important question for women is how much the state
repays their political participation. Clearly, the answer
depends on the definition of political participation and on
the characteristics of states as they develop at different
political moments.
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2.1 THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB STATE 
In order to understand the position of women, it is necessary
to examine the development of the Arab state. The political
development of the Arab countries, including Jordan, has been
affected by many important events, such as the decolonization
of the region, the creation of the State of Israel, the focus
around and attempts toward unification, and the transformation
of the region into a place of strategic confrontation between
the two superpowers.
Between the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and World War
II, much of the Arab World was occupied by European powers.
Many countries tried to have a portion of influence. In the
Arab East, France and Britain shared mandates -- France in
Syria and Lebanon, Britain in Iraq and Jordan. Also, Britain
had effective control of Egypt, Sudan and the small
principalities of the Arabian Peninsula. In the Maghrib,
Algeria became a department of France, while Tunisia and
Morocco were under French protection.
World War II ended with the creation of new nation-
states. 33 The Arab world entered contemporary history already
shattered: weaker in economic and social structures and
political organizations than the developed ex-colonial powers.
The new states were divided. Many of those countries that had
rebelled forcefully against the former colonial powers adopted
a socialist state ideology. The more conservative were those
states that negotiated their independence from the countries
that occupied them. The countries that gained independence by
confrontation were: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria. Others,
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who negotiated freedom, included Jordan, and Morocco. The
latter nations, plus Saudi Arabia, were content with a neo-
colonial type of independence capable of ensuring the security
of the new monarchies and containing mass movements.
After independence, Arab countries were influenced by a
number of major trends: nationalism, developmentalism,
socialism, democracy, and Islamism. Islamism has been
discussed earlier in this chapter. It is instructive to
examine the other factors.
Many Arab countries used nationalism as an important
unifying force. Albert Hourani states that pan-Arab
nationalism was the foremost ideology of the Arab World for
half the twentieth century, from the end of world War I to the
late 1960s.' Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Iraq all used
nationalism. Many governments nationalized foreign economic
interests, redistributed large amounts of land, and made a
series of five-years economic development plans. These
processes resulted in the strengthening of the public sector,
which also promoted social laws benefiting the masses.
Socialism was the preferred form of government in many
Arab countries. Although some ideas were taken from the
Soviet Union, the governments concerned tried to combine these
ideas with Islamic concepts. The socialist regimes generally
states allowed greater access to education and employment, and
reformed the personal status laws affecting the role of women.
There has recently been a growing demand for democratic
reform. Several Arab states -- including Algeria, Tunisia,
Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen -- have held multiparty
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elections and have permitted opposition in the political
sphere. The reforms that have occurred, however, scarcely
warrant the label "democratic," in the sense of allowing for
popular or majority rule.
People tend to equate "democratization" with
"liberalization," but the terms refer to two distinct
concepts. Democracy denotes a governing mode in which
decision-making power is shared by "the people" instead of
being concentrated in the hands of a small circle of
leaders.' "Liberal," in the classical sense, refers to
limitations on the power of a state to intervene in the
individual and collective lives of people.'
After the second Gulf War in 1991, the Arab regimes had
to cope with economic and social crises. Political reform is
now on the agenda in key Arab states because important sectors
of the population forcefully put it there. These societies
have become more complicated, and that complexity has not yet
found institutionalized political expression.'
2.3 OIL'S IMPACT ON THE ARAB STATE 
The emergence of the new oil states in the 1970s, and their
promotion to the forefront of world trade and finance has led
to the development of the concept of rentier economies within
the Middle East. Oil has drastically changed the weaker state
structures as it has brought generous financial rewards.
During the 1970s, the effects of oil on the role of the state
and on economic behavior in general were so important to the
Arab world that they need to be explained. The effects were
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felt throughout the Arab world. The oil boom created
employment for migrant labor which resulted in wealth
generated from outside the native economy and also a marked
redefinition of the role of women within these societies. The
idea of a "rentier economy" is used to explain the economic
factors in the oil economies in the Arab region.
Hazem Beblawi says that there is no such thing as a pure
rentier economy, rather that there are elements of rent in any
economy. His definition of a rentier economy is "one where
rent situations predominate"." Beblawi argues that an
external rent can sustain the economy without a strong
productive domestic sector. The majority are only involved in
the arrangement of it. A rentier economy is thus an economy
where the creation of wealth is centered around a small
fraction of society. The rest of society is only engaged in
the distribution and utilization of this wealth."
The government is the principal recipient of external
rent and it creates different layers of new beneficiaries. As
Beblawi argues, "The whole economy is arranged as a hierarchy
of layers of rentiers with the state or the government at the
top of the pyramid, acting as the ultimate support of all
other rentiers in the economy". Beblawi adds that "the
rentier nature of the new state is magnified by the tribal
origins of these states. The long tribal tradition of buying
loyalty and allegiance is now confirmed by an estate
providence, distributing favours and benefits to its
population"."
Thus, in a rentier state there is no requirement for
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taxation, as the state allocates its income received from the
rest of the world. However, ambitious overspending by
governments have forced them to start introducing taxation.
Previously, citizens saw the state as benevolent, and saw
little need for political participation. However, there are
growing calls for democracy in the Arab world as elsewhere.
As a result, people are refusing taxation without
representation to enable them to make demands on government.
Jordan and other non-oil states have gained location rent
from neighboring oil producing and exporting countries.
Workers' remittances, moreover, are becoming one of the major
foreign exchange sources in some non-oil states such as Egypt,
Yemen, and Jordan. The economies in these countries have been
called "semi-rentier". In Jordan, for example, a successful
trade has been developed around workers' movement to the Gulf
countries. Also, money dealers have made huge businesses in
processing workers' remittances.
The semi-rentier nature of non-oil states has strong
effects on the role of the state and on citizens' behavior.
Governments provide welfare state subsidies for education and
basic needs. The routing of aid from oil-rich countries such
as Saudi Arabia to Jordan, Egypt and Yemen has influenced
policy in these aid-dependent countries. Saudi Arabia and the
other Gulf nations have strengthened their cultural and
political influence by distributing money to these states.
Hence, there has been much accommodation of Islam in aid-
dependent countries. The influence of the oil-rich Arab
states has had the effect of maintaining the status quo.
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Women with education have benefitted from the migration
of the male labor force to the oilfields of the Gulf. Being
left behind to continue the family concerns has meant women
taking the role of decision makers and breadwinners. Also it
has resulted in a shift from traditional modes of female
employment - agriculture and the service industries. However,
it has also been the experience in Jordan that the importation
of labor from Egypt and Sri Lanka has left uneducated women
unemployed.
2.4 THE EXTERNAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES UPON ARAB 
COUNTRIES 
In the international context, two important factors have
influenced women's status. First the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and various development projects
sponsored by Western donor agencies have imposed policies that
shifted parts of the economy to the private sector, and
allowed foreign investment.' This policy greatly increased
the number of women in the labor force, especially in the low-
paid casual and non-unionized sectors of the economy. 42
Second, the International Women's Year in 1975 and the United
Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985) raised awareness at the
national and international levels of the role of women in
combating poverty, illiteracy and high birth rates, and to
eliminate all forms of legal discrimination based on sex.'
Despite that the UN described the overall achievement as
"modest". "
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3 . FEMINISM
The colonial domination of the Arab countries and the post-
colonial reliance on the West have created an area of cultural
resistance around women and the family. Layla Ahmad addresses
the dilemma of feminists in the Arab world as follows:
It is only when one considers that one's sexual
identity alone (and some would not accept this) is
more inextricably oneself than one's cultural
identity, that one can perhaps appreciate how
excruciating is the plight of the Middle Eastern
feminist caught between these two opposing
loyalties, forced almost to choose between betrayal
and betrayal.'
The early feminists were affiliated with nationalist groups
for liberation movements and worked for better lives for women
within an Islamic framework. Hence, women did not blame
seclusion and the practice of polygamy for the subordination
they faced. Male reformers, on the other hand, strove to
advance modernity. The family form that most suited this goal
of modernity was the nuclear family. And the nuclear family
was based on stable monogamous unions, the free choice of
spouses, and companionate and egalitarian relationships among
family members."
The involvement of Arab women in politics beyond the
local level has usually involved participation in the
struggles for independence from foreign domination, as in
Egypt, Algeria, and Palestine. Women can break traditional
boundaries and engage in militancy; but once the war ends
women are reassigned to domesticity. The nature of the
women's participation (as auxiliaries or replacements for
men), implicitly restricted the growth of a feminist
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consciousness, reinforcing the non-autonomous and attachment-
like nature of women's organizations. During the struggle
against colonial domination, the nationalists used tradition
as the embodiment of cultural authenticity. They manipulated
traditional ideology, a prominent mobilizing force against
colonial domination.
After independence most of the Arab countries did not
have a clear ideological position on the role of women in the
new states. The new Arab states were seeking to industrialize
in order to modernize, and there was a need for female labor.
Most of the Arab states planned to integrate women into
economic development.
The most important issue for feminists is reform of the
personal status laws, Tunisia and Yemen (until 1994) have had
the most progressive personal status laws in the Arab world.
Algeria and Egypt have also modified their personal status
laws. Although these changes were carried out by the state,
they were made as a result of pressure from feminists.
However, the feminists held little real influence over the
state, which either abolished independent women's
organizations or made them manageable auxiliaries of the
ruling state-party.
CONCIAISICR4
The issues of cultural identity and the related questions of
who can represent women are still points of controversy. The
rise of Muslim fundamentalism in the region, compounded by the
economic, political, and moral setbacks imposed upon the Arab
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masses after the second Gulf War, highlighted the importance
of women's participation. Also, in the new pluralist
democracies, the parties are competing for women's support.
In addition, the growing feminist movement started calling for
more rights for women.
To elaborate on this theoretical framework, Chapter Three
will address in detail women's participation in liberation
movements in Egypt, Algeria, and Palestine. I will explore
their ability to organize and act in search of broader goals,
which may not be directly related to their gender interests
but do affect their role as citizens. As we will see, women
have been able to embrace political policies and movements to
further their own common gender interests. More importantly,
women are not passive victims of patriarchal domination. They
are fully-fledged social actors. Women's organizations span
the whole political range, from liberal nationalism and the
communist left to radical Islamist movements within a more
pluralistic framework.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE HISTORY OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
THE ARAB WORLD 
INTRODUCTION
Conventional studies of political participation (voting,
activities in an electoral campaign etc.) have centered upon
participation within formal, government-oriented institutions
or procedures. That approach ignores a large amount of
political behavior which influences decision-making in
society. A misleading view of women's participation has thus
been presented. For example, there is evidence from the
literature that women have become involved with men in
politics under the flag of nationalism. Women's struggles for
independence in relation to national liberation, however, have
not been highlighted in the literature although women have
even participated in armed struggles to achieve national
liberation.
This chapter will discuss the political participation of
Arab women in relation to their political mobilization and
nationalist struggle for independence. To do this, I will
describe the role of the feminist movement, which first
emerged in the writings of women of privilege and education
who lived in urban areas. This "feminist movement" (a broad
collection of organizations and individuals working to improve
women's rights) simultaneously grew and was repressed by
nationalist efforts. The cases of Egypt, Algeria, and
Palestine are excellent examples to illustrate this. The
situations in these Arab nations not only reflect but have
affected the development of women's political participation in
Jordan, which shares so much culturally and historically with
its Arab neighbors, and also is sensitive to instability in
its neighbors. Although Jordanian women have not been as
involved in liberation movements as their counterparts in the
states I will discuss, they participated in demonstrations
supporting the liberation of Algeria, Palestine, and Egypt.
Since the emergence of the Arab states, the role of women
in the Arab World has been at the center of a conflict which
has involved feminists, Islamists, the state, and
international pressures, and has influenced priorities and
policies. I will address Personal Status Laws -- family
laws -- particularly in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Yemen.
Egypt and Algeria will be examined first, as they have much
more conservative family laws than Tunisia and Yemen, which
are more progressive. Then, I will discuss the struggle of
women in Bahrain and Kuwait to gain such rights as voting, and
the effect of the Second Gulf war on women in Saudi Arabia.
My hope is to give a broader picture of women's political
involvement across the region. Throughout, I will describe
the situations in these nations in terms of how opportunities
are given and taken, implying that the role of women in the
end is a matter of political expediency.
Feminists have insisted upon radical changes in gender
relations. They have persevered despite state repression of
feminist ideology in the Arab World. Since independence,
women have had a difficult time achieving rights, not because
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the climate is more difficult, but because they are making
more specific demands than before independence.
I. THE EARLY ROOTS OF FEMINISM AND THE NATIONAL
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD
1. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN EGYPT 
1.1 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN EGYPT UP TO 
1920 
The feminist movement grew early in Egypt because Muhammad
7
'Ali, who ruled from 1811-1841, had a desire to modernize the
7
country to European standards. Muhammad 'Ali sent a large
number of students to study in France in order to construct a
generation of elites for the new state he was determined to
build.'
Among the first generation to benefit from Muhammad
-
'All's modernization policies were Rifa'ah al-Taht gwi (1801-/
- -
1873). Al-Tahtawi wrote in his book Al-Murshid li'l-Banat ;
wa'l Awlad (A Guide for Girls and Boys) "Girls must learn
reading, writing, mathematics, and grammar, to raise their
awareness.... Work prevents women from leading sinful
lives". 2 Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) and al-Tahtawi studied
in the West and later returned to Egypt, calling for changing
society within the Islamic context.2
To understand how the feminist movement grew, we must
discuss how the British presence affected attitudes among
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Egyptians. Some social groups in Egyptian society benefitted
from British administration policies. For example, irrigation
projects which the British began extended the amount of
cultivable land, helping landlords and peasants as well as the
colonialists and the European manufacturers. 4 However, many
of the British colonial attitudes were discriminatory,
creating hostility toward the British influence. The British
held exclusive political control; British officials held all
the key administrative positions and filled the top ranks of
the civil service. 5 The split between the British and the
Egyptians grew more severe over time and this tension laid the
basis for the 1919 revolution.
It is worth examining the contributions of leading
feminists in more detail. In the early twentieth century,
Qasim Amin was inspired by Muhammad 'Abduh's leadership of
reform. Also educated in the West, Qasim Amin in 1899 wrote
in Tahrir al-Mar'ah (Women's Emancipation) "Women must remove
their veils, and must become educated, otherwise they will
become a commodity", and in 1901 he wrote Al-Mr'ah al-
•nn•
Jadidah (The New Woman). Amin was the first to advocate
women's rights to education, but his reasoning was that they
could be better mothers and daughters.'
The first Egyptian magazine for women was published in
1898 and was edited by a woman. The editor, Hind Nufal, a
Syrian Christian woman, was from a family of journalists. The
magazine was named Al-Fatat (The Young Woman). In the first
editorial, the journal declared its dedication to advancing
48
the women of Egypt along the path that European women were
taking.
Malak Hufni Nasif (1886-1918) was the first Egyptian
woman to be awarded a teacher's certificate. She worked as a
teacher but also wrote articles for newspapers and magazines
under the pen name of Bahithat al-Badiya. In 1911, she
presented a petition to the Egyptian Legislative Assembly
asking that women be given more and better education.' She
did not demand the full and equal participation of women in
-
public life. Nasif's position in her writing was against
unveiling and against the Westernization of Arab women.
Instead, she advocated education for women because it would
help them perform better in the traditional roles of mother
and wife.
The beginning of women's political participation in the
Arab world is usually identified with the thousands of veiled
upper-class women who, led by Huda Sha'rawi, marched in 1919
as part of the first Egyptian demand for independence from
Britain.' Women who participated did not call for women's
rights, but instead supported the nationalist position that
Sa'd Zaghlul be allowed to present the views of Egyptians.
Sa'd Zaghlul had been forbidden from leaving the country.
-Nuriyah al-Sadani, however, does not agree. She argues that
women became activists not in March 1919, but exactly two
years earlier. In 1917, Palestinian women demonstrated
against the Balfour Declaration, giving Jewish people the
right to have a state in Palestine.'
49
1.2 THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN EGYPT AFTER 1920 
The feminist struggle continued after the 1919 revolution, and
issues of women's rights came more into the public sphere. On
March 16, 1923, Huda Sha'rawi (1879-1947), established the Al-
- -
Itthad Al-Nis'ai Al-Masri (Egyptian Women's Union [EFU]). The
-
EFU began the Arabic-language journal, Al-Masriah (The
Egyptian Women). Sha'r-awi fought for women's suffrage after
the constitution that was endorsed in April 1923 limited
suffrage to males. Lay3i.
 Ahmad writes that in May 1923, al-
Sha'rawi, her friend Sizya Nabarawi, and Nabawlyya Musa
publicly removed their veils after returning from a conference
- -
in Rome. Nabawlyya has a famous story about a confrontation
in 1908 with Douglas Dunlop, the British adviser to the
Ministry of Education. He refused to allow her to take the
Secondary School Examination because she was a woman. This
was reported in the newspapers Ahmad says that Nabawiyya Musa
took the examination later and passed.'
-
Both Nasif and Sha'rawi believed that society should
enable women to pursue education to the limit of their
abilities. Na- sif's background was more acceptable to most
-Arabs. Sha'rawl was from an aristocratic family and was
raised to be bicultural - being educated in French. Despite
their differences in background, the mutual cooperation
between them improved women's lives.
Muniyrah Thabit wrote in the magazine Al-Sufur 
(Unveiling) and Al-Ahram under the pen name Al-M
-ar'ah al-
M;sriah (Egyptian Woman) in October 1922 and May 1923, asking
—7--
indirectly for political rights for women. However, in her
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magazine Al-Aml in 1925, she explicitly asked for women's
rights to vote and to be elected to public office.'
Although she was from Nazareth, Mayy Ziyi-dah (1886-1941)
—lived in Egypt. Mayy Ziyadah was from a Christian Arab
family. She never married, which was rare for men as well as
for women at that time. ZiyiLlah was a writer, an
intellectual, and a feminist. She was one of the first women
to host a weekly salon which attracted many distinguished
intellectuals and politicians, and she used these to raise
questions regarding feminism.
Dux.; Shafiq (1914-76) graduated from the Sorbonne in 1940
- -
with help from al-Sha'rawi, and won a scholarship to study in
France. Shafiq, after returning to Egypt, worked in different
positions, first as a teacher and later in the Ministry of
Education. After leaving the government, she worked in
journalism, co-founding in 1948 a journal called Bint al-Nil 
(daughter of the Nile). The periodical appeared regularly
from 1945 to 1957. The objectives of Bint al-Nil were
political equality between men and women and the abolition of
illiteracy.' The Bint al-Nil organization, according to
40.
Ahmad, took its first revolutionary action in 1951 when Shafiq
led 1,000 women in a demonstration to the Egyptian parliament.
They dispersed when the presidents of both chambers promised
to support their demands for representation in parliament.'
Shafiq and her followers continued to work for women's
suffrage even when all parties were abolished after the 1952
revolution. In 1954 she went on a ten-day hunger strike which
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ended when the new Egyptian government promised her that the
new constitution would give women the right to vote."
The constitution, which was finally ratified in 1956, did
grant women the vote, but only if individual women requested
••n
suffrage. Shafiq protested against the limitation of that
law, and held a hunger strike at the Indian Embassy to win the
right for all women to vote. During that hunger strike, she
also announced to the foreign press that she was against
Israeli occupation of Egyptian land, and against the
dictatorship as well. Her associates at Bin al-Nil disagreed
with her tactics, forced her to resign and, along with all
other women's associations in Egypt, publicly denounced her as
a traitor.'
Shafiq and Ziyadah both had tragic endings, Ziyadah had a
mental breakdown and died in 1941; her body was discovered in
the flat she occupied by herself three days after her death.
After suffering many mental breakdowns, Shafiq killed herself
in 1976.
-
Zaynab al-Ghazali, a contemporary of Shafiq (b. 1918),
•n••
was in many ways the exact opposite of Shafiq. Whereas Shafiq
propounded women's rights and human rights in the language of
-
secularism and democracy, al-Ghazali -- the daughter of a
wealthy cotton merchant with an Al-Azhar education -- placed
the Islamic heritage at the cornerstone of her teaching.
Furthermore, she committed herself to native culture and
pursuing feminism in indigenous terms. Although al-Ghazali
started her political life working for Huda Sha'rawi, she had
her own ideas about women's issues. At the age of eighteen in
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1936, she started her own organization, Al-Akhawat al-Muslimat 
(the Muslim Sisters). The association helped women study
-
Islam and carry out welfare activities. Hasan al-Banna, the
leader of the Brethren, tried to convince al-Ghazali to
affiliate the association to his Muslim Brethren movement, but
she refused because she wanted her movement to be independent.
An interview with al-Ghazali by Layla Ahmad in 1985, al-
Ghazali said it was "a grave error to speak of the liberation
of women" in an Islamic society.' She believed that Islam
provided women with "everything -- freedom, economic rights,
political rights, social rights, public and private rights,
"but that these opportunities were unfortunately not manifest
in Islamic societies. The goal of the Muslim Sisters was
to acquaint the Muslim woman with her religion so she
would be convinced by means of study that the women's
liberation movement is a deviant innovation that occurred
because of the backwardness of Muslims... We consider
Muslims to be backward; they must remove this
backwardness from their shoulders and rise up as their
religion commands.'
- -
The arguments of al-Ghazali are still echoing in the 1990s.
She was imprisoned and tortured for six years (1965-72) at the
hands of the Nasir regime for her alleged support of the
Brethren cause.
-
Like al-Ghazali, Fatimah Rashid was a friend of al-
Sha'rawi but left her mentor and started the first Egyptian
women's party in 1944. The party's constitution demanded that
Egyptian women should have the right to vote and be elected as
members of parliament.
From this illustration of early contributions to the
feminist movement, the influence of the West and the tensions
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that resulted are obvious. On the one hand, Western ideas
helped create the feminist movement. On the other hand, these
ideas threatened the Islamic tradition which many women
embraced. Hence, we see the beginnings of the conflict within
the women's movement that is still alive in today's Arab
world. This will be discussed later. Despite the conflicts,
these women provided much of the inspiration for future
generations through the Arab world. Without their struggle,
the present -- and indeed the future -- would be different.
2. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN ALGERIA
2.1 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN ALGERIA
=IRE INDEPENDENCE 
The feminist movement in Algeria was started by French
Algerian women reformers who edited journals like La Voix des 
Humbles and La Voix during the 1920s and 1930s. In these
journals, they (Jeanne Faure-Sardet, for example) addressed
the most controversial questions of the times -- the
instruction of Muslim girls, arguments for and against the
veil, marriage, divorce, and polygamy. The journals also
carried reviews of the writings of Qasim Amin of Egypt and
Tahir al-Haddad of Tunisia, who both defended the emancipation
of women as compatible with Islamic traditions.'
Peter Knauss writes that the Algerian feminists were
students, teachers, or free-lance writers. He argues that
unlike their upper middle class counterparts in Egypt, their
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living conditions did not give them as much material resources
and spare time to contribute to the feminist movement, and
that they faced social rejection and were called traitors to
the Muslim people. He says they were considered to be unfit
to marry Muslim men and were disqualified from any
inheritance." An alternative explanation is that the
struggle against French domination took precedence over the
struggle for women's rights. French colonial domination
against the people of Algeria victimized both men and women.
It insisted on instilling French language and culture. The
only way to attack French cultural imperialism was by using
the strengths of Muslim national patriarchal identity. That
led to the proposition that the Algerian nation and Islam must
prevail over other competing claims to loyalty. Further, it
was emphasized that the Arabic language would preserve the
ideology of national identity. This nationalist effort
prevented the feminist movement from becoming stronger. One
individual contribution was that of Rosalia Bentami, whose
L'infer de la Casbah (The Casbah Hell) was a popular novel
published in Algeria in 1936. In her book, Bentami described
the conditions of women in the Algerian Casbah.
In 1939 thousands of veiled women marched for the first
time in Algeria, asking for "Land, Bread, and Freedom."n
They believed that their freedom would come through the
liberation of their country. On November 1, 1954, the National
Liberation Front (FLN), called for the formation of an Army of
National Liberation (ALN). Women began joining the ALN in
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January 1955, when some women volunteered as nurses. They
described their role as:
1) moral support for the combatants and resistance; 2)
provision of information, liaison, food and clothing, and
safe shelter; 3) aid to families and children of the
maquisards - (resistance fighters) and of those
imprisoned and interned.'
The decision of the FLN to involve women as an essential part
of the revolution reflected an attempt not to alienate half of
society. During the war of independence, which took the form
of a lihad (Holy war), Islam had unified Algeria's Berbers and
Arabs. The male fighters were called mulahidin, the female
ones mulahidat, and in the countryside the colonists were
called kafir (unbeliever). This meant the politics was based
around Islam which integrated and internalized the legacy
shared by the vast majority of Algerians. Independence was
won on July 5, 1962.
In 1978-79 Djamila Amrane, an Algerian social scientist,
conducted an empirical study of 10,949 women who had
participated in the war of independence, based on the files of
the Algiers Ministry of Combat. 23
 The Amrane study shows that
the role of Algerian women in the liberation movement against
the French, in contrast to that of men, was a task that was
not rewarded with military glory or heroism. Only 205 of the
3,271 for whom there is reliable data served in "military"
capacities with the ALN. Over 95 percent of the women
performed nursing, cooking, and laundering functions.
However, there were at least two women who served as
"political commissars" and one as an "armed fighter". Of the
10,949 women involved in the war effort, 1,343 were imprisoned
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and 949 were killed; one out of every five female
revolutionaries suffered imprisonment or death. Fifty one
percent of the women were under twenty years of age, and 84
percent of the female military personnel were under thirty.
The most well-known female militants, at least to the West,
were Djamila Bouhriyred, Djamila Boupacha, and Zohra Drif
Bitat - all of whom were tortured.
Amrane's study was based on the official records, and
excluded those women who assumed responsibilities for village
affairs which had been abandoned by men. Many women were
either taken by the French as forced laborers or arrested and
tortured for collaboration with the nationalists. In the end,
the French army even took to indiscriminately shooting women
as well as men on the streets of Algeria.'
Although women were relegated to subordinate roles, they
made active contributions to the Algerian national
independence movement. This participation opened the door for
women to assume a more active role in politics after the
nation's eventual independence. Unfortunately, much of the
current literature on Algerian women does not reflect their
heroic efforts. Again, their example inspired the cause of
women in other Arab countries.
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3. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN PALESTINE 
3.1 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF 16014EN IN PALESTINE UP 
TO 1960 
Palestinian women, like Algerian women, were in demand for
armed struggle, and also began to participate in mass
demonstrations. In 1920 -- when the first major Palestinian
demonstration against the British Mandate in Palestine
occurred -- about 40,000 men and women marched in the streets
of Jerusalem and Yafa.'
The first Federation of Palestinian Women was formed in
1929 by Ruqyah Murad and Maryam al-Khalq. 26
 It was held in
Jerusalem and was attended by 300 women. Resolutions were
passed demanding the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration and
the prohibition of Jewish immigration into Palestine. On May
4, 1936, the Federation called for a general strike. Six
hundred students responded and on May 6, 1936, women
demonstrated in Jerusalem against immigration.
The agenda of the early feminist movement was centred on
political struggles. The Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU)
conference, which met in Cairo in 1938 and hosted
representatives from many of the Arab countries, dealt not
with feminist causes but with the immediate nationalist
concerns of the Palestinian people. The political resolutions
called for an end to the British Mandate in Palestine, an end
to Jewish immigration, an end to the transfer of Arab lands to
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Jews in Palestine, and a rejection of any plan to divide
Palestine.'
Palestinian women participated in the fight by also
transporting weapons under their clothes to the Palestinian
fighters to bypass the British inspection. Further, women
collected money to help the people who had suffered from the
war. Several women died from British bullets and became
heroines. Fatimah Gh6.z. g.1, Jamilah Ahmad, 'A'ishah Abu Hasan,
and 'Azbah Salamah all perished after British attacks. In
1948, other women fell victim to the British: Julit Nayif,
Hayat Al Bulbisi, Jamilah Salah, Zaynab 'Atiyah, and Hulwah
Zaydan."
The year 1948 saw a major blow to the women's movement.
The quick exile of the Palestinians after Israeli occupation
left the movement splintered between women in the refugee
camps and women who remained inside Palestine. Peasant women,
middle class women, and elite women became refugees overnight.
Not until 1967 did the movement fully recover.
3.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WO= IN PALESTINE 
AFTER 1960 
The recovery began with the formation of the Palestine
Liberation Organization in 1964. PLO leaders wanted to create
a mass-based organization which would represent the majority
of Palestinian people. The women's movement was reconstructed
and officially made part of the larger national body in that
year."
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After 1967, more women joined political organizations.
Fath organized the General Union of Palestinian Women, which
was and is open to all Palestinian women. Its second
conference in Beirut in 1974 was held under the theme
"Organizing the efforts of the Palestinian women is essential
for the Battle of Liberation"." As members of the PLO, women
were (and are) involved in national liberation in the fields
of politics, education, health, and hygiene. Also, they
served as agents in secret operations. Still, however,
women's issues were subordinated to the PLO's main focus. The
PLO needed popular support; its main purpose was to let the
refugees know they are part of the uprising.n
Some of the leftist groups such as the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), were more progressive
in terms of women's rights. Both organizations called for a
more reformative stand on women.'
From the late 1960s, until 1982 the Palestinian
Liberation Organization in Lebanon recruited women and
instituted a variety of social services to empower rural and
refugee women through education, leadership training,
employment, and the availability of child care. Julit Peteet
described the role of Palestinian women during the 1976 siege
of the Tall al-Za'atar refugee camp by the Maronite Lebanese
Forces. She argues that peasant women nursed the wounded and
organized assistance activities for the sustenance of the
fighters. Notable numbers of women fought alongside men.
Many died from snipers' bullets while bringing water from
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wells during the siege.' Currently, women work in PLO
factories and various PLO enterprises in Lebanon, especially
in social work.
The Palestinian women in their political struggle,
confirm the Western feminist slogan that - "the personal is
political." Palestinian women cook not only for their
families, but for the fighters and to raise funds. They sew
traditional dresses emphasising the revival of Palestinian
identity. In the winter of 1988 women knitted 5,000 sweaters
to show solidarity with prisoners of the intifadah, the
uprising which started in 1987. Also, they sewed thousands of
Palestinian flags as symbols of the Palestinian struggle.'
Few women, however, hold leading positions in the
organization. In 1986, the Palestine National Council (the
Palestinian Parliament in exile) had 33 women members out of a
total of 428, and there were no women on the PLO's 15-member
executive council.' Recently, however, there have been gains
in representation, particularly in positions of influence.
For example, in 1991 Hanan 'Ashrawi became the spokesperson
for the Jordanian-Palestinian delegate to the peace talks in
Washington, D.C.
Palestinian women can not demand immediate changes in
their legal status because they are stateless -- despite the
declaration of a Palestinian state in November, 1988. Their
main focus is the ending of Israeli occupation and the
creation of a Palestinian state. Peteet argues:
Palestinian women, by becoming politically active in
such a manner as to maintain their commitments to
domesticity, have not posed a fundamental challenge
to the asymmetrical division of labor between men
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and women. Indeed, their activism has engaged the
domestic sector for political purposes and
intensified existing labor-sharing relations between
women of different generations and classes.
Palestinian women that have participated in militant
national politics may initiate the process of
challenging those patriarchal structures and
ideologies that confirm and legitimize women's
assignment to the domestic sector and men's
exclusion from it, but it does not ensure any
permanent and comprehensive sort of
transformation.'
This discussion is valuable, and one could add to this
analysis that the Palestinian case differs from other Arab
countries, for example Egypt and Algeria, for several reasons.
First, Palestinians have had a longer period of struggle that
has affected women's rights. Second, Palestinian women are
scattered across the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and
other Arab countries. They face a double burden of struggle
for the independence of Palestine and for survival. However,
both in Palestine and in other Arab countries the political
mobilization of women and nationalist movements are connected.
II. THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD AFTER
INDEPENDENCE 
1. THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN EGYPT 
1.1 THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN mrammm STATE-BUILDING: 
EGYPT SINCE 1952 
The Egyptian revolution of 1952, led by young military
officers of the lower middle class, received support from the
majority of the Egyptian people. Among the supporters were
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the Muslim Brothers, who hoped for a new era of more freedom
for their organization. Later, however, Islamists were seen
as dangerous to the state. The leader of the Muslim Sisters
- 7Association, Zaynab al-Ghazall, was imprisoned in 1964 and
—
released only after Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's death.
In the late 1950s, Nasir introduced economic reforms such
as land reform and industrialization, challenging the old
class system. N7isir also called for social equality and
justice for all citizens, aiming at pan-Arab and Third World
solidarity. The social state was secular, but it accommodated
religion.
The first confrontation between feminists, the state, and
official Islam, came during the review of the Electoral Law in
the 1953. Dura Shafiq published Al-Kitab al-Abvad wa Hucrim
al-Mar'ah al-Misriyah (The White Book and Rights of Egyptian
Women). She summarized the views of pro-suffrage women and of
others within the Islamic establishment. The Constitution
proclaimed all Egyptians equal in civil and political rights,
but the government position, she said, agreed with official
Islamic doctrine and thus opposed political rights for women.
In 1953 the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Senate
- _
rejected women's suffrage, as did the fatwa Committee of al-
Azhar - the highest religious scholars in Egypt. But al-Azhar 
Shaykh Hasan Makhluf replied that Islam does not oppose
political rights for women. However, the Muslim Brothers held
a conference and demanded that the government discontinue
discussion of women's political rights, arguing that women's
suffrage runs counter to religious doctrine."
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Because there were no women in the committee to discuss
the new constitution, women had to take their protests to the
public. They occupied the Journalism Association and went on
a hunger strike that began at noon on March 12, 1954. Shafiq
was among 14 other women in Cairo, members of the Bint al-Nil 
organization in Alexandria, who participated in the hunger
strike. The women finally ended the strike after the governor
of Cairo stated that full political rights would be given to
women.
Five years later, in 1959, the revolutionary government
granted Egyptian women the right to vote, but it limited this
right only to women who asked for it. Women had to apply
formally to vote, in contrast to the automatic and obligatory
character of male suffrage. In the same year the state made
the National Women's Union organization by disbanding all
other feminist groups.
al•
Despite the attempts to hinder women's efforts, Nasir's
-
education policies opened opportunities for them. Nasir's
regime adopted mass education and employment policies which
enabled many women to graduate from college and join the labor
force. The state was interested in increasing its scientific
and technical capacities, so it implemented policies to
further this goal. In the middle of the 1960s, the state
supported a birth control program and enforced policies to
encourage greater enrolment of women in the applied sciences
at universities."
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1.2 FEMINISM AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
Margot Badran says that the post-independence period produced
two woman scholarly writers, 'Aisha 'Abd al-Rahman, who wrote
under the pen name bint al-shati (The daughter of the shore),
and journalist Aminah al-Sa'id. 'Abd al-Raturian became a
professor of Islamic thought at Cairo University, and a
prolific writer of articles and books. Her work includes a
series on the lives of the wives and female relatives of the
prophet Muhammad. She was held up as a model for those who
were neither feminists nor fundamentalists, was respected by
the regime and received many awards.
- -From 1956, al-Sa'id was the editor of Hawa (Eve), a
popular magazine for women. Al-Sa'id's magazine discussed
liberal feminism in the socialist state. Al-Sa'id used the
writing to promote women's causes within the framework of the
Arab socialist revolution."
The state policy on education and work, formulated in
1952, brought large numbers of women from middle and lower
class families into the ranks of the educated and employed.'
However, the partial change did not bring equality to women.
This inequity led to the emergence of new feminist and
Islamist activists, such as 1\1:;.wL	 (b 1930), and
Safinaz Kazim. Once again, the political situation produced
_ -
two diametrically opposed women leaders, as al-Sa'dawi was
left-wing and K -a-pm was Islamist and conservative.
Al-Sa'dawi, after graduating as a medical doctor in
1955, devoted her writing to the physical and psychological
health problems of distressed women. Her work focused
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especially on the practice of circumcision in Egypt and the
obsession with female virginity in the Arab World. In her
writings, she discussed the connections between patriarchy,
class, and religion, and the oppression of women. Her first
-
book, in which she put forward her views, was Al-Mar'a wa al-
Jins (The Woman and Sex), which was published in 1971. She
also discussed the sexual oppression of women connected with
everyday customs. Al-Sa i dawl. brought Arab women's sexuality
to the public. She smashed a cultural taboo and led the way
to a new generation of feminist discourse. Yet, her work did
not go unpunished by those who resented her immodesty. Her
books and writings were blacklisted and banned by the state.
She was forced to recede from public life.'
_	 -
A contemporary to al-Sa i dawi, Kazim was educated in the
United States from 1960-1966, receiving an M.A. from New York
University. While studying in New York, she was inspired by
-
the book, Al'Adalah al-Iitima'ivah fi al-Islam (Social Justice
in Islam), which was written by the Muslim Brother, Sayyid
Qutb. In that book, Qutb argues that Islam is a force of
unique awareness. Believing that Islam is an identity, Za-zim
took up Islamic dress and went to Mecca for a pilgrimage. In
-
the 1970s she met Zaynab al-Ghazali. Both shared the same
-
view of Islam as din wa dawlah (religion and state), and "the
desire to see an Islamic state in Egypt"."
It is worth mentioning that in the 1957 parliamentary
elections, five women ran and two women were elected --
Rawiyah 'Atiyah and Aminah Shukri. In 1962, Hikmat Abu Zayd
became the first woman to be appointed to the Cabinet as
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Minister of Social Affairs." She was a teacher from a lower
middle class family from Upper Egypt and had benefitted from
the expanded educational system. Nasir appointed Abu Zayd
after she challenged him publicly to appoint a woman to prove
he was really serious about liberation for women, as was
expressed in the National Charter.'
In 1962 the Arab Socialist Union took control of the
women's movement from the government. Women from government
served as the leaders. They strove to mobilize women at the
grass roots level in developmental programs. The women in the
ASU were mainly interested in social concerns, such as family
planning, health systems, and literacy programs in the
villages." The state encouraged educated women to join the
workforce to reinforce the notion of a socialist state.
1.3 SADAT'S INFITAH AND ITS EFFECT ON EGYPTIAN 
SOCIETY 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Egypt, ruled by Anwar al-S -Lit and
Husni Mubarak, continued its practice of using feminism as a
pawn to further unrelated political goals. Both leaders
promoted feminist and Islamists view points to further their
own objective of creating a capitalist state.
-
When Sadat came to power in 1970 the country was
traumatized by the defeat of 1967 in the war with Israel.
Sadat depended on, and hence encouraged, the religious revival
that followed the war. This was in direct opposition to
Nasir's Arab socialism. The Islamic fundamentalist movement
revived after the 1973 war and Sadat's victory. The popular
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view was that Egypt had been victorious in 1973 because
Muslims had embraced again the proper practice of religion.
The state encouraged this movement, but later offered less
accommodation to radicals.'
-
Sadat's infitah, or Open Door economic policy, of 1974
was a fundamental shift from socialism and anti-Western
imperialist rhetoric to one of a careful laissez-faire policy
with the government reserving its right to exercise control
when perceived necessary.
In 1979 the Arab Socialist Union was formally abolished.
The new political framework of the regime was that of a multi-
party system. Three political organizations emerged to run in
the 1979 election right, left, and center. The right -- the
Liberal Socialists -- could claim only 14 members of
parliament and 35,000 members. On the left were the Unionist
Nationalist Progressives, who numbered only three members of
parliament and had about 20,000 members. The center, which
was the largest organization, had 293 members of parliament
and several hundred thousand members. Each of these groupings
had its own Women's Committee."
1.4 THE DECREES AFFECTING WOMEN UNDER SADAT RULE 
••••
On June 20, 1979, President Sadat issued two decrees affecting
women's rights. The first decree involving the :reform of the
••••
personal status laws is commonly known as "Jihan's Laws".
Jihan al-Sadat, wife of President Sadat, supported women's
causes. Inspired by the United Nations' decade of women
(1975-1985), the state encouraged her campaigns. At the same
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time, the state contained the radical feminism promoted by
1\11Z1 al-Sa'dawi and others. In an interview in February
1989, al-Sa'dawi argued that Jihan al-Sadat ordered the
repression of feminists because she wanted to be the supreme
champion of women's causes in Egypt.°
These reforms included the right of the wife to a
divorce, if her husband took a second wife without her
approval. The other changes were as follows:
1. The wife must be informed in the event of
divorce.
2. The mother has the right to maintain custody of
children until boys are ten and girls are twelve
years of age.
3. A women must receive alimony during that time.
4. The woman can stay in the marriage house until
she remarries or until her period of custody of the
children expires.
Women still were not equal to men, but they had more rights
and security than before the 1979 law.
In the second of Sadat's decrees, 30 seats specifically
for women were added to the Egyptian parliament. A similar
quota system for women's representation had already been
instituted in Sudan in 1976. Also, 20 percent of the seats on
the local, district, and provincial elected councils were
allocated to women. In the 1979 election, women responded
enthusiastically; 200 women candidates competed for 30 local
seats. Three women defeated men for the other seats. Two of
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these women long-term members from the urban areas, and third
was the minister of social affairs, Amal 'Uthman.'
These two decrees were issued behind the back of
parliament. The "emergency clause" allowed the president to
issue -- in the absence of the Assembly -- decrees in
circumstances requiring immediate action. His decrees
contradicted the constitutional stipulation of equality of all
Egyptians 51
In 1979 was the institution of a second parliamentary
chamber, Mauls al-Shrirg (The Consultative Assembly), whose
members simply advise when they are asked. Two-thirds of its
210 members are elected, the other third nominated. No seats
in this body were set aside for women, but two women were
elected from the governing party, and five were appointed by
the president.52
— -
The year 1979 also saw Sadat's regime carrying out
-
conflicting policies. First, Sadat signed the Camp David
treaty with Israel, isolating Egypt from the Arab World and
outraging both leftists and conservatives at home. Second, he
made changes in the personal status laws and provoked Muslim
conservatives.
In the autumn of 1981, there were massive arrests of
women and men. People from across the political spectrum,
including feminists and fundamentalists, were arrested for
opposing government policy. Ironically, the police arrested
_	
-
both Nawal al-Sa'dawi and Safinaz Kazim (Kazim had been
imprisoned two times before: in 1973 and 1975). After these
arrests, Sadat was assassinated by a Muslim fundamentalist and
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the two women were released along with others by the new
president Mubarak.
1.5 WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN EGYPT UNDER MURARAK' S RI= 
Sadat's reform of the personal status law was eventually
challenged in the court system. On December 12, 1982, the
case moved from a circuit court to the Higher Constitutional
Court. The case was resolved on May 4, 1985 when the Higher
Constitutional Court declared the 1979 amendments to the
Personal Status Laws unconstitutional on the grounds that the
original emergency decree, which announced the laws, was
issued in the absence of a genuine emergency. Hence, the law
was not valid.
Egyptian women then went into action. At a meeting on
May 9, 1985, women activists decided to form a delegation to
protest at the parliament. There was a broad spectrum of
participants, which included women from the women's committee
in the Arab Lawyers' Union, the Arab Women's Solidarity
Association, a coalition of leftists, and Nasirists. The
unified group issued a statement, reproduced in the May 15,
1985, edition of Al-Ahall newspaper. The statement said:
Although Law No. 44 of 1979 does not fully achieve
the interests of Egyptian society, the stability of
the family, or the hopes of Egyptian women, its
cancellation at this time will cause grievous damage
to the Egyptian family unit and the stability of
relations between its members. It is not possible
to return to the laws of 1920 and 1929 which were in
force half a century ago in social, political and
economic conditions radically different from those
of today.'
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The unified group called for a family law that would meet the
n••
needs of the times, without conflicting with the shari'ah 
Islamic Laws, and asked for open debate on the subject. The
debate grew strong in the newspapers.'
In 1985, the Mubarak regime made a compromise between
fundamentalists and feminists by supporting new revisions to
the personal status laws. The changes were passed in 1985,
just in time for the United Nations ending the women's decade
conference in Nairobi in July 1985. The Egyptian Government
may have been wanting to convey a "modern" image at the
meeting. There had been strong pressures from both sides.
After the law was passed, a wife no longer had the automatic
right to divorce if her husband took a second wife. This
satisfied some of the fundamentalist demands. From the
feminist perspective, however, the new law granted a woman
adequate housing if she had custody of her children. Hence,
one feminist demand was satisfied.
The revision, Law 188, eliminated the allocated seats for
women, retained seats for farmers and workers. It also
reinstituted the principle of independent candidacy.'
The new election to parliament was held on April 6, 1987.
Because of the absence of guaranteed seats for women, the
number of women in parliament dropped. Women had to be
elected on their own merits. At first, the loss of guaranteed
seats appeared to energize the activists outside parliament to
make a concerted effort to preserve their rights. However,
after the election, the smaller number of women MPs had less
influence in parliament. Two years after the 1987 election,
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the activists did not look to parliament in general, or its
women members specifically, for solutions to their problems.
1.6 ARAB WOMEN'S SOLIDARITY ASSOCIATION
The Arab Women's Solidarity Association AWSA was established
•••	
_ -
in the early 1980s, al-Sa'dawi and her followers. Al-Sa'dawi,
an independent feminist, had gained a local and international
reputation for her efforts. She organized the significant
number of highly educated women who espoused feminism and were
in the professions. They practised law and medicine, taught
at universities, worked in business, and were active as
writers and journalists. In 1985 al-Sa'dawi finally succeeded
in registering the AWSA as a non-governmental organization
with the United Nations.
In 1986 AWSA held its first conference. Under the title
"Unveiling the Mind", their theme was "Challenges Facing the
Arab Woman at the End of the 20th Century. Al-Saida'wi
emphasized the contradiction of the laws that give women
equality in public rights and duties, yet narrow the
distinction between a person's "public" and "private" lives.
_ -
According to al-Sa i dawl this distinction was established
solely to subjugate women to men's control, and to impose
duties upon women without giving them rights. She told the
conference that "the labor laws give women equal rights to
work as men, but women can not actually practise this right
because of marriage laws -- for it is a woman's husband, not
she, who possesses the right to make decisions in this
matter".' At the same conference, Fatimah al-Mernissi stated
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that "peculiar to the Arab World is not the form assumed by
the patriarchal system which is similar to most societies, but
rather the perpetuation of this system as an uncontestable
model and an ideal, while in other societies it is open for
discussion.""
It is worth mentioning that the Egyptian government
closed down the AWSA in 1989 and has refused to take al-
Sa'dawi to court. It is her contention that the organization
is a United Nations funded body and not under the jurisdiction
of the Egyptian government.
1 . 6 CONCLUSION 
In Egypt, Islam has been controlled by the state, and has
remained the main force regulating family life. State leaders
have thus had to defend the social and political changes they
introduce as being compatible with Islamic values.
Throughout the history of the women's movement in Egypt,
many disagreements have arisen as women from both the feminist
and Islamist groups have gained more influence. The state has
also pursued contradictory policies to further its own goals.
On the one hand, it has promoted new roles for women, for
practical and ideological reasons; on the other, it has only
done so when men have permitted such changes. At all phases
of state-building -- liberal, socialist, and infitah 
capitalist periods -- women have made political gains and
losses. However, the state has never addressed gender
inequality.
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2. THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN ALGERIA AFTER
INDEPENDENCE 
2.1 THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN ALGERIA UNDER AHMAD BIN
BILIA 
The declaration of Algerian independence occurred on July 5,
1962. The new constitution, which was adopted on September
10, 1962, made Islam the official state religion and declared
Arabic the official state language. The government adopted
socialism and seemed to assure equality and justice to women
within the framework of Arab and Muslim values. The FLN was
the only political party allowed to operate in the country.
The National Union of Algerian Women UNFA was set up by the
FLN in 1962.
The new constitution guaranteed equality between the
sexes and granted women the right to vote. The constitution
listed the states objectives with regard to women as follows:
Article 5: To work for the realization of the rights
of women in creating the conditions permitting her
to fulfil the role of mother, worker, and citizen.
Article 6: To promote better harmony in the
relations between man and woman in work, the family
and society.
Article 7: To protect the child and to work for his
[sic] development.
Article 8: To safeguard and favor the development of
our Arab-Islamic values which are the foundations of
our personality.58
Articles 5 and 7 show the traditional view of women in the
UNFA constitution as mothers and child-raisers.
Ahmad Bin Billa, the first president of Algeria, first
made peace with the conservatives by issuing a decree that the
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Ramadan fast and the Muslim charity offering be made
compulsory for believers on January 26, 1963. Also he
prohibited the use of alcohol by Muslims, closed down cafes
that served liquor, and raised taxes on alcohol. Bin Billa
called on his religious foundation, Tawfiq al-Madani, to
provide a rationale in Islam for "socialism". The 'ulama.' 
found different citations from the Our' -an and an
interpretation to support Ben Billa's thesis that socialist or
collectivist values formed the basis of early Islamic
doctrine. In spite of Bin Billa's efforts to accommodate the
conservative Muslims, he remained under attack.'
Bin Billa's regime faced high unemployment and demands
from feminists for the employment of women. Official
declarations were made encouraging women to obtain employment
and thus take their share in nation-building.
2.2 THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN ALGERIA UNDER HUWWARI BU
=Kg
On June 18, 1965, Huwwari Bu Midyan successfully carried out a
coup d'etat. The first group publicly to support the coup was
the 'ulaMa' (the higher religious scholars). With the help of
the technocrats, Bu Midyan expanded the role of the state in
the economy, education, and industry, and helped to develop
new political institutions. Under Bu Midyan's rule, from 1965
to 1978, Islam remained the moral foundation of the society.
Women were to continue to play their special role as protector
of the family. The state policy for mass education and the
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rapid industrial development later became forces of change in
Algeria.
The UNFA was integrated into the FLN in 1968. According
to Peter Knauss, the integration did not increase women's
participation in politics. There were no women in the party's
Central Committee under Bu Midyan, and no women were nominated
to the National Council of the Revolution, the leading
decision-making body. There were a few women in the National
Assembly, but they were "removed" in 1965. In the 1977
elections for the National Popular Assembly nine women won
elections out of a total of 261."
Women also became active in regional political
assemblies. In the first elections for the Popular Communal
Assemblies held in 1967, 99 women were elected out of a total
of 10,852 municipal council members elected nationwide.' In
the election held in 1969 for the Popular Provincial
Assemblies at the regional level, 78 women stood for the 665
seats, and 20 were elected. 62
2.3 THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN ALGERIA UNDER AL-SECAMI 
BIN JADID 
Algeria, by the time of Bu Midyan's death in December 1978,
had an unemployment rate of around 20 percent. To counteract
this problems, the government of al-Shadhli Bin Jadid -- which
came to power in February 1979 -- adopted a program entitled
"For a Better Life". The program, striving to battle poverty,
instituted a new five-year plan in 1980 that placed stress on
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nonproductive investments sacrificed for a decade:
transportation infrastructure, urban housing, etc.'
In 1984, the FLN party congress adopted a new theme
indicating a new perspective it introduced the slogan "Work
and Self-restraint to Guarantee the Future". To accompany the
change, school textbooks were revised to lay emphasis on
nuclear families. Pharmacies were free to sell birth control
pills, and hospitals were authorized to perform abortions. A
moral revolution had begun, but at the same time a family code
of conservative orientation was adopted.
Feminists argued that women had done enough to earn full
equality during the revolution, and hence the personal status
law should be corrected to create more equality. Women had
played an active and prominent role in the revolution. After
the regime adopted socialism, women immediately received full
civil rights, like the right to vote and to be elected, but
personal rights remained an untouched grey area.
2.4 THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS 
In 1980 the government started discussing changes to the
personal status laws. The drafting of the law was veiled in
secrecy during the Boumedienne years. No women had
participated in the intra-governmental discussions on the law,
and they protested against this exclusion. Respected
militants from the days of the revolution -- like the
legendary Djamila Buhired whose story of resistance and
steadfastness under torture became a symbol of perseverance
throughout the Arab World -- led a march in December 1981 to
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protest against the secrecy surrounding the subject. The new
laws, were finally passed in 1984.
When they did receive the details of the personal status
laws, Algerian women were angered to learn they would become
perpetual legal minors under the law needing the permission of
male guardians to work or travel. Polygamy would be somewhat
restricted, but women still would not generally have the right
to divorce. A Le Monde article of January 9, 1982 reported
that about 100 women gathered in the Algiers town center
carrying banners reading "No to silence, yes to democracy" and
"No to socialism without women's participation." In the end,
the police broke up the demonstration."
The 1984 personal status laws insisted that Algeria must
remain faithful to its Arab-Islamic heritage. Hence, the law
that was passed in 1984 defined marriage as a consenting
contract between the two partners, at which the woman's legal
guardian had to be present. The guardian could not prevent
the marriage, and a judge could authorize it if the guardian
opposed. The dowry had to be fixed and was the woman's
property. The marriage had to be registered, and both parties
could insert any stipulations they wished into the contract.
A widow or divorcee had to wait out the legal period before
remarrying (three months, to ensure that the woman is not
carrying the former husband's child). A Muslim woman could
not marry a non-Muslim unless he converted to Islam, although
a Muslim man could marry a non-Muslim woman."
Women strongly protested against the adoption of a the
family law bill in 1984." This text appears to be a striking
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expression of how a woman should behave with her husband and
his kin. She could be married off by a guardian, divorced by
a husband's oath, thrown out of the conjugal home, or receive
only a sixth or eighth part of an inheritance. Frankly, she
was made into a minor subject. The legislation expressed the
stubborn traditionalism of the political and legislative
structures, as well as the survival of patriarchal culture.
2.5 ALGERIA AFTER 1984 
In 1984 the government appointed a woman minister of social
affairs to the cabinet for the first time, Mme Zohor Wanisie.
One Algerian woman commented:
The government put Mme Zohor Wanisie 	  there
to shut us up, and then we have UNFA (Union National
des Femmes Algerians), the only women's organization
in this country, which does absolutely nothing for
women. It even accepts that men are allowed four
wives. UNFA is an official organization; that is
why it doesn't do anything which the government
might dislike, and the government is made up of men.
Men aren't going to fight for us; we have to fight
for ourselves.°
The interview suggests that this woman believed the system
betrayed women, and also that the official organization of
women did not represent women.
Algeria was to experience yet another political upheaval.
In October 1988, a group predominantly made up of students
rioted in Algiers, protesting against unemployment and price
rises. The main political powers in Algeria were not the FLN,
but rather the army, the president and the politicians of the
FLN party. 68 The riots resulted in a new constitution,
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ratified in 1989, which introduced a process of political
democratization and economic liberalization in Algeria."
In contrast to the liberalization that was occurring in
government and the political system, the 'ulamg.' were moving
to create a conservative national identity. In the shadows of
the colonial system, the 'ularria' provided educated Algerian
administrative and economic elites with a philosophical and
political culture that they could find neither in the colonial
culture nor in traditional religions.
This division in culture remains today. Currently, the
Islamic Salvation Front FIS, which has explicitly rejected
democracy as an alien value and practice, has made a clear
demand for the establishment of an Islamic republic whose
-
constitution would be the Qur'an and the sunnah. The new 1989
Constitution adopted multiparty elections at the national
level, the FIS won many seats in the June 1990 municipal
elections. The FLN was taken by surprise.
On December 26, 1991, the election was canceled by the
Algerian government after the victory of the FIS. The
consequence was a high army presence and civil war with
Islamist opposition.
On January 2, 1992, Algerian feminists demonstrated
against FIS and their victory in the national election. Their
target was the Islamist assault on women's rights and the
threat of violence against women."
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2.6 CONCLUSION
In Algeria, as in Egypt, it is clear that the role of the
state is the key variable, and most useful barometer, for
explaining the changes in women's status. State arbitration
is not only responsive to economic or class-based demands, it
is also shaped by the political guidelines of state stability
or unity.
In Algeria state formation has affected the position of
women in society in several ways. In particular, the state
has mediated gender relations through the law. The government
mainly uses legislation to foster or inhibit social change, to
maintain existing arrangements or to promote greater equality
for women in the family and the society at large. As it
regulates marriage, divorce, individual rights and
responsibilities, and the transmission of property through
inheritance, family law is a prime example of state policy
affecting women.
3. THE WOMEN' S MOVEMENT IN TUNISIA
3.1 THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT UP TO 1956 
The political participation of Tunisian women in the
liberation movement against the French started on April 8,
1938. Women's national awareness developed strongly,
particularly after the lively debate caused by Tahir Haddad,
who defended the emancipation of women as compatible with
Islamic traditions. The political movement called Neo-Destour
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called for women to fight in the field. The situation led to
the founding of the first Tunisian women's association, the
Women's Islamic Union, set up in 1938 by a group of women who
had become aware of the importance of the role of associations
in integrating the women's political and moral causes into the
liberation struggle.' The women's movement enabled women to
demonstrate their fighting spirit and their readiness to
sacrifice themselves for their country's freedom.
Women were inspired by the nationalist order to
demonstrate against the colonial power. On April 9, 1938 some
women joined the nationalist resistance network which held
secret meetings in hospitals, Turkish baths, and Zawivh the
locations of famous religious people's graves.'
Habib Burgibah, leader of the Neo-Destour and later the
first president of Tunisia, stressed the importance of Islamic
values at the nationalist meeting in 1939, where one woman had
taken off her veil:
Is it in our interests to hasten, without caring for any
transitions, the disappearance of our ways, of our
customs, bad or good, and of all those little nothings
which as a whole whatever one might say constitute our
personality? My answer, given the very special
circumstances in which we live, is categorical: No!
To Burgibah it was important for Tunisia to maintain its
personality as part of the struggle against the French.
In 1930, the Tunisian religious scholar Tahir al-Haddad
-
published a book on the status of women, Imra'atuna fi al-
Shari'lh wa al-Multama' (Our Women in Law and Society). Even
though Haddad was a defender of Islam, he said:
I believe, without a shadow of doubt, that Islam is
innocent of the accusation of arresting reform but
that, on the contrary, it is the ... inexhaustible
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source of reform. The collapse of our (social)
structure is but the result of illusions we have
believed in, of pernicious and terrible customs we
have tied ourselves to... (Islam) is the religion
which holds to the principle of gradualism in
legislating its laws according to (limiting)
capacity. There is nothing which states or
indicates that the stage achieved during the
Prophet's lifetime was the hoped-for final (stage)
after which there would be no end since gradual
(evolution) is linked to the difficulties of those
issues for which gradual (steps) are to be taken.'
Al-Haddad considered men and women equal and their rights and
duties balanced."
The women's movement within the Liberation struggle
continued to expand. In 1950, the Neo-Destour organization
founded its first official women's section. Women took part
in mass demonstrations such as that of March 3, 1952, and a
large number of women militants were arrested." Women's
participation in the struggle for independence gave them a
chance to become actively involved in a nationwide movement,
an opportunity to break out of their shells and show their
abilities.
The National Union of Tunisian Women (NUTW) was formed in
1956. The NUTF gradually set up regional and local branches,
thus actively contributing to the mobilization of women in the
building of the nation. Feminism has never become an
independent political force in Tunisia, and the NUTW is the
only group to provide useful social services - reducing social
isolation for some women while creating service opportunities
for others.
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3.2 THE NEW PERSONAL STATUS LAWS 
After Tunisian independence in 1956, the nationalist strategy
was to operate through a powerful party extending throughout
the whole country. The state proceeded in large part without
reliance on the political leadership of kin-based communities.
The goal of the state was to break kin-based solidarities,
which had already lost much of their political leverage.
The personal status laws passed on August 13, 1956 were
used in Tunisia as an instrument of change. Habib Burgibah,
the first president of Tunisia, played a key role in the
development and declaration of the laws.
After independence, Burgibah felt that Tunisia was ready
to raise the question of women's political rights. He felt
strongly that there was a need for social justice and the need
for a rational effort to adjust Islam to suit the modern
world. He faced criticism by the conservatives because of the
new personal status laws, but this was not as harsh as the
attack on al-Haddad had been.
The most important reform introduced by the Personal
Status laws PSL was undoubtedly the abolition of polygamy.
Article 18 of the PSL specified that the taking of a second
wife was a crime punishable by a fine, a term of imprisonment,
or both. The PSL thus created a precedent in the Islamic
world by making polygamy a crime."
The PSL goes on to set the legal age for marriage: 20 for
the man and 17 for the woman. Marriage below these ages
required special permission from a judge, and could only be
allowed with proper justification. Most significantly,
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according to article 30 of the PSL, both the male and female
could file for divorce. Divorce could only be granted if the
judge made every effort possible to reconcile the two parties,
but if divorce is granted, the woman benefits as well as the
man. A divorced woman is thus guaranteed a pension as well as
custody of the children, ending the male privilege of keeping
the children from the age of 7 in the case of boys and 9 in
the case of girls.
In the question of inheritance, article 143/2 lays down
the primacy of restitution, by which daughters and grand-
daughters in the paternal line take precedence in inheritance
over certain agnatic relations, such as the brothers of the
deceased, paternal uncles, and their descendants, as well as
the treasury. The effect of this clause was to improve
dramatically the position of women with regard to inheritance.
It became possible for a woman to receive the entire estate if
she is the sole survivor."
The PSL specified the following: marriage could only be
performed with the consent of both spouses, and the dowry had
to be fixed; women had the right to contract marriage on their
own behalf and did not need a guardian; custody was decided in
the interests of the child, and mother and father had equal
claims.
Traditionally, women in the Arab World could be lawyers
but not judges. However, in Tunisia, along with Iraq,
Morocco, and South Yemen women can serve as judges.
Ironically, women are still regarded as legal minors. For
example, two women are needed as witnesses in the place of one
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man. This stems from the Qur'anic verse 280 in Sura 2, "The
Cow",
And call in to witness two witnesses, men: or if the two
be not men, then one man and two women, such witnesses as
you approve of, that if one of the two women errs the
other will remind her.
3.3 WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AFTER 1980 
Women in Tunisia, like most of the Arab countries, are equal
in their public rights and duties, and are equal to men before
the law. Women's political participation was poor, and women
were noticeably absent in community and political life. Since
the 1980s, a woman has been elected vice-president of the
Chamber of Deputies several times. In 1980, the first woman
mayor took office. Ministerial responsibilities have also
been entrusted to women: Minister of Health from 1983 to 1987,
Minister of the Family and Promotion of Women from 1983 to
1986, Secretary of State for Social Affairs since 1987 and
Secretary of State in charge of Women's and Family Affairs
since 1992." In the Chamber of Deputies, women have been
making slow but sure progress, moving from 1.12 percent in
1957 to 4.26 percent in 1989. In municipal councils, women's
presence has achieved a far higher rate of increase, from 1.29
percent in 1957 to 14 percent in 1990."
3.4 CONCLUSION
Like Egypt, the state is the main actor that affects the
position of women in Tunisian society. In particular, the
state mediates gender relations through legislation. The
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passage of new laws is a key element for fostering or
inhibiting social change. Also, legislation has been used
alternately to maintain existing arrangements -- perpetuating
the status quo -- or to promote greater equality for women in
the family and the society at large, altering the norm. The
PSC gives greater rights to women and decreases the legal
control of male kin over them. The law came from above rather
than as a response to pressure from below. It was formulated
by the government, the result of political choices on the part
of the social groups in power.
Tunisia is an interesting case study because the absence
of a bureaucratized state in the pre-colonial period allowed
the modern state apparatus to control effectively the whole
territory. Unlike Egypt, the state does not rely on kin-based
communities, and thus has not been faced with resistance from
Islam. Perhaps unusually, these dramatic legal reforms were
made without resistance from conservatives.
4. THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN SOUTH YEMEN
4.1 THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT FROM 1967
Five years of guerilla fighting ended the 128 years of British
colonial rule in South Yemen in November 1967. The National
Liberation Front came to power in March 1968. Influenced by
the left of the party, the NLF was committed to taking a
revolutionary stand. It advocated the creation of a
revolutionary people's army, espoused an anti-imperialist
foreign policy, and proposed a radical land reform.
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Nevertheless, this policy did not become reality until a new
group -- calling themselves the "corrective move" -- adopted a
socialist bloc policy.
The state took a leading role in economic life,
advocating radical changes to the economy and society along
socialist lines. Industry was given greatest priority, and
trade was brought under government control. The People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, according to the 1970
constitution, would allow working people to exercise their
opinions through their representatives in the Supreme People's
Council, which was a 111-member body that assessed laws and
approved state policies." Land reform was decreed in
1970."
Women in South Yemen were traditionally restricted by
local customs and religious practices in general. In the city
of Aden, however, the situation for women was more progressive
than in rural areas. Women from the wealthier classes
returned home after finishing their education in Beirut or
Cairo and entered the labor force. Unveiled women were more
noticeable.
According to Maxine Molyneux,
women were almost totally excluded from positions of
social influence, which were generally in the hands of
elder males. But in some regions they played an
important role in agriculture, and in many parts of rural
Yemen were unveiled, although restrictions and
segregation still operated."
Like Algeria's women in the independence movement,
national liberation was regarded as the overriding priority.
In Yemen the Women's Union, which emerged from the national
liberation movement, had integrated itself thoroughly with the
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Yemeni revolution while raising the special demands of women
within it.
Women were given the right to vote and to run for office
for the first time in 1970 but the first elections were in
1977. Then, a special effort was made to ensure that some
women candidates ran.
In July 1974, the first Congress of the Women's Union
placed great emphasis on the full incorporation of women in
the political, economic, and social life of southern Yemen.
Women increasingly participated in the People's Militia and
the Women's Union served to mobilize women."
4.2 THE NEW PERSONAL STATUS LAWS OF 1974 
The government wanted the state to become a higher authority
than either the kin group or religion. However, not until the
announcement of the family law in 1974 was any notable
progress made in transforming the legal position of women
within the family. 85 Before it was announced, the Family Law
was discussed in the press and in open meetings around the
country. The first draft of the law was prepared in 1971 and
the Yemeni family law was passed in 1974.
The law has many progressive statutes. It restricts but
does not ban polygamy. Men and women have equal rights when
it comes to divorce. Other provisions include: both spouses'
consent to the marriage; setting a limit to the dowry; sharing
the cost of running the household between husband and wife;
and favoring the mother for custody of the children even if
90
she remarries; although in the end the court has to decide in
the child's best interests."
It is worth mentioning that after the Law passed the
divorce rate became higher, and increased even more after
1978, when a civil law bill was passed granting the marital
home to the wife if there were children from the marriage.
The government tried to make divorce more difficult to gain by
asking the People's Council (the Legislature) to revise the
article to give the courts more power in the resolution of
these situations. The Women's Union or the Popular Defense
Committees acted as marriage counselors and tried to reconcile
couples.'
In fact, the radical changes in the law still maintained
inequalities between men and women. For example, the man
could take a second wife on the grounds the first wife was
infertile, but women could not ask in the same situation. A
1984 symposium held by some women asked for more egalitarian
inheritance laws, but the proposals were crushed by the
legislature."
4 . 3 WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AFTER 1990
Saudi Arabia used Yemeni exiles to cause internal opposition
to legislation favorable to women's rights." The Saudis
accused the Yemeni government of being against Islam. With
other conservative Arab states, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
condemned the PDRY and its efforts to emancipate women
contravening religious customs. They criticized the
appointment of women as judges. This, they argued, was in
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violation of the Qur'an, which qualified that being male is
among the ten stated required of judges." With underground
opposition organized by the Muslim Brothers with funds from
Saudi Arabia, the PDRY was under pressure from both internal
and external forces to break into the open in 1990."
In May 1990, North Yemen YAR and South Yemen PDRY merged
and became the Unified Republic of Yemen URY. In the YAR
women had such rights as:
pregnancy leave, voting, driving, travel, running
for office and property ownership, and several women
were prominent television broadcasters. In most
Northern cities and districts women covered their
faces, left school early, and avoided public places.
The prevailing ethic was that only dire economic
necessity would drive women into markets, factories,
or offices. In the countryside, of course, women's
contribution to farming and herding was vital."
In contrast the PDRY's women were more progressive. After the
integration, women maintained all legal rights enjoyed under
previous regimes. Conservatives, however, challenged the
notion of female judges." The problem was resolved when one
woman was appointed to the newly-created 15-judge Supreme
Court. Women also held the positions of deputy minister of
information, dean of education, department heads in education,
health, social affairs and other ministries, and a few
parliamentary seats."
The first elections in the unified country were held
April 25, 1993. A multiparty system was implemented for the
first time for residents of both the north and south, and the
outcome was a three-way coalition of the Congress Party, the
more modernist Yemeni Socialist Party -- which governed
Marxist South Yemen -- and the Islah Party, a fundamentalist
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Muslim movement. Islah won 62 seats and the Socialists won
56. Several smaller parties won the remaining seats. The
victory of the Islah party raises the question of whether
Yemen is moving closer to fundamentalism. However, of 50
women nominated for election, only two won seats.'
4.4 CONCLUSION
The personal status laws were conceived by the Yemeni
government to provide greater rights for women in an effort to
improve society. The law constitutes a form of intervention
outside the economic realm to meet certain social policy
objectives. The government -- using legal reform -- assisted
in the social, political and economic repositioning of women.
THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS IN KUWAIT
AND BAHRAIN
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1940s, the beginning of oil's political and
socioeconomic impact on the Middle East, the Arab Gulf states
have undergone a notable transformation. Regimes have
actively promoted a wide-ranging process of economic
development. The Gulf countries differ noticeably from one
another because of their different degrees of urbanization,
the strength of existing religious influences, and the shock
effect of change according to the length of time the
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communities have been exposed to oil income and socioeconomic
development.
1. THE STRUGGLE MR POLITICAL RIGHTS IN BAHRAIN
Several women's organization played key roles in raising
women's issues in Bahrain. The first women's society
—
Jam'iyat Nandat al-Fatah al-Bahraniyah (Bahraini Women's
•	 •
Advancement Society), was formed in 1954 by upper class women,
to provide and assist poor families." Politically the group
supported the liberation movements in Algeria and Palestine.
It also asked for women's suffrage in the early 1970s. The
Jam'iyat al-TufTilah wa-al-Umumah (Motherhood and Children's
Welfare Center) was founded in 1960, by wives, daughters, and
sisters of the al-Khalifa ruling family as well as high-level
civil servants and middle-class women who wanted to play a
more active role in community affairs. Also, two other
women's associations made significant contributions. The
first, the Jam'iyat Awa'il al-Nisa'iyah (Women's Society), was
founded in 1969, and was composed largely of young, unmarried
women, many of them teachers. The other, Al-Ruf'ah
Association, was founded in 1970 and was composed largely of
young graduates and intellectuals. The group regularly
sponsored talks from guests about current issues."
Bahraini women were the first to enjoy education in the
area. The first girls' primary school opened in 1928 and the
first in Kuwait was in 1937. The first secondary schools for
girls in both countries were opened in 1951. Qatar's first
girls' school opened in 1955 and girls' education in Saudi
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Arabia began in 1960." Bahraini women entered the labor
force in traditional areas such as education. Also, a
Bahraini woman was the first female in the area to be a
teacher in a school for boys.
There are few females in key positions in the Bahraini
civil service. Two women are directors in the Ministry of
Education, as well as several section heads. In 1989, five
women were serving as section chiefs in the Ministry of Social
Affairs, but none of them were directors. There were only
five female employees in the Directorate of Social Affairs
(including the director) out of a staff of 180-200."
During pre-election meetings in August and September
1972, Bahraini women actively protested against restrictions
from voting. The Bahrain women's clubs circulated a petition
signed by supporting groups demanding that women be given the
right to participate in the political life of the country.
Also, the petition rejected the reasons advanced for denying
them the right to vote. The women's groups presented the
petition to the ruler on November 20, 1972. 100 The issues of
women's suffrage declined in prominence when the assembly was
dissolved in 1975.
1.1 THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS 
In contrast to Tunisia and Yemen -- which had progressive
state laws based on a liberal interpretation of shari'ah law
- the personal status law in Bahrain was still based on
traditional shari'ah doctrine. According to the female
lawyer, Hayah Rashid al-Khalifah, in an interview in the
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government-owned magazine Al-Bahrain on May 2, 1984, a man can
initiate divorce, but a woman has to be divorced, either by
her husband or by the judge. She continued to say that in
practice the judge does not use his authority to divorce the
woman without conditions. Instead, judges tended to divorce a
woman by khal', hence requiring her to repay the husband for
what he had spent on her, sometimes including the dowry. In
other words a woman bought her freedom. Al-Khalifah adds that
this was not legal in Islam nor was it legal to force the
woman to give up custody of her children. 101
Women disapproved of how family law was practised in
Bahrain. Unlike Kuwait, the debate over Family Law was held
in public. The discussions lasted for two years in the
National Assembly before the law was announced in 1984.
Originally, the committee drafting the law wanted to give
women the right to include in marriage contracts whatever
clauses they wished. However, the members later reversed this
decision and the amendments proposed by women's organization
were neglected. 102
2. THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS IN KUWAIT 
The Kuwaiti women's movement started immediately after
independence in 1961. The first women's association was
established in January 17,1963, named Jam'iyat al-Nandah al-
.
n•n••
'Arbiyah al-Nisaiyah (Society for the Advancement of Arab
Women). In 1971 -- under the new name Jam'iyat al-Nandah al-
.
Usariyah (Society for Advancement of the Family) -- the
society presented a petition to the national assembly to
96
consider women's suffrage. However in 1973, women went
further than discussion. A bill that would give women the
vote but exclude them from office was introduced in 1981.'3
The bill was blocked by Islamist elements in 1982. Led
by Lula al-Qattami, the women's organizations went to the
National Assembly in January 1982, to push for the inclusion
of women's issues on the legislative agenda. Yet, some groups
of Kuwaiti women resisted female suffrage. Ironically, the
heir's wife Shaykhah Latifah came out against women's voting
rights, basing her argument on the fact that few of the women
involved in politics "have the necessary understanding in this
regard." 104 Her statements are in great contrast to the
Prime Minister Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdullah's words in 1980 that
the time has come to take note of the position of the Kuwaiti
woman and her effective role in society, and to put forward
the matter of the vote for study and discussion".'s
There was a strong public debate about women's suffrage
and considerable resistance to women's voting rights. In
1984, the opponents of women's rights issued a fatwa 
interpretation by Saudi 'ulam;' against coeducation and
women's right to vote in Kuwait. These were distributed
outside masa id (mosques). Also, a Kuwaiti f' twE against women
voting was presented in the National Assembly in 1985 by a
combination of Islamists, including the Social Reform Society
(Muslim Brotherhood), and liberals. 106 It is surprising that
the Kuwaiti liberal groups supported this fatwa.
Interestingly, on February 11, 1984, Kuwaiti women
activists started a new strategy in their fight. They charged
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that the government's denial of their right to vote was sexual
discrimination, and thus a violation of the constitutional
guarantees of democracy as well as the equality of all
citizens. The women's activists took a step ahead by trying
to register at the election registration offices, but they
were rejected. Another 13 women tried again, and eight of
them reported the rejection to the police.n7
The women tried to initiate a legal case and also to
raise the issue to the public to gather support. The women's
strategy was to lobby for their case. Nevertheless, after the
election, a group of representatives brought a bill to grant
women the right to vote. The members were uncompromising
opponents of women's suffrage and called on the Ministry of
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs to help them fight the case. The
Ministry issued a f;twa announcing that "the nature of the
electoral process befits men, who are endowed with ability and
expertise; it is not permissible that women recommend or
nominate other women or men. uns The rationale behind the
conservative action was that they were afraid that the liberal
women would not vote for them. They used an Islamic
interpretation to serve their own electoral interests. When
the assembly was suspended in July 1986 the issue died with
it.
CONCLUSION
Kuwait and Bahrain have had the longest exposure to
development and social change in the Gulf, and women there are
likely to obtain more political rights than elsewhere in the
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Gulf. At the same time, restraints on increased women's
participation are also determined by the degree and strength
of historical traditions in each Gulf society. The enormous
expansion of education has broadened the perspectives of women
as well as men, and created new employment opportunities for
both. The newly created institutions such as national
consultative bodies in Kuwait and Bahrain brought the
questions of women's participation to the surface. The issue
of women's suffrage in the other Gulf countries loses much of
its immediate importance because men do not have the
opportunity to vote either.
The women's organizations in most countries in the Gulf
play a prominent role in addressing issues involving women's
concerns and social activities. Primarily, women's
organizations serve mostly as welfare associations involved in
establishing women's libraries, collecting for the needy,
training women in household tasks, advocating cultural events
and lectures, and fighting female illiteracy. They are also
instrumental in questioning traditional ideas about women's
education and work.
3. THE EFFECT CT THE SECOND GULF WAR CM WOMEN IN
SAUDI ARABIA
During the second Gulf War of 1990-1991, women were highly
visible in the media. After the war there was an assumption
that women would gain more rights, and women activists used
foreign media such as CNN to present their case for political
freedom. In fact, the Saudi women took advantage of the
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presence of outside press to defy the unofficial ban on
women's driving. On November 6, 1990, 47 women took over the
keys from their drivers and drove in a convoy of about twenty
cars through the streets of Riyad until stopped by police.
The women, who included university professors, a photographer,
an author, and other well-educated women from all parts of the
country, were sent home)" Within days, however, the
Interior Ministry made the ban on women's driving official,
and also issued a ban on all political activity by women in
_
the future. The Ministry ruling was based on a fatwa from the
head of the state-funded Directorate of Islamic Research,
Shaykh Abd Allah bin 'Abd al-aziz Baz. He ruled that women
should not be allowed to drive motor vehicles; the shari'ah 
instructs that the things that degrade or harm the dignity of
women must be prevented. The Ministry and the 'ulam;' both
called for punishment. The women and their husbands had their
passports confiscated and were forbidden to leave the country.
Ironically, there were many women in the UN forces fighting to
liberate Kuwait; the Saudi rulers ridiculously classed them
males with female features'.'
Although Saudi women did not make gains, the election
held in Kuwait in 1992, in fact, fulfilled the women's
optimism that the war would bring change and meet their
expectations. Women did not receive immediate satisfaction of
their demands, but in the long run women increasingly assumed
positions that might be classified as public roles. For
example, women turned to education as means self-improvement.
100
Women are television and radio announcers and newspaper
opinion columnists.
3 . 1 CONCLUSION
The women's struggle for more rights in Saudi Arabia and
cannot be ignored any more, especially with the external
pressure. There are reasons to assume that the future will
find women playing broader and less restricted public roles in
society and wielding considerably more influence on the
political systems of Saudi Arabia.
CONCLUSION
Women now have more rights than before. For example, women
can now divorce (Tunisia, Yemen), refuse arranged marriage,
work and vote. Further, they can seek the assistance of mass
organizations. On the other hand, men lost certain rights and
privileges that they previously enjoyed (polygamy, divorce).
The consequence of these legal reforms is that the state
has become the major authority, weakening kin-based, class-
based, and tribal control over women. The state's goal was to
promote the nuclear family to help construct less private,
traditional, identities. Legal reforms also made it easier
for women to enter the legal profession and politics.
The extension of full citizenship to women can be seen as
part of the process of creating a new state. The state, as
agent of change, created policies in education and employment
to further development. Even though the reform was introduced
from above in more progressive countries (Tunisia, Yemen), in
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Egypt and Algeria the feminist movement worked to gain rights
beyond what the state offered. Islamic and customary law was
challenged by the state in Tunisia and Yemen, but in Egypt and
Algeria the state accommodated Islam.
In the Arab world, governments have interpreted the
shari'ah law to encourage or to hinder women's interests,
depending on their own needs. The women's suffrage movement
was attacked through questions about the morality of women who
engaged in politics. The overall issue, however, was not
morality, but a government's desire to manipulate political
movements.
Feminists were competing with both the state and Islam.
Women's organizations were more active in less progressive
countries like Egypt and Algeria than those in Tunisia and
Yemen.
The way a ruling power defines women's roles depends upon
the way the state defines its mission. Also, the way a state
juggles the competing interests of women, Islam, and
international politics greatly affects women's political
participation and rights.
Chapter Four examines how Jordan not only faces the same
difficulties but has been greatly influenced by policy in
other Arab countries. The Jordanian government has engaged in
similar manipulation to advance its own political ends. Also,
Jordanian leaders have had to contend with the demands and
influences of Islam, much the same as other Arab countries
have. However, as we will see in the next chapter, Jordan
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differs from its Arab neighbors in that it has not had a
particularly strong feminist movement. Although women's
associations have succeeded in gaining ground in the areas of
social policy and political involvement, the Jordanian
feminist movement is much weaker than the organized women's
forces in the other Arab countries. This weakness is the
result of a variety of social, political, and historical
forces, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
WOMEN'S ROLE IN JORDAN: JORDANIAN
SOCIETY,DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL INSTTUTIONS, 
EDUCATION, LABOR FORCE, AND LAWS 
INTRODUCTION
To understand the status of women in Jordan it is necessary to
examine the societal, and political roots in the country. The
structure of Jordanian society has undergone major changes
over the past decade chiefly as a result of migration and
urbanization. Politically, the country has gradually moved
toward liberalization. In addition, relations with
neighboring countries have had a major impact on Jordan's
political and economic condition. Wars, refugee flows, and
external aid all profoundly affected Jordan's economic
development.
This chapter will analyze Jordanian society, focusing on
the bedouin, the village, and the city. The development of
political institutions will be discussed to provide a context
for understanding the political participation of women. It
also, discusses the background to women's political
participation in Jordan, and Jordanian women's associations --
whether official or unofficial -- exploring how these
associations were used to advance women's participation.
A major concern of this study relates to the level of
education of women, their participation in the labor force,
and their treatment under the laws. Each of these issues is
examined in this chapter.
I. SOCIAL smuculmE OF JORDANIAN scx=wry 
The bedouin tribe, the village, and the city are the three
essential elements of Jordanian society - just as they are to
most Arab societies. While each of these elements is distinct
and represents a basically "secure" society for its members,
as will be shown below, there are economic and political
motivations for them to interact and socialize. For example,
the city in particular and the bedouin tribe to a lesser
extent have always been dependent on the food production of
the village. These three components also are critical for
understanding the role of women in Jordanian society.
1. THE BEDOUINS IN JORDAN
Most of Jordan is desert, and humans have traditionally been
able to sustain themselves only by raising animals, such as
camels, able to live in such a climate for at least part of
the year. Because of the desert climate, farming is not an
adequate means of year-round support in most of the country.
In the northwest of Jordan, there is an area of settled
farming, and camel husbanding is steadily giving way to sheep
and goat herding. In a process of sedentarization, some
bedouin (a term which refers to inhabitants of the desert)
have today turned to village life and full-time farming.
The Jordanian nomads classify themselves in several ways.
A broad distinction is made between the sedentary population
of villagers and townsmen alike, who are called hadar, and the
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ruhhal (nomads). In the opinion of the nomads, only they
t•
themselves have the right to be called Arabs - a name
indicating (to them) people of noble blood and applicable only
to tent-dwellers. They further distinguish, among themselves,
between those groups whose main herds consist of camels and
those who primarily raise other animals.'
1 . 1 TRIBAL STRUCTURE 
The Jordanian bedouin tribal structure is basically the same
as elsewhere in the Arab world. The size of the tribe is very
important. Some tribes may include only a few families, as
occurs in the Jordan Valley. Others can be very large and
include thousands of people.
The qlbilah (tribe) is usually subdivided into 'asha'ir 
-
(subtribes). An 'asha'ir contains several fakhd, and each
fakhd in turn is customarily divided into two or more parts.
-
The hamulah, a further subdivision, consists of two or more
connected extended families. Throughout the tribal structure,
kinship is based on male lineage.2
1.2 LEADERSHIP IN =BILL SOCIETY 
The leader in a nomadic tribal society is the shavkh. No
strict rule of inheritance governs the actual selection of the
leader within the family. It is not felt, for example, that
the first-born son of a shavkh should always succeed him. If
the shavkh is ill, old, or weak, the tribe will be intensely
preoccupied with the question of succession, and out of the
deliberations of the elder men a consensus emerges as to which
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of the shaykh's sons or other close male relatives is suitable
to fill his place.'
The shavkh is assisted by the ma . lis (tribal council).
Composed of the heads of the various subdivisions of the
tribe, the ma'lis meets daily in the guest tent of the shavkh;
usually it discusses such questions as when to break camp,
where to find grass, news of other tribes, and cases of
litigation. No vote is taken in the counci1. 4 The shavkh, in
his capacity as chairman, makes any final decisions and
influences the council's deliberations. The shaykh is also
responsible for representing his tribe, ruling on water
rights, and acting as arbiter and judge in litigation. In
matters involving consent to marriages and divorces,
protecting the weak, receiving guests, breaking camp,
protecting the honour of the tribe, and working to ensure its
welfare, the shavkh is assisted by a hakim (tribal judge).
The recent growth of government has added to the shaykh's
duties; he must now collect taxes in the tribe and assist
government tax collectors, as well as serve as a
representative to the state.
1.3 BEDOUIN LIFE WMAJ
The influences of the 20th century are bearing down hard on
the bedouins and causing major social changes to long-
established nomad traditions. Jordan adopted a purely
voluntary policy for sedentarization of the nomads.' However,
modern economic forces are altering the traditional
foundations of bedouin life: the village or town now seem
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unavoidable (if not appealing) options. The replacement of
the camel caravans by motor vehicles and railways has greatly
decreased the role of the nomads in the economic life of
Jordan. In the transition to sedentarization, distinguished
by established villages with permanent houses, and near-
complete dependency on agriculture as a means of livelihood,
the newly settled groups have found themselves in a
relationship with peasant neighbors whom they had never
encountered before. Economic cooperation and social
interaction between nomads and peasants has slowly resulted in
intermarriage.
The historic ideals and images of nomadic society remain
powerful influences on popular standards in Jordan and in the
rest of the Arab world. However, translating these values
into meaningful terms in the context of modern Jordanian life
has been difficult. The nomadic past remains only as a
nostalgic tradition and the values and ideals which once
governed nomadic society are of limited practical use in the
earth-bound existence of the agricultural village.
1.4 WOMEN IN BEDOUIN SOCIETY 
There are two conflicting views in the literature on the
position of women in bedouin society. On the one hand, it is
contended that women are viewed as having a high position in
society based on customary law. On the other hand, it is
maintained that women are treated as second - class citizens,
because they are seen as weak emotionally and their sole
purpose in life is deemed to be reproduction.
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In the second view, women also need to be protected and
taken care of. If a woman does not have male children she can
easily be divorced. She can be blamed even if it is the
husband who is impotent. The concept of honour for bedouin
men is very strong (and a man's honour can easily be impugned
by any comments about his wife's or a related female's
reputation). Usually the status of a woman in a bedouin
society is based on the position of her tribe vis-a-vis other
tribes, and the number of male children she has. The bedouin
woman has no say in tribal decisions. She has no right to
inheritance; in the best situation, she will be given a sum of
money only to placeate her.6
The other view, holds that a bedouin woman has a high
position in her society, as she is not required to veil her
face. In addition, she traditionally does men's work such as
chopping wood and herding sheep, as well as maintaining and
keeping house. She is free to move from place to place and
sit with men according to bedouin customs.
These two views seem to be diametrically opposed, yet
they are accurate in that bedouin women have a high status but
limited rights.
1.5 BEDOUIN CUSTOMS 
Customs are key to bedouin society and help shape daily life
and mens' relationship with women. There are laws that govern
marriage, engagement, adultery, inheritance, and crime. The
most important things that concern women in bedouin customs
concern marriage and honour. In the case of marriage, bedouin
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customs do not give women any opportunity to refuse or accept
her future husband -- except in rare cases, which depend on
the woman's economic or social status. For example, if a
woman refuses to accept a potential suitor, she can go to the
head of the tribe and he will intervene, either deciding to
force her to marry against her wishes or to let her choose a
husband. The dowry of the woman is paid to her father and she
does not have the right to use it (usually the dowry consists
of a sum of money or a piece of land or livestock). The
amount of the dowry depends on the woman's position in the
tribe.'
In bedouin society, it is a custom for two families to
"intermarry." For example, if a man chooses a girl from
another family, his brothers and sisters are also obligated to
choose husbands and wives from that family. This has far-
reaching implications, since the initial marriage is the
determining factor of the success or failure of all the other
marriages; the destiny of one couple is the fate of all
others. If one man decides to divorce his wife, all the other
marriages must also be dissolved. It is very easy for a man
to divorce his wife. A man can divorce a woman if: she cannot
bear children; if she has only daughters; if after seeing his
new wife, the husband finds that she has a physical defect or
imperfection; if she talks too much or is too loud; if she
does not serve her husband or his family; or finally, if she
is stubborn, gossips, or is not thrifty with money.8
Cases of divorce and polygamy do not always follow
religious laws. The man can have more than four wives, yet
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the woman can not ask for a divorce even if her husband is
impotent. If the wife leaves her home, she will be called al-
tumuh, (someone who can not be controlled). In this case she
•
can not be granted a divorce and is unable to marry again
until she can obtain permission from the head of the tribe
(who can force the husband to divorce her). The father of the
girl is then obliged to give back to the husband all of the
dowry.
It is worth mentioning that all marriage and divorce
contracts are done orally, but witnesses must be present.
Under Islamic law, a woman cannot be granted a divorce or
remarry until waiting 90 days to ensure that she is not
pregnant. However, in bedouin society there is no period of
waiting and the woman may marry as soon as the divorce is
agreed upon. Of course the children remain with their father
and the woman has no right to her children.'
In cases involving the important concept of honour,
bedouin and customary law is not taken lightly and is a
reflection of bedouin heritage. A woman can be killed if she
does anything to defame a man's honour. For example, if a
girl goes with another man, custom says she must be found and
killed along with him.' Bedouin customs also lay claim to
the right to seek revenge upon anyone harming or killing a
member of one's family. However, not all cases involve blood
revenge. Generally speaking, the laws and customs are very
biased against women and all the responsibility for a man's
honour is placed on the shoulders of a woman. However, a man
will defend a woman's reputation and honour; for example, if
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one man talks about any female member of another man's family,
men in the latter family have the right to have the offender's
tongue cut out or the offending man can offer money in lieu of
his tongue.'
In bedouin law, the responsibility for a woman's actions
does not end with her husband or immediate male family
members. It extends to the fifth line of the male's extended
family.' A woman is not allowed to take revenge against the
crime of another woman in the case of a killing.
Custom also dictates that harming a woman is not allowed.
The husband has the right to hit her only if it is to
"straighten her up", but men are not allowed to injure women.
Because of this, women are often sent to negotiations between
tribes, due to their protected status.' If a woman is
killed, a man has the right to either blood revenge in the
form of four to eight men, or divah, which means the accused
offers money to the other tribe in place of his life. In the
case of a pregnant woman, exposure to any conditions that
would cause her to lose her child is repayable in blood
7
revenge of one man, or diyah.' To the bedouin man, the worth
of a woman is always equated to her reproductive value.
One of the worst fates that can befall a women is to be
-
offered as part of a gift (ghurrat al-divah), along with money
to another tribe to make peace and prevent revenge.' Her
position in the new tribe is no more than that of a slave.
She must remain within the new tribe with no hope of ever
seeing her former family -- except if she produces a male
child. Her former family may then ask to take her back on the
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condition that she leave her son behind. The son is then
considered to be a replacement for the male that was killed.
1 . 6 CONCLUSION 
Even though bedouin society has changed and such concepts as
ghurrat al-divah no longer exist, the conditions that created
such customs are very much still the foundation around which
bedouin life revolve. The original inhabitants of Jordan were
of bedouin background. Some began to settle rather than
maintain their nomadic lifestyle. Jordanian society has
maintained many bedouin ideas and these constitute the basis
from which the society has grown.
2. THE VILLAGE IN JORDAN
In Jordan, peasants constitute the majority of the total
population. The importance of the fallahvn (village
cultivators) rests on the fact that their labor feeds both the
towns and the nomads. Over time, the villages have grown with
the increasing sedentarization of the bedouins.
Three factors affect the preferred location of a village:
access to water, soil fertility, and defensibility. It is not
always possible to meet all three conditions. In some
districts there is no ground water; the soil differs in
productivity from place to place; and villages in the flat
lands lack natural defensibility -- the secured village, in
fact, is remarkably uncommon in Jordan. The typical Jordanian
village is composed of a close group of houses and other
buildings, surrounded by fields. Most villages have sahah 
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(open space) where biweekly or monthly markets are held and
which serves as a social gathering place. The village mosque
is often situated at or near the s'ahah, as are whatever stores
or coffeehouses the village may have. In larger villages, or
in those in which more than one religious sect is well
—
represented, there may be more than one sahah, each with its
own mosque or church.'
Jordanian rural society shows little economic
stratification. There is little real social organization in
the village. Because of the harsh and dry land, most
Jordanian villagers live on an economic scale that does not
set them very far apart from each other -- whether it is a
peasant working his own plot of land or a small landlord
seasonally employing a few laborers. The few who have
obtained real wealth have moved to the towns.'
Socially, however, people in a village do differ in terms
of their prestige and influence in the community.
Traditionally in Jordan the farmer has ranked above the
craftsman and merchant. One reason is because the merchant is
often seen as an outsider, standing apart from village
society.
2.1 LEADERSHIP IN VILLAGE SOCIETY 
Leadership in Jordanian rural society requires relative wealth
in land, advantageous family connections, age seniority, and
reputation. As with the nomads, a basic kinship organization
exists in the villages: male descent, paternal residence and
authority, the extended family, and the clan are all present.
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Hence, an individual villager is bound to the other members of
his lineage by a network of mutual obligations, which is
strongest within the circle of the extended family but which
can also draw the whole lineage together in the face of any
external threat •18
Traditional characteristics of village life in Jordan
are: worship of the land, involvement of individuals in the
kinship group, obedience to religious sect, and community
connections. However, these characteristics are being
influenced by migration to the towns and the effect of Western
ideas and methods. The old forms of paternalistic authority
have become less forceful and command less respect. The wage-
earning husband finds himself more dependent on his own
efforts than on the cooperative economic activity of a circle
of relatives. The force of religion remains strong, but the
secular influences of the town are calling into question the
traditional meaning which religion has had for the countryman,
and with the spread of education there is much less to bind
him to his former place in the village. Also, the movement of
the rural population to urban centers in itself affects the
overall solidarity of the community.
2.2 THE PROBLEMS FACING VILLAGE SOCIETY
A study by Shabib Abu-Jabir on immigration from the
agricultural areas indicates that most rural inhabitants
preferred to work in government or military service, or in
- -
urban manual labor positions. Abu-Jabir found that 57% of
his sample worked in such fields, while 28% worked in
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agriculture, and 13% in other occupations (2% refused to
answer). This study also showed that 56% of the respondents
preferred their children to work in clerical jobs.' Of the
28% working in agriculture, only 8% wished their children to
follow their occupation. n These findings show the serious
problems of village life. Most people are illiterate or semi-
literate. Economic, health, and social conditions are also
unsatisfactory for most residents.'
2.3 WOMEN IN VILLAGE SOCIETY
Rural society is heavily influenced by the bedouin heritage.
Both are conservative in their social trends. Tribal
connections and collective responsibility are very close.
Even though the last decade has seen a spread of education,
communications, and the media, the conservative attitude still
prevails. The effect on the economy is that education has had
no real impact on social life in this rural agricultural
setting.
Rural society is fundamentally a man's society. Men are
the providers and the decision makers. A woman's position is
marginal, even though women in rural village society work
alongside men in agriculture (for example, tilling the land,
planting and harvesting) and they also usually fill the role
of raising livestock. A woman's work is not considered to be
productive labor but rather her duty; all productivity belongs
to the man and his family.
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2.4 THE PROBLEMS OF STUDYING WOMEN IN RURAL AREAS 
It is worth mentioning that there are not many studies on
rural women in Jordan. The first census, in 1961, reported
that 389,958 people worked in agriculture, of which 6% were
women. Of course this number does not include women who
worked without pay but rather as part of their family duty.
The only study done regarding the situation of rural women
concerned women in the labor force in the Jordan valley, in
1975. This study showed that 46.2% of women in the labor
force were in the agricultural sector. Of this number, 73.3%
worked with their family without pay and only 26.7% were
working for wages.'
Another relevant study was published on November 19, 1980
by the Development Journal with support from the Queen Alia
Fund. This study was conducted in a specific area in southern
Jordan. A key finding of the study was that only a small
percentage of women worked outside the house (besides
agriculture): 5.5% as seamstresses, 3.3% in teaching, 2.6% in
tapestry weaving, 1.6% working as vendors, and 0.3% as maids.
The percentage of women who worked for their families without
pay was 44.5%. This study sample included .308 married women
from six villages with a total population of 10,732, which was
approximately 1,624 families.' It is apparent from the data
that rural society is patriarchal: the man is the head of the
family and makes the daily decisions. Authority rests with
the father who has the right to dictate everything in his
children's lives. For example, children do not have rights to
their own property; everything is in the father's name and the
122
decision-making process rests with him in all public and
private matters down to the marriage of his children. The
father's authority is the same as in the bedouin tribal
system. In this reality, women hold marginal positions in
society. A woman's place is determined by the ability to
produce male children and to be obedient to her husband and
his family. An unmarried woman's life will be in danger if
her virginity is in question -- even if it is only a rumor,
her father, brother, or husband has the right to kill her if
she has done anything against her customs. A woman can be
divorced or the husband can take on a second, third, or fourth
wife if she does not produce male offspring.
In the case of older women and mothers of important men,
however, they may exercise influence through advising sons and
often through helping to arrange marriages. In the case of
widows, influence and status is very much determined by the
status of their family.
2 . 5 CONCLUSION
It is clear from this analysis that women are under
considerable economic and social pressure. A woman does not
have the right to refuse or accept a marriage proposal; even a
man has only partial rights in this matter. Usually the
marriage is arranged by the father in accord with social and
economic interests. The marriage arrangement is often made
when the children are first born. The right of the cousin
takes first precedence, a traditional practice which continues
to this day.
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3. THE CITIES IN JORDAN
The contrasts between life in the Jordanian villages and
nomadic tribes and life in the city are great. In the city,
Islamic culture is obvious but secular patterns also exist
which are essentially urban. The city looks to the rural
areas for tax revenues, food, and some raw materials. The gap
between city and countryside has formed largely due to Western
influences. Cities are diverse in composition and have more
readily adapted to such influences, while the homogeneous
village has been relatively remote from these new forces.
For a long some time the rural population had been
economically self-sufficient and able to satisfy its basic
dietary needs from its own food production. Today, the
peasant (and increasing the nomad) relies on commercial
agriculture and consumer goods available in the city.
The cities are important as centers of administrative,
political, judicial, religious, and educational activities.
Religious minorities are concentrated in the cities, working
mainly in these activities and other professional fields, as
well as a still smaller minority of well-to-do landed
proprietors and modern businessmen.
The city has wealth, power, and cultural pursuits.
Coupled with current economic and social forces, this has
helped speed rural migration to the urban centers. For
example, Amman is the largest city in the country; its
population expanded from just a few thousand in the 1920s to
1.573 million people in 1991. Other general features of a
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city are hospitals (or at least a government clinic), one or
more public and/or private schools, a number of mosques and
churches, and a newspaper.
A major source of wealth in Jordanian cities has been
real estate. The urban owners of landed estates put their
capital into building houses, apartment blocks, and so on.
The new middle class has exerted appreciable influence on the
political, economic, and cultural life of the country. 24
3.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JORDANIAN CITIES 
In Jordan, a distinction must be made between old and new
cities, between those with long-established populations and
those like Amman which are based on an influx of refugees and
other settlers. The settlers brought with them the social
patterns of their home localities, but it remains to be seen
how these settlers will adapt to the confused and generally
poverty-stricken conditions of contemporary Jordanian urban
life.
The social organization of the older cities shows a
general resemblance to that of the nomadic tribe and the
village. Extended families are grouped into lineages.
Paternal descent and authority, family loyalty, and intra-
lineage cooperation are more important in these cities.
However, the actual integrity of the extended kin-group varies
from the strong cohesiveness of the conservative lineage to
the more relaxed approach of families influenced by Western
education or residence abroad.
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3.2 WOMEN IN THE CITY 
Women in the city have more chance for a college education,
because most universities are located in cities. At the same
time, the availability of work outside of the home is greater.
The rise of new values to replace old ones, along with
modernization, and increases in wealth, have given urban women
more opportunities and freedom of choice than their rural
counterparts.
The immigration of Palestinian women into Jordan after
the 1948 and 1967 wars has been an important factor
influencing women in the city. Some Palestinian women
imparted their knowledge to Jordanian society. Other
Palestinian women came from villages to refugee camps,
bringing with them their traditional values. These latter
women -- who had little education or job skills -- could not
compete economically with city women. As a result, they were
forced to adopt new values to cope with the economic realities
of city life. Politically, the Palestinian women brought to
Jordan a commitment to continue with the struggle to regain
their homeland.
To sum up, women in Jordan's cities have been exposed to
different outside influences, customs, and values than village
or tribe women.
3.3 CONCLUSION
Jordanian cities have faced a break from the old order as a
result of several factors, including the occupation of
Palestine and the ensuing refugee flood, Western influences,
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and nationalist turmoil in the Arab world. All these factors
have had a particularly intense impact on the cities. New
styles of work and social forms compete with traditional ways
of life.
Jordanian cites are dominating the rest of society as
they have never done in the past. The continued development
of new economic forms and the efforts of the government to
substitute a pattern of unified political administration for
the local and family controls of the past seem certain to move
the cities, and with it eventually the other main sectors of
Jordanian life, closer to patterns familiar in the Western
world.
CONCLUSION
Jordan is made up of three societies these of the bedouin, the
villages, and the cities. Even though bedouin society has
changed, traditional customs are still the foundation around
which bedouin life revolves. Rural society is fundamentally a
man's society: men are the providers and the decision makers.
A women's position is marginal, even though women in rural
village society work alongside men in agriculture. While life
in the cities is still influenced by bedouin and village
customs, cities are also subject to other influences - such as
these stemming from the large influx of Palestinian refugees
and from westernization. There more opportunities for women
to obtain education and employment.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN
JORDAN
1. POLITICAL EMTPOPTY 
The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan was the new name given in 1949
to the enlarged state of Transjordan, originally created in
1921. Prior to 1921, the area comprising the state of
Transjordan was called Urdun or Sharq al-Urdun. The reason
that Transjordan had no permanent name in the past was that it
was never before a separate and independent entity. Since
ancient times this area's geographical location exposed it to
numerous conquerors who occupied it for varying reasons, such
as security and protection of trade routes.
In the first two decades of this century Transjordan
experienced a series of quick political and administrative
changes. After the outbreak of World War I, Transjordan was
occupied for a short period by the forces of the Arab Revolt,
but it eventually came under British influence.
2. JORDANIAN POLITICS DURING KING I ABD ALLAH'S 
RULE 
INTRODUCTION
The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan achieved independence from
Britain in 1946. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the East
and West Banks of the Jordan River were united in order to
save the parts of Palestine which remained under Arab control
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from Israeli occupation. Unity was confirmed and announced in
1950. Seventeen years later, the West Bank was occupied by
Israel during the 1967 war.
Today, Jordan is bounded on the north by Syria, on the
north-east by Iraq, on the east and south by Saudi Arabia, and
on the west by Israel. The total area of Jordan is 97,740 sq
km (37,738 sq miles). The territory west of the Jordan River
(the West Bank) -- some 5,600 sq km (2,160 sq miles) -- has
been occupied by Israel since June 1967. 2' According to a
recent study conducted by the Department of Statistics,
Jordan's population stood at 3,888,000 at the end of 1991,
(not including the West Bank) much of which was in Amman
Governorate where 1.573 million people lived. 26 The
Department of Statistics reported that:
Children under 15 years of age constituted 43 per
cent of the total population, down from 45.5 per
cent found in a 1987 study and 50.7 per cent in a
1979 study. The 1991 study also indicated that a
decline in the fertility rate in the past decade
meant a decline in the number of under-15s and a
rise in other age groups. The number of people
above 60 years old rose by 4.1 per cent in 1987 and
by 4.4 per cent in 1991. According to the study,
the under-59 group rose from 45 per cent in 1979 to
53 per cent in 1991, indicating that the average
life expectancy is on the rise, coupled by a decline
in births.'
Jordan has been ruled by three monarchs: King 'Abd Allah
ibn Al-Husayn (1921-1951), King Tallal ibn 'Abd Allah (1951-
1952), and King Husayn ibn Tallal (1952-present).
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2.1 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN JORDAN BEFORE 
INDEPENDENCE 
A treaty was signed in February 1928 with Britain which
granted limited independence; the British retained the right
to advise on such matters as financial policy and foreign
relations. This same treaty created a constitution, which was
proclaimed in April 1928. The first Legislative Council met a
year later." A supplementary agreement was added permitting
Transjordan to appoint consular representatives in Arab
countries in January 1934. Jordan did not have a regular
Cabinet with ministers in charge of specified departments
until Britain permitted this in May 1939. In addition, the
British subsidy and the British-officered to Arab Legion
(whose second commander was the famous Sir John Bagot Glubb
"Pasha"), helped the amir (prince) before he became King to
extend his authority over the country's internal affairs.
The outbreak of the Second World War prompted moves
towards independence. This was finally achieved, if only in
name, by the Treaty of London on March 22, 1946."
2.2 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN AFTER 1946 
On May 25, 1946, 'Abd Allah was proclaimed King and a new
constitution replaced the old one of 1928. On behalf of an
independent nation, in 1947 King 'Abd Allah signed treaties
with Turkey and Iraq and applied for membership to the United
Nations; this move was vetoed by the Soviet Union and the
United States of America on the grounds that Transjordan was
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not an independent state. Britain arranged a new treaty in
March 1948, which gave Jordan independence, but retained for
Britain military privileges, including the maintenance of
airfields and communications, transit facilities, and
arrangements for military training. In addition, Britain
agreed to provide economic and social aid."
After Israel was created in May 1948, Jordan refused to
agree to the internationalization of Jerusalem, and introduced
a plan for the resettlement of Arab refugees. Jordan
indicated it would accept as permanent the cease-fire
boundary. Despite this action in April 1950, Jordan agreed to
a resolution by the Arab League Council held in Cairo which
ruled out negotiations with Israel or occupation of
Palestinian territory. In the same month elections were held
in Jordan and the West Bank. The West Bank inhabitants voted
to be part of Jordan, which led 'Abd Allah to annex the latter
territory formally on April 24, 1950. This step was
immediately recognized by Britain.'
The East Bank's population was essentially rural and
nomadic with a low level of education. The tribal and local
character of loyalties limited the East Bank population's
involvement at the grassroots level in politics. In contrast,
the West Bank population had a quite different political
history. There was more Western influence and the educational
facilities were much better. A relatively large professional
group formed the core of a growing middle class; many of its
members had been educated in Britain or continental Europe.
Also, because of Jewish migration into Palestine, the
131
political awareness of the Palestinians had increased. These
new elements brought experienced Palestinian leadership into
Jordanian politics.
3. JORDANIAN POLITICS DURING =MG FusAnnsvs RULE 
Since 1948, Jordanian political activity has been conducted
under conditions of continued crises involving war, civil
interference, constitutional change, and constant alarms in
the unstable ceasefire with Israel. Developed organizations,
and large popular Western-style parties, with platforms and
defined positions on particular issues, were not formed until
1953. Before that the average Jordanian tribesman or villager
came into contact with the government only through the mukhtar 
(village chief), local police, and sometimes with the ra'is 
al-baladivah (mayor). On the most important issues, the
mutasarrif (provincial governor) was involved. The government
seemed distant to the people and was not held in high regard.
As already discussed, family, tribe, and village
constitute the significant units of rural Jordanian social
life. Within these circles, politics is a loyalty given or
withdrawn on the basis of attitudes toward the personality of
the individual leader. People turn to the figure most able to
help them and their families personally -- to lend money,
provide food when needed, give employment, and act as advocate
before authority.
This "patron-client" relationship remains a basic force
in Jordanian life, even in urban areas. In the villages, the
patron is typically a man from a well-established family.
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Even such local leaders assemble around other more powerful
individuals. It is from these personal loyalties that the
larger pattern of Jordanian politics is formed. The highly
personal element in leadership and organizational life makes
political parties loose organizations around a key individual.
In February 1955, Jordan announced that it intended to
join the Baghdad Pact (a Middle Eastern defense arrangement)
along with Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. There
were three days of demonstrations and rioting in Amman.32
King Husayn called for the Arab Legion (the Jordanian Army) to
restore order, and the Hazza' al-Majali government resigned
after only several weeks in power. 33 Because of the strong
public reaction against the Baghdad Pact, King Husayn
dismissed Glubb Pasha as commander of the Arab Legion in March
1956, and British officers were dismissed from the Army.34
3 . 1 THE 1956 ELECTION
Political parties developed more fully in Jordan before the
national election of October 1956, which witnessed the victory
of leftist, anti-West, pro-N-asirist candidates. Seven parties
were contesting seats in the legislature, although only three
of them were legally recognized. These three parties were the
Nationalist Socialist Party, the Arab Renaissance Party and
the Arab Constitutional Party. The other four which, although
the government had declined to register, were nonetheless
permitted to participate in the elections, were: the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Movement, the Arab
Nationalist Party, and the National Front (a front
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organization for the Communist Party).
-
In the 1956 elections the Al-Hizb al-Watani al-Ishtiraki 
(Nationalist Socialist Party) emerged as the strongest
political force in Jordan. It gained eleven seats in the new
parliament, and Sulayman al-Nabulsi, its leader, formed the
new Cabinet. Al-Nabulsi was in favor of close cooperation
with Egypt and Syria, cancellation of the treaty with Britain,
and neutrality in the East-West struggle. He also advocated
establishing relations with the Soviet Union and rejecting
American aid.
In April 1957, King Husayn decided to strike against the
opponents of his regime. With the help of loyal bedouin
regiments, he defeated a military coup. He imposed martial
law, dissolved parliament, and disbanded political parties.
As a result, Jordan did not establish diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union. The United States replaced Britain as
the main source of outside aid, although there was no
bilateral treaty or other formal alliance.35
3.2 JCTUIDiN AFTER THE 1967 TOUR 
After the 1967 war, Israel occupied the West Bank, many
Palestinian refugees went to the East Bank, and Jordan started
to receive financial subsidies from wealthy Arab oil
countries. There were questions as to whether the Kingdom of
Jordan could still survive the radical nationalist pressures
from revolutionary Arab regimes, such as those in Iraq, Egypt,
and Syria.
According to Michael Hudson "there was a strong
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interrelationship between legitimacy and strength of
leadership in the traditional Arab systems"." This is clear
in Jordanian politics. King Husayn himself was able to
quickly adjust his policies to accommodate progressive
nationalist forces. For example, despite opposition from Arab
countries in February 1960, Jordanian citizenship was offered
to all Palestinian refugees who applied for it."
3.3 THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank in June 1967 followed the
general elections of April 1967 and impeded the democratic
process in Jordan by making it impossible to hold elections in
the occupied territories. 	 Because of this there were two
forms of parliamentary institutions: an extension of the
mandate of the last elected parliament, and the National
Consultative Council (NCC). The NCC was created in 1978 as a
temporary body empowered to give advice and consultation. The
NCC discussed public policy, considered legislation and laws
submitted and passed by the government, and debated general
state policy in cooperation with the government. The council
had no powers to approve, amend, or reject legislation. Its
60 members were appointed for two-year terms, upon the
recommendation of the prime minister."
The NCC was dissolved in 1984, when bye-elections were
held in the East Bank to fill seven seats vacated by the death
of some members of the last elected parliament. Vacant West
Bank seats were filled by a vote within the parliament itself.
The 60 seats in parliament were divided equally into 30
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deputies from each of the East and West Banks."
3 . 4 JORDAN AFTER 1988 
The Palestine intifadah (uprising) against Israeli occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which began in December 1987,
increased international support for Palestinian national
rights. The Palestinians also demanded statehood and
supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization PLO as the
official representative for the Palestinians. Because of
these circumstances, King Husayn stated that he would
immediately recognize a Palestinian government-in-exile, if
the Palestinian National Council (the governing body of the
PLO) decided to establish such a body. Another issue to be
considered by the PNC was whether to proclaim an independent
Palestinian state in the West Bank. King .Husayn stated that
he would immediately recognize a Palestinian Affairs
Department. New electoral laws were approved in 1986 which
increased the number of seats in the lower house from 60 to
140, divided equally between the East and West Banks."
In October 1988 it was decided to revise the electoral
laws as these were inapplicable - dividing seats between the
East and West banks - and the government announced that the
election would be in November 1989.
On November 15, 1988, the PNC proclaimed the
establishment of an independent State of Palestine and, for
the first time, endorsed U.N Security Council Resolution 242
as a basis for a Middle East peace settlement, thus implicitly
recognizing Israel. Jordan and 60 other countries recognized
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the new state.
3.5 THE ELECTION OF 1989 
After 22 years without an election, Jordan held one in 1989
and for the first time Jordanian women went to the polls to
participate in the political process. The election was the
result of the breaking of formal ties with the West Bank in
July 1988, which removed any reasons for continuing to
postpone an election. Another factor contributing to the need
for an election was the riots in April 1988, which signalled
clearly that the Jordanian people were looking for change --
especially economic reform. Martial law, which had been in
force since 1967, and the ban on political parties in effect
since 1957, were also unnecessary artifacts of the past.
The general election in Jordan was held on November 8,
1989, for an 80-seat House of Representatives. It was
contested by 647 candidates most of whom were independent as a
result of the ban on political parties in effect since 1957.
However, it was possible for the Muslim Brotherhood MB to
present candidates for election, owing to its legal status as
a charity rather than a political party. At the election, in
which 46% of the total electorate (including, for the first
time, women) of 877,475 voted, the MB won 20 seats, while
independent Islamic candidates, who were supported by the
Muslim Brotherhood, won a further 14 seats. 41 It was
estimated that Palestinians or Arab nationalist candidates won
seven seats and that candidates who were supported by leftist
political groups won four seats. The remaining seats were won
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by candidates who were broadly considered to be supporters of
the Government."
The King and the government were in favor of
democratization and there was no sign of the King or the
government intervening in the electoral campaign. The King
personally ordered that Article 18 of the Constitution would
not be used to ban candidates on grounds of their past
political activities; because of this many who had engaged in
political activities in the past participated."
Jordanian political institution take the form of a Bi-
Cameral system. The king appoints members of the Senate and
the parliament is elected. In 1989, there were multiple
constituencies, and voters could make seven votes.
Women were allowed to participate in national elections
for the first time. There were 12 women among the 647
candidates were competing for 80 seats. Despite the fact that
50% of the potential voters were women, women only constituted
about 2% of the candidates." All of the women ran as
independents, and their campaigns were not supported by any
party, society, or women's organization. In the end, none of
the women received much support. The 12 women who ran as
candidates in seven voting districts, were:
Hayfa' al-Bashyr received 365 votes, or 1.32% of the
vote in the district,
Janayt al-Mufti received 2604 votes, or 9.44% of the
vote in the district,
-
Tujan al-Faisal received 1328 votes, or 4.74% of the
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vote in the district,
NMI
Hudl Fakhuri received 2978 votes, or 5.6% of the
vote in the district,
Asbiyr Zriyqat received 828 votes, or 2.32% of the
vote in the district,
Wadad al-Shanawi received 155 votes or, 0.8% of the
vote in the district,
Naydah Bishnaq received 2602 votes, or 4.47% of the
vote in the district,
Nada al-Shar'a received 491 votes, or 4.01% of the
vote in the district,
'Ayshah al-Khawaja received 1176 votes, or 4.26% of
the vote in the district,
'Ayda al-MTItlaq received 3495 votes, or 5.46% of the
vote in the district,
-
Mufyda Swydan received 3817 votes, or 5.96% of the
vote in the district,
-	 -
Na'ilah al-Rashdan received 1046 votes, (percentage
unknown)"
In Amman there was 1 woman in the first voting district, 3
were in the third, and 3 in the fifth. Two women stood in
Irbid, 1 In Balqa, 1 in Zarqa, and 1 in Ma'an."
During the election there was one incident worth
OS.
mentioning. This was when the deputy mufti (chief religious
official) al-shavhk 'Abd al-Rahman Faris brought a case before
-
an Islamic court against Tujan al-Faisal, a well-known
television personality and one of the few women candidates
standing for election. She was charged with "apostasy"
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because she had "slandered Islam" in an article in the
newspaper Al-Ra'i on September 21, 1989, which discussed the
role of women in Islam. She raised topics such as wife-
beating, polygamy, and child abuse. The mufti asked the court
to rule her legally incompetent, dissolve her marriage,
separate her from her children, and give protection to anyone
who would kill her. The court dismissed the case.' It was a
-
rumored that the King personally intervened on al-Faisal's
behalf.
-
The al-Faisal case was a message from the fundamentalists
to women indicating that women's issues could not be discussed
in the open and that it was imprudent to raise topics such as
polygamy and subordination of women, which touch women's lives
every day. Because of what happened to al-Faisal, more women
felt that women's voices had to be heard, and this brought on
a heated discussion in the daily press as to whether people
agreed or disagreed with al-Faisal. The debate raised
questions about the democratic process and what kind of
democracy there was if women were not free to bring their
issues to the public without fear of a backlash.
3.6 THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM IN JORDAN 
Following the 1989 election, King Husayn, under increasing
pressure to initiate Constitutional reform, promised to allow
political parties more freedom, and to tighten controls on
corruption. In April 1990, he appointed a 60-member Royal
Commission to draft Al-Mithaq al-Watani (The National Charter)
to provide a framework for reform. A former Prime Minister,
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Ahmad 'Ubaydat, was appointed Chairman of the Commission,
whose members included figures from the country's various
political and religious groupings, including leftists and
religious fundamentalists. The Charter, which achieved
widespread political consensus in its drafting, was adopted as
a constitutional document on July 5, 1991. Soon after,
parliament passed a law legalizing political parties, thus
forming Jordan's first multi-party system since 1954."
A law passed by parliament in August 1992, specified
that parties must have at least 50 founding members; respect
the Constitution; and have no financial or administrative
links with foreign groups or governments. Party names and
symbols should not be similar to those of foreign parties.
The Minister of the Interior had the right to reject or grant
a party's application, but in the case of rejection the party
could appeal to the Supreme Court for a final decision.
With the enactment of the law, several women became
founding members of new political parties. These were as
follows:"
1. The centrist Jordanian National Alliance had no
women among its 167 founding members.
2. The centrist Popular Unity Party had 10 women among
its 85 founding members.
3. The centrist Jordanian Pledge Party had 3 women
among its 205 founding members.
4. The Islamic Action Front had 13 women among its 353
founding members.
5. The centrist Future Party had 5 women among its 160
founding members.
6. The leftist Jordanian Progressive Democratic Party
had 17 women among its 96 founding members.
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7. The leftist Communist Party had 9 women among its 70
founding members, and 2 women in its executive
primary leadership.
8. The leftist Jordanian Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
had no women among its 72 founding members.
9. The leftist Jordan People's Democratic Party had 14
women among its 100 founding members, and 3 women in
its executive primary leadership.
10. The centrist Progress and Justice Party had 7 women
among its 175 founding members, and 1 woman in its
executive primary leadership.
11. The leftist Jordanian Socialist Democratic Party had
1 woman among its 61 founding members.
12. The centrist Reawakening Party had 1 woman among its
178 founding member, and 1 woman in its executive
primary leadership.
13. The leftist Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity had 6
women among its 98 founding members.
14. The centerist Freedom Party had 6 women among its 61
founding members.
15. The centrist Unionist Arab Democratic Party had 10
women among its 182 founding members, and 1 woman in
its executive primary leadership.
16. The Islamist/liberal Arab Islamic Democratic
Movement had 10 women among its 72 founding members.
17. The leftist Arab Ba'ath Party for Progress had no
women among its 76 founding members.
18. The leftist Homeland Party had 13 women among its
152 founding members.
19. The Pan-Arab-leftist Arab Democratic Party of the
Masses had 9 women among its 56 founding members.
20. The Pan-Arab-leftist the Jordanian Arab Democratic
Party had 10 women among its (uuknown) founding
members.
It is clear that there are few women among founding members,
and even fewer in the executive primary leadership of these
parties.
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3 . 7 JORDAN AI= 1989
With the peace process that started in June 1991, the country
faced growing divisions between the regime and the opposition.
Moreover, the opposition was also slit between secularists and
Islamist activists. Both secularists and Islamists opposed
many aspects of the current system, and both were represented
in the professional ranks which led the movement for
democratization. However, while both groupings sought for a
more open system, they parted company over the Islamists'
desire to pursue a socioreligious agenda. They agreed on
democracy for all, but the secularists wanted a democracy that
would guarantee individual rights.
The Muslim Brotherhood wanted democratic structures to
allow them to gain power and alter the political and
socioeconomic structure. The influence of the Brotherhood
could be seen in the media and in the mosques, and the group
became more powerful after it had won the presidencies of the
medical association, the engineering association, and the
pharmacists' association. It was, besides, the largest bloc
in parliament. The regime found itself in opposition to the
Brotherhood, whom it had previously used against the left.
The Brotherhood called for the liberation of all Palestine and
-
refused to join the Tahir al-Misri government, which had
called for peace talks with Israel.
A factor in the increased support for Islamists was that
the leftists and nationalists were largely limited to drawing
support from urban intellectual elites. The left's failure in
the elections showed that their concern with political
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doctrines was not shared by average voters, who struggled with
practical economic issues and voted instead for the
Brotherhood.
THE BACKGROUND TO WOMEN'S POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION IN JORDAN
INTRODUCTION
The structure of Jordanian society in general does not
encourage women's public activity. Jordanian women started
receiving education in 1922 when six schools for female
students were founded". The main employment for educated
women until 1962 was as teachers for the Ministry of
Education. There were no universities in Jordan until 1963,
and women wishing to study in university had to go to
neighboring Arab countries, and also had to have family
financial support and approval. At the time of writing there
are three state universities and all admit women. Also, five
private universities have opened recently. These create
opportunities for students who would otherwise not meet strict
the entrance requirements of the state universities.
The feminist movement in Jordan has been weaker than that
in other Arab countries. Before the 1950s, there is no record
in Jordan of women's political participation. Whereas urban
elite women in other Arab countries took the lead in starting
feminist movements, this did not occur in Jordan.
There are several possible explanation for this. First,
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up to 1948, there were no large cities in Jordan comparable to
Cairo or Damascus. The only major cities in Jordan were Salt
and Irbid. Even Amman had only a small population before
1948. Second, in comparison to neighboring Arab countries,
Jordanian women did not encounter a tangible enemy British
rule in Jordan was more removed than in other countries, and
there was no physical occupation even though Jordan was under
British mandate. Third, Jordanian women had no experience of
working in national liberation movement, which might have made
them feel they were an important part of public life. These
factors account for the weakness of Jordan's feminist
movement.
However, there was an indirect influence from Arab
feminist struggles on Jordanian women, even though political
participation for women did not start until the early 1950s.'
Women like Huda Sha'rawi were role models for Jordanian women
and the struggles of Palestinian and Algerian women were often
used as an example for Arab women.' The feminist movement in
Jordan was started by women working in the political
opposition from 1950-1957 when Jordan had political parties.
1.1 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN FROM 1950 TO 
1973
A number of Jordanian women worked in the opposition Al-
Harakah al-Watanivah, but they did not influence the parties
concerned towards creating an agenda that would integrate or
improve the status of women in society. It is worth
mentioning that in the early 1950s most of the women who had
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an active role in politics had at least one male family member
who was politically active.' Most of these women
participated under the protection and approval of the male
family member.
In the early 1950s, when the opposition was in its prime
in Jordan, large numbers of women participated in the party
campaigns by word of mouth, distributing flyers, or organizing
demonstrations.
While feminists also supported the Palestinian cause and
put their energy into demonstrations against the occupation of
Palestine, they did not express concern for their own rights
or even for obtaining the right to vote. As a result, the
feminist movement did not become serious until much later.
The Arab Women's Union was created on June 17 1954, and
sought the vote for women. This goal was achieved on March
10, 1955. But the right to vote was limited to women who had
at least an elementary education. The new arrangement did not
prohibit women from being candidates for office.
Unfortunately, women did not practice the right of vote
because of the abolition of political parties under martial
law.
After the abolition of political parties in 1957,
Jordanian political life and mass participation by women
levelled off. In the mid-sixties, the educated women started
to press for equal rights and free political participation.
This trend continued into the seventies.
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1.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN FROM 1974 to 
1989
Women's political participation in Jordan is not as widespread
as in neighboring Arab countries. In part, this is because
the main issues of the feminist agenda were sidetracked by the
Palestinian movement.
The state began to push forward women's political
participation in 1974, partly because the U.N. had decided
that 1975 would be International Women's Year. King Husayn
signed election law No. 8 in 1974, which gave women the right
to vote and to run for office. However, no general election
was held until November 1989.
In spite of the limited participation of most women,
several women did hold public office. From April 20 1978, for
example, women were able to participate in politics through
membership in the National Consultative Council. Three women
am.
were appointed: Widad Bulus, Na'ilah Rashdan, and In'am al-
Mufti. The three women came from different backgrounds.
Bulus was christian palestinian and a school principle.
Rashdan was a native Jordanian , a muslim, and a political
active lawyer (see an interview with Rashdan, p. 197), and she
was the daughter of a member of the Jordanian Supreme Court.
Mufti was a Circassian, the daughter of former prime minister
of Jordan Sa'iad al-Mufti, and had received a college
education. All three of those women, then were educated and
in the case of Rashdan and Mufti kinship ties were important .
The women also had some economically independence, as Bulus
and Rashdan had their own incomes from their jobs.
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The number of female members increased to five in the
second meeting of the council which began on Feb 31, 1979.5'
The state was intent on increasing and upgrading the
level of women's participation, and in December 1979 a
Ministry of Social Development was established. In'am al-Mufti
was appointed Minister and became the first woman minister to
serve in a Jordanian Cabinet.' The Ministry had a budget of
$6.4 million in 1980, and a staff of 99 working in its offices
in Amman. The Department of Women's Affairs was established
within the Ministry of Social Development in 1981."
The state used an integrated approach to women's issues
and programs in an effort to activate and coordinate the
process of overall development. Support was given to the
General Union of Jordanian Women, which had been established
in 1981. The Union was composed of social groups and
individual women. Its primary goal was to promote women's
skills in different fields, with a view to enhancing their
role in social and political development. Also, a Law of
Municipalities was passed in 1982, giving women the right to
vote and be elected to municipal councils.
In 1984, Layla Sharaf became the first female Information
Minister in the Middle East. However, she resigned after some
months because she did not have a free hand in deciding
information policy.
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2. THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN JORDAN AFTER THE 1989 
ELECTION
INTRODUCTION
With the new political atmosphere in Jordan, Jordanian
feminists found it easier to raise women's issues for public
debate. This was done at several conferences between March
1992 and July 1993, held in Amman. The value of examining
these conferences is that they shed light on the position of
contemporary Jordanian women.
2.1 SYMPOSIUM ON "THE ROLE OF WOMEN WITH REGARDS TO 
THE DRAFT LAW ON CIVIL STATUS" HELD ON MARCH 24, 
1992
The symposium was organized by the General Federation of
Jordanian Women. The first presenter criticized the lack of
women involved in the law review, and the second pointed out
-
	
-
that the law treated women as minors. Rhadijah Abu 'Ali (a
political activist), stated that, " women should not abide by
laws and regulations to the letter", referring to the need for
continual change in the laws. AbZ. 'Ali indicated that women
activists should participate in the law review committee
created in 1990 by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan,
which she said was composed solely of shaykhs.'
The second paper, presented by In'am 'Abd al-Hadi (a
lawyer), discussed certain aspects of the draft civil status
law. For example, she said the definition of marriage under
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the draft civil status law was that
"marriage is a legitimate agreement between man and
woman aimed at a certain stable family life under
the husband's care to be founded on a sound basis
that can ensure for both of them the ability to
shoulder burdens cordially and compassionately."'
'Abd al-Hadi argued that the phrase "under the husband's care"
portrays women as incapable of running their lives and their
families without supervision from men."
2.2 THE CONFERENCE ON UIEE "STATUS OF JORDANIAN 
WOMEN" ON MARCH 6, 1993 
This conference, attended by Princess Basmah, was organized by
a government committee with the objective of examining women's
status. A paper submitted by the Minister of Planning to the
meeting said that "the low number of women in the nation's
labor force is primarily attributable to the lack of serious
family support for female members working in the labor market
and therefore outside the home."' He added that the
unemployment among able-bodied and willing-to-work females was
estimated at 24% of the total unemployed workforce in Jordan.
The Secretary General of the Ministry of Education in his
paper said that "illiteracy stood at 25 per cent of women
above 16 years of age and 12 per cent for men. II 61 Also, he
indicated that the total number of females in vocational
training programs was estimated at 86,000 compared to 164,000
males at the end of 1992. He noted that more than 57% of
students at community colleges were women and said that
"despite the high number of school and university students,
numerous constraints continue to obstruct the path of women in
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assuming senior positions in Jordan's social and economic
sectors"." Attorney Tahir Hikmat suggested that a
comprehensive study of laws related to women be conducted with
a view to introducing amendments that would end the privileges
of men over women.'
This conference ended with a recommendation for another
meeting entitled "Towards a National Women's Strategy in
Jordan." Princess Basmah emphasized that there was a need to
activate the role of Jordanian women in comprehensive
development. This required a commitment to find ways of
putting the final strategy into practice so that the public
can see and feel its effects.
2.3 LECTURE ON "CRITICIZING EXISTING SOCIAL VALUES 
AND LAWS AS DISCRIMINATING AGAINST WOMEN" ON
MARCH 6, 1993 
An important lecture was organized by the 'Abd al-Hamid Shuman
Foundation. Suhayr al-Tall, a prominent Jordanian writer,
said that the Jordanian women's movement was suffering, partly
because women themselves did not exercise enough effort to
bring on change. Al-Tall indicated that the Jordanian women's
struggle had failed to introduce change or raise awareness
among women. She characterized this failure as resulting from
the dominant perceptions of a woman's role in society that are
usually based upon a traditional tribal or patriarchal style
of thinking. For example, school textbooks continue to
portray women as housewives or as weak creatures who rely on
151
men to rescue them from dangers or critical situations. Al-
Tall added that there was a lack of representation in the
recently established political parties, which provided further
evidence of the absence of women in the political arena.
Women were only used at the last minute to complete the
numbers required for licensing these parties."
.2.4 SYMPOSIUM ON "THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL 
SOCIETY" ON MARCH 12, 1993 
This symposium was at the Royal Cultural Center. It
recommended the "creation of a national society", to defend
women's rights in conjunction with Amnesty International.'
Although this conference was not specifically feminist, it
raised many issues on the feminist agenda. Participants said
that there was a large gap between the theory and practice to
women's rights. Participants also devoted time to discussing
the rights of women obtaining passports independently from men
and having access to family planning. Other subjects included
the need to form pressure groups to ensure the enactment of
laws giving equal rights and treatment to men and women, and
focusing on women as victims of rape, sexual exploitation,
severe punishment, and other forms of maltreatment.
2.5 SYMPOSIUM ON "THE AGREEMENT FOR THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN" ON
APRIL 20, 1993 
The symposium was arranged by the Business and Professional
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Women's Club. The purpose of the symposium was to shed light
on the U.N. agreement on discrimination against women and to
discuss its suitability for approval in Jordan. The symposium
was held in Amman at the Chamber of Commerce. The symposium
tried to bring to the public important issues related to
women's status by inviting well-known guests from both sides
for balanced discussions. Even though these meetings did not
recommend any strategy to change the status quo, at least
women knew what they were facing and would be prepared for the
next step.
At the meeting, Ahmad 'Ubiydat, the former prime minister
of Jordan, said that the United Nations agreement for the
elimination of discrimination against women did not contradict
the Jordanian Constitution." He said that each country
should have the right to interpret the United Nations
agreement in a way that conformed with its constitution and
its traditions and values. He indicated that more analysis
was required before Jordan could give an answer as to whether
the U.N. agreement would be adopted. The former Social
••••
Affairs Minister, In'am al-Mufti, and director general of the
Noor Al-Husayn Foundation, said that in 1988, 94 countries
validated the U.N. agreement, but only four of these countries
were Arab. "Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt are the Arab
countries that approved the U.N agreement; Jordan signed the
agreement in principle but has not yet validated it".' She
indicated that the agreement was flexible and took into
consideration the traditions of each country, and that Jordan
needed to examine how to implement it with respect to its
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traditions.
'Abd al-Azrz al-Khayyat, former Minister of Awaaf 
(Islamic Affairs), said that Islamic law and gave women
equality with men -- as children, as girls, as young women, as
wives, and as mothers. Nevertheless, he said that certain
aspects mentioned in the U.N. agreement were in contradiction
with Islamic Law. For example, "Women can not inherit equally
with men as it is men who have financial burdens that women
are exempt from." " He also said that "Women have equality
in working, as long as that does not negatively affect the
children's upbringing". He added that women have equality in
politics in their right to vote and the opportunity to learn
in mixed schools, as long as the seating arrangement separated
men from women. Al-Khayyat said it was not possible to change
Islamic Law with respect to women's dress, eating, drinking,
marriage and inheritance, because there were norms and
traditions by which men and women in society abide." This
represented the traditional religious view.
2.6 THE SEMINAR ON "WOMEN AND POLITICAL ACTION" ON
JULY 5, 1993 
A seminar was held at the Royal Cultural Center on July 5,
1993, chaired by Layla Sharaf, a member of the Senate of
Parliament. The seminar was organized by the new women's
research center in Jordan. Sharaf told the seminar that "we
should not keep on blaming society - though it plays a major
role for women in the present crisis; nor should we blame the
man, though he has also stood in the way of women's
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development.... We should not distance ourselves from our
responsibility if we really want to get out of this deadlock".
She said that feminist actions should concentrate on raising
awareness among women in the countryside of their rights,
especially their political rights."
2.6 CONCLUSION
Whereas the early feminist movement tended to concentrate on
the Palestinian issue, recent feminists have taken advantage
of greater political openness to present women's issues for
public debate.
3. THE DEBATE OVER GRANTING WOMEN A QUOTA OF SEATS 
IN PARLIAMENT
INTRODUCTION
Just before the 1993 parliamentary elections, advocates of
women's issues were pondering ways and means which would
advance women's chances of getting into Jordan's 12th
Parliament. One idea which was floated was granting women a
quota of seats in the Parliament. While advocates of such a
quota system describe it as a positive action, rivals said
that it would be undemocratic, depriving qualified men of
seats in the legislature. This issue was to divide the
feminist movement. However, a quota system was already
incorporated in Jordan's Election Law, which ensured that
racial groups, such as Circassians and Christians, were
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represented in Parliament. Nine seats were reserved for
Christians, two for Circassians, and one for Chechens.
Although women, theoretically, could take all seats in
parliament through the electoral process, Parliament did not
at that time include a single woman.
3.1 ARGUMENTS FOR THE QUOTA SYSTEM
Advocates of the quota system said that it would ensure that
minorities participated in the decision-making process.
Although women were not a minority, they were politically
disadvantaged. Twelve women ran in the 1989 elections but
none of them won. They all ran as independents, and their
campaigns were not supported by any party, society, or women's
organization.
In March 1993, quota advocate Arwah al-'Amiri, president
of the Center for Women's Studies was quoted as saying "many
Jordanians still perceive that a woman's place is in the
home." She added that "even though women are increasingly
becoming more visible in the public arena, they still only
occupy lower level positions with few exceptions."n
Suhayr al-Tall said the quota system was needed because
many parties which supported women's rights instead decided to
increase their chances of winning by nominating men, rather
than implementing their own programs and nominating women."
She added that the role of women in the 1989 elections was
extremely limited. First, only a small number of women stood
for election. Second, women were not aware of their rights
and their voting patterns showed that the majority of them
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followed the voting of their fathers, brothers, or husbands.
Some feminists accepted the quota system as being
temporary action until society changed and women became
incorporated in all aspects of life. At that point, women
would be able to win office on their own merits."
Some feminists felt that the presence of women in the
public arena would increase women's political, social, and
economic skills. They argued that women could not develop if
they were isolated from public life, and that the current
Parliament had neglected women's issues and had weakened the
civil status laws associated with women.
3.2 ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE QUOTA SYSTEM
It is worth mentioning that some feminists opposed the quota
system on the grounds that it would place mainly conservative
women in Parliament, and would sign away the remaining rights
of women in Jordan. Other feminists saw the quota system as
undemocratic, and here they had political allies.
The Chairman of the Islamic Action Front, Ishaq al-Farhan
said "I oppose the quota system because I perceive men and
women as equals...enactment of the quota will portray women as
inferior to men."' 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdah, a deputy in
the Parliament, said that the quota system would only benefit
a minority of women - those who work in the public arena. He
added that this representation of women would be "fake" since
women would be ensured a place in Parliament by law, not by
the choice of the people.'
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3 . 3 CONCLUSION
The debate over the quota system raised other related women's
issues with the public. These issues had never before been
debated in Jordan. The outcome was that the idea died out
before the 1993 elecation.
4. THE JORDANIAN ELECTION OF 1993 
INTRODUCTION
The first multiparty poll since 1956, the year before King
Husayn outlawed parties after a failed left-wing coup to
overthrow his Hashemite dynasty, was held in Jordan on
November 8, 1993. There were 20 political parties registered,
and the elections saw leftists, centrists, conservatives,
traditionalists, and pragmatists competing. It was also the
first test of Palestinian support for the Washington peace
accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization. The peace talks with Israel were opposed by the
fundamentalist Islamic Action Front (IAF), which constituted
the biggest bloc in the previous parliament. There were 550
candidates, including three women.
It is important to mention that there were three
incidents which seemed likely to interrupt the process. The
first was the change in the voting law from bloc voting to a
one-person, one-vote system, which the Islamists in particular
interpreted as a government move to cut their support and
strengthen tribal voting patterns. The second event, the PLO-
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Israel agreement in September, caused more upset, as it
suggested that Jordanians of Palestinian origin who chose to
vote in the elections planned for the West Bank in 1994 would
not also be able to vote in the Jordanian elections. Also
there were strong indications that the Jordanian elections
would be postponed due to the agreement. The third incident
was when the government rejected the IAF's application to hold
election rallies. The ban was overturned by the courts only
10 days before voting day, and this contributed to a fairly
quiet campaign:76
4.1 THE RESULT OF THE 1993 ELECTION
The result of the 1993 election was that centrist and
traditional candidates, who endorsed the King's peace dealings
with Israel and further democratization moves, won over 50 of
the 80 parliament seats. Islamic fundamentalists, who
hostilely opposed peace with Israel, lost nearly a third of
the 22 seats won in 1989.
The campaign raised no major national issues. Voter
turnout was higher than in the 1989 elections, with 68% of
registered voters casting their ballot in the 1993 election,
compared to 46% in 1989." Voters in Amman gave the highest
number of votes to the IAF candidates. Jordan's first woman
member of parliament, Tujan al-Faisal, was elected in Amman.
Al-Faisal was an outspoken feminist and liberal whom the
Islamists had tried to have declared an "apostate" during the
1989 campaign. She won one of the three seats reserved for
the Circassian minority, although she only received 1885
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votes, or 4% of the total in the third district. Two other
women stood, but received even lower support. Janayt al-Mufti
came fourth for this seat, with 853 votes, or 1.8% of the
total. Naydah Bishnaq, in the city of Zarqa drew 1195 of the
votes, or 1.3% of the total."
It important to mention that Kerak, which in 1989 turned
its back on traditionalist leaders, returned a leading tribal
figure and leader of the centre-right nationalist Al-Ahd
party. Tafilah, in contrast, voted heavily for newcomer and
pan-Arab leftist Muhammad Daoudiah, while the Balqa
constituency, which includes the quintessentially Jordanian
city of Salt, now has among its eight deputies two
representatives of Palestinian origin elected largely by the
residents of the Baq'ah refugee camp and representing their
interests. Only 26 former deputies returned to the new house.
The election showed a strong desire by Jordanians to see
change. This was reflected in the election of a liberal woman
member of parliament for the first time.
4 . 2 CONCLUSION
The 1993 election saw a high voter turnout and a strong swing
away from Islamists. It was disappointing that only three
women stood as candidates, but the consolation was that for
the first time in Jordan a woman was elected as a member of
parliament, and it was a particular victory for the feminist
-
movement that it was Al-Faisal.
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5. JORDANIAN WOMMR'S ASSOCIATIONS: onlmcIAL 
AND UNOFFICIAL 
Although after 1989 women were able to vote, they still found
it difficult to use the political system to advance their
cause. Thus, many of the issues were raised by women's
charitable associations. The associations were first started
by female royalty as social welfare agencies for the poor and
for children. Later on, educated women and working women
became involved with associations, and as a result the goal of
these organizations changed to calling for more political
rights for women.
5.1 JORDANIAN WOMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS FROM 1944 TO 1954 
The first women's association in Jordan was created in 1944
under the name of Al-Tadamun al-Nisa'i al-Iitima i i (Women's
Social Support). The mother of Prince Tallal was honorary
President of this association. The goal of the association
was to care for children and women and enhance the social
welfare of the poor and needy. On May 31, 1945, another
association was established under the name Al-Itthad al-Nisa'i 
7
al-Urduni (General Jordanian Women's Association), again with
Prince Tallal's mother as honorary President. The acting
President was Princess' Zayn Al-Sharaf, now known as the queen
mother." This association differed from Women's Social
Support in that its goal was to increase the level of
education for women, raise basic health standards for
children, and give assistance to poor mothers. In 1949, the
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two associations become one under the name of the Al-Jam'yah
al-Nisa'iyah al-Urduniyah al-Hashimiyah (Hashemite Jordanian
Women's Association). However, the association dissolved in
that same year." No official explanation was given for this.
Between 1951 and 1979 there were more than 340
associations in the General Union of Social Associations,
which was formed by the Social Welfare Ministry.' Women's
associations, defined as those with only women as members,
totalled 32 out of the 340 associations. Basically, they
provided financial assistance to kindergartens, day care
centers, centers for homeless children and the elderly,
schools for the handicapped, and charities for the poor.'
Several women's clubs also worked in social activities
with an emphasis on education. The membership of these clubs
was made up of different classes and political affiliations.
Three major clubs were the Professional Women's Club, and the
Arab Women's College Club. Members of the Arab Women's
College Club had to have a college degree and most of their
activities were of an intellectual nature. All of these clubs
sponsored lectures and educational activities for their
members. In addition, most did charity work, but none
seriously addressed women's issues.
There was also an association to combat women's
illiteracy through work in poor areas and refugee camps. With
the help of the Ministry of Education, this association opened
an evening school for women, staffed by Ministry of Education
teachers.
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5.2 THE ARAB WOMEN'S UNION FROM 1954 TO 1974 
Some Jordanian women saw the need for a unified organization
which would improve women's status. On June 17, 1954, Al-
Ittihad al-Nisa'i al-'Arabi (the Arab Women's Union) was
founded by more than 100 women from Amman. The president was
Emily Bisharat". For the first time in Jordan the question
of women's right to vote and to participate in parliament was
publicly raised." After much work and discussion, in 1955
women achieved a declaration from the parliament giving them
the right to vote in the national elections if they had an
elementary education. However, women could still not be
candidates for election. The union was not satisfied with
this and continued to work for equal status with men. Their
principal argument was that whereas women with an elementary
education could vote, men who were illiterate could both vote
and run for office. The union kept pressing this point and
wrote a petition in February 1956 endorsed by thousands of
women who used their fingerprints rather than their signatures
- as this was the means of identification used when illiterate
men voted. This was perhaps the most unusual petition ever
submitted in Jordan up to that time."
In March 1956, the Arab Women's Union called for
modifying the personal status law and for the abolition of
polygamy." The union also wanted to modify the labor laws to
ensure better conditions for Jordanian working women. In June
of that year, the union also asked for the right to vote and
be candidates in municipal council and village council
elections."
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The Arab Women's Union asked the government in June 1956
to train women to carry arms and administer first aid and
render civil defense. They sought this at a time when Egypt
was under attack from Britain, France, and Israel after the
Egyption government had nationalized the Suez canal. Also,
the Arab Women's Union organized demonstrations in support of
Algerian women against French occupation." In interview in
1994 Emily Nafa' said that in 1956 Jordanian women asked to
have equal rights under law and sought to abolish the
Jordanian-British treaty."
In 1957, the Arab Women's Union was dissolved following
King Husayn's move to restrict political parties and other
organizations in Jordan."
5.3 JORDANIAN WOMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS FROM 1974 TO 1991 
A. ASSOCIATION THE UNION OF JORDANIAN WOMEN'S UNION
In 1974, a new independent women's organization was formed:
the Jam'ivat al-Ittihad al-Nisa'i al-Urduni (the Association
•
of the Jordanian Women's Union). One factor which led to the
establishment of this organization was the United Nations'
announcement that 1975 would be International Women's Year. A
large number of women who had experience working in voluntary
associations joined this new association. The association was
officially formed on November 17, 1974. The organization was
permitted by the Ministry of the Interior. Emily Bisharat was
the president of this Association.
In its constitution, the organization set its goals as to
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improve the educational, social, and economic status of women,
to ensure that women would be able to enjoy all their rights
as citizens, workers, and housewives, to have good
relationships with other local and international unions and
associations, and to represent Jordanian women in local and
international conferences."
When the Association started, it had just 100 members,
but after six years there were 3,000. The Association put its
emphasis on vocational work for women and on combating
illiteracy, and opened a center in Amman to train women to
sew, embroider, and knit, as well as to learn to type in
Arabic and English. Completion certificates were given at the
end of the two-month training period. There were also
branches in northern and southern Jordan. Clubs aimed at
educational activities for children were also created."
Emily Bisharat told the researcher the Association first
published a journal in 1975 under the name of Al-Ra'idah 
(Pioneer). These journals were stopped when the association
was dissolved."
The Association was also politically active. It played a
supportive role for Palestinians by holding a demonstration in
March 1975 in front of the International Red Cross office to
protest against the torture of Palestinians in prison." On
July 1, 1975 the Association sent a telegram to the Secretary
General of the United Nations, signed by thousands of women
asking him to intervene on behalf of the imprisoned president
of the Jam'ivat In'ash al-Usrah (Family Assistance
Association) of the West Bank. Finally, the Association was
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dissolved by the Ministry of the Interior on October 26, 1981.
The justification given for this move was that the Association
was involved in activities that were outside its own
constitution. In reality, the Association had become very
active and was well organized and the government felt it could
be a potential threat." In 1989, the case of the Association
of the Jordanian Women's Union came before the courts and it
was decided that the 1981 dissolution was unconstitutional.
Thus, the organization was reestablished.
B. THE BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL WOMEN'S CLUB 
The Club was established in 1976, and in 1984 started to
increase its activities by offering advisory services to
Jordanian women, for example, free legal assistance. By 1986,
the Club had started to play an important role in working to
modify laws such as the civil laws and to inform women about
their rights and duties." Panels were created with
government decision-makers to discuss women's issues. Another
project begun in 1989 was to help women start small businesses
to reduce the unemployment in Jordan. Also, before the 1993
election the Club started panels to encourage women to vote."
The Club tried to politicize Jordanian women in any way
it could to make them aware of their rights. The Club
proposed three changes in the personal status law to the
Ministry of Justice in 1993, first, a man should pay alimony
to a woman until she remarries when there was no reason for
divorce (but that she must have a court decision to be
eligible). Second, the deferment dowry should be adjusted for
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inflation. Third, there should be a fund available for child
support until the court gave a decision."
C. THE GENERAL JORDANIAN WOMEN'S UNION
In 1981, a new official women's organization under the name of
Al-Ittihad al-Nisa'i al-Urduni al-'Amm (the General Jordanian
/ •	 1
Women's Union) was established to represent women and was
funded by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Because of this
official influence, many women were hesitant to join.
5.4 WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS AFTER 1991 
There were two large of women's organization after 1991 in
Jordan: the General Jordanian Women's Union and the
reestablished Association of Jordanian Women's Unions.
Several parties also had their own women's organizations.
IV. WOMEN AND EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
A key hypothesis of this thesis is that as women become more
educated, their political participation will increase. It is
worth in this context examining the development of women's
education in Jordan in detail.
As noted earlier, in 1922 there were six schools for
female students and ten schools for male students. In 1922
there were 318 girls in elementary schools and 2182 boys at
the same stage. The number had increased by 1945-1946 to 1956
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girls and 7918 boys."
1. EDUCATION IN JORDAN AFTER 1952 
It is now generally accepted in Jordan that women have the
right to and need for an education. Education in Jordan
became compulsory in 1952 for elementary school, which is six
years, and preparatory school, which is three years. Higher
education is also available for women. The University of
Jordan was established in 1962, the University of al-Yarmuk in
1976, and Mu'tah University in 1982.
Total enrolment of women, a useful measure of educational
development, is illustrated in the following table:n°
Stage School year Males Females %Female
Elementary 1975-6 206,618 179,394 46
1984-5 256,841 245,412 49
Preparatory 1975-6 67,388 48,229 42
1984-5 108,339 69,463 47
Secondary 1975-6 25,394 16,743 40
1984-5 49,917 46,685 49
Secondary voca- 1975-6 4,548 1,893 29
tional 1984-5 18,679 10,347 36
Higher education- 1975-6 7,904 3,969 33
institutes 1984-5 30,070 23,825 44
Universities 1984-5 15,875 10,054 39
This table shows how much of an improvement there has
been from 1975 to 1985. (More details are given in Appendix
2). There is also evidence of a change in attitudes regarding
the purpose of women's education. A study by Najat al-
Sanabary in 1985 found that a majority of the women in her
sample said they were looking for work in educational and
occupational fields previously dominated by men. 101
The Secreatry General of the Ministry of Education
referred to the fact it that 57% of student in community
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colleges in 1992 (see p. 150) were women. This compared to
50.9% in 1986-87 (see table p. 279). This increase was
typical of women's participation at all levels of education
and is likely to have been a major factor increasing women's
political participation (see p. 254).
1.2 CONCLUSION 
Women have had increased access to engineering studies and to
the natural, physical, and medical sciences. This reflects a
marked change towards education since the 1970s, when women
concentrated on studies that would make them better wives and
mothers. There is no doubt that education improves the lives
of women, despite the restrictions that still exist for them
in political activities.
V. WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE 
INTRODUCTION
The patterns of women's participation in the labor force are
changing. An investigation of these patterns shows definite
shifts over time, especially during the past decade profound
the changes in the national economy have occurred. Changes in
the regional oil economy, as well as the increase in planned
development on the national level, have had a significant
impact upon the structure and nature of women's work.
As noted earlier, better education has increased the
opportunities open to women in the workforce. Jordanian women
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entered the labor force in the 1950s despite societal
opposition. This opposition is illustrated by the state ban on
the employment of women in government agencies until 1947;
married women, moreover, were not allowed to teach. 102 Most
women who had taken a non-agricultural occupation by the 1970s
were either teachers or were working for the government as
public servants. Later, it became acceptable for women, even
married women, to work for wages outside the home (See
Appendix 3).
1. THE PROBLEMS OF STUDYING laromEN IN THE WORKFORCE 
Jordanian statistics about women in the workforce are limited
to government employees, and do not include women in the
private sector, or in the army. Most statistics on the
private sector take into account institutions with more than
five people, which excludes small businesses. For example, a
woman who works at home or a woman who works as a maid or a
baby sitter would not be counted.
According to government figures, in 1980 about 48% of
Jordan's population was female. 50.7% of women were under 15
years old, 34.4% were 15-39; 10% were 40-54; and 4.6% were
more than 55•" A recent statement by the secretary general
of the Ministry of Labor in Jordan indicates that "at present
women form 14 per cent of the total workforce in the Kingdom,
up from 7.4 per cent in 1979". 1" However, the assessment of
women's participation in the agricultural sector remains
problematic because of the differing definitions of employment
and the contradictions between various studies.' This makes
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it difficult to generalize about increasing or decreasing
participation in this sector. A 1979 estimate was that 70% of
the female labor force was in agriculture and this constitute
33% of all labor. Of these, only 2.2% were paid and permanent
workers, 17.6% are paid and non-permanent, and 79.8% were
unpaid. 106
1.2 THE OBSTACLES FACING WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE 
A study of obstacles facing women workers in Jordan was
published in 1989. Its author, Amal al-Farhan, used
•
interviews with women and men working in administration
offices of the Ministry of Education in Amman. Her sample
identified 2460 people working as administrators, of which
81.7% were male and 18.3% were female. She found that only
2.8% of women believed they would be promoted. The rest
mentioned the lack of motivation in their current position due
to the limited chances for promotion, or the lack of training
provided. According to al-Farhan, the Ministry of Education
did not send women employees to training courses to improve
their work skills. In addition, when promotions are given a
man always had priority. 107
2. JORDANIAN LABOR UNIONS 
The labor movement in Jordan started in 1948 under the name
_ -
Jam'ivat al- 1 UmMal al-'Arab al-Filastinivah (Arab Palestinian
/
Workers' Association) in Hayfa. After the occupation of
Palestine, the Association moved to Amman. The activities of
the Union continued until 1951, but after 1952 the name was
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changed to the Jordanian Labor Association; however, in the
same year, it was dissolved by the state. 108
Owing to popular pressure, the state issued law No. 35 in
1953, which gave the Ministry of Social Affairs the right to
issue licenses to labor unions in Jordan. By 1956, there were
27 associations within the General Union of Jordanian Labor,
which including the Vocational Association, the Industrial
Association, Government Employee Association, and Agriculture
Labor Association.' But the state contest government
employees being classified as "labor," and forbade them to
have an association. Labor union activities increased in the
early 1970s with the Ministry of Labor responsible for all
labor associations.
2.1 WOMEN IN JORDANIAN LABOR =NS 
Most working women were working for the government and were
thus excluded from labor unions. According to Ministry of
Labor statistics, 110 80% of women in private education
participated in unions; 28% of women in banking; 20% of those
who worked in stores; and 25% of those who worked in travel
agencies and airlines. In other areas, participation in
unions was less than 1%. (See Appendix 4 for more details.)
In explaining the low level of women's participation in
unions, Suhayr al-Tall has contended that women feel the laws
do not protect them from employers and fear losing their jobs.
Also, because of the absence of democracy in Jordan, women are
afraid to confront the state. The consequences for a woman
sent to prison would be devastating, given cultural norms and
172
the inevitable involvement of the whole family in the
process •112.
This seems reasonable. It is also likely that women are
not aware of their rights, which is the fault of the Unions
because they do not stand for women's rights or demand more
protection for women under the law. Based on the above
analysis, it is clear that women's participation in the
Jordanian labor force has been increasing in recent decades.
It has increased not because women achieved a better position
in society, but because economic necessity forced many women
to work outside the home. Islamic culture did not stand in
the way of women joining the labor force in greater numbers.
Indeed, many women today have adopted the hi . Eb as a symbol of
identity that does not interfere with their roles in the
modern urban workforce.
3. THE slwrE ROLE IN PROVIDING EzmucnalErm MR WV=
The attempt by the state to further development raised the
need for more workers and created new opportunities for women
by providing the appropriate environment for women's
employment through planning and legislation. The state as is
clear from plan in The 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan, emphasized
the need for a new concept of social organization, assuming
that all sectors of the population would participate
effectively in development and women's participation in the
wage labor force would be significantly increased. 112
In February 1977, the Ministry of Labor created the
position "Secretary for Women's Affairs," the job description
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being to follow up and implement the resolutions of the
Manpower Symposium, which was held in April 1976 and focused
specifically on the role of Jordanian women. According to
Nadyah Hijab,
The Symposium adopted some 55 resolutions to
modernize labor legislation, enforce universal and
compulsory education, expand work opportunities for
women, provide training and placement services,
conduct research on obstacles and attitudes
preventing women's participation, enforce the
principle of equal pay for equal work, and involve
women at the policy making-level."
The 1976-1985 plan included measures to promote women's
education, organize special training programs for women, and
establish child care centers. This plan was discussed during
several conferences and seminars on women organized by
different governmental and non-governmental institutions. 114
4. THE EFFECT OF LAMM MIGRATION ON THE EIEFLOMENT 
OF MIEN
The effect of labor migration to the Gulf was twofold. First,
the migration of men encouraged women to join the workforce to
replace male migrants. At the same time, the rise in the cost
of living pushed more women to work outside the home. Second,
the labor migration that increased women's involvement in
economic activity also led to women having a greater share in
decision-making, because the women left behind had more family
responsibilities. The extent to which this occurred, however,
was uneven and depended greatly on the woman's position prior
to the man leaving. A newly married young woman would not
find her position strengthened until she has children,
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particularly sons, and establishes control over her own
household by wresting control from her mother-in-law.
Women with an education benefitted most from the labor
migration of men to the oil countries. A woman with poor
skills and low education level had little employment
potential. Such a woman did not have a promising job future
outside the home, and in many cases dropped out of the
workforce altogether and lived on the money sent by the male
working outside the country.
Jordan also employed large numbers of Egyptian and Asian
workers, estimated in 1980 at 80,000." (See Appendix 6 for
up-to-date numbers), taking up the vacancies created by absent
Jordanian males. This not only delayed the entry of women
into vacancies in the labor force, but may in fact have
removed some from those spheres where they had high levels of
participation in the past. This phenomenon showed itself
clearly in the agricultural sector, but also occurred in urban
areas where domestic services were increasingly performed by
non-Jordanians. However, the number of outside laborers
decreased after the second Gulf War according to government
statistics, due mainly to an economic slow down and high
unemployment in Jordan. 116 (Unemployment figures are given in
Appendix 7.)
In the last few years Jordan has been in a recession and
has been faced with backlash migration from the Gulf after the
war and a cut in Arab aid. Since then, the unofficial policy
has been for the withdrawal of women from the labor force as a
solution for the rapidly intensifying unemployment problem in
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the country. The policy was implicit rather than explicit;
for example, if a man and a woman applied who had equal job
qualifications applied for a job, the man would be given
priority on the assumption that the man would be the provider,
ignoring the fact that some women provide for themselves and
their family.
If this policy is pursued, then even the limited inroads
that women have recently achieved in the formal sectors of the
economy will be threatened and they will be likely to
disappear once again into the "invisible" and unmeasured
spheres of labor.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the state needs women in order to successfully
pursue development in Jordan. To do so, the state must create
opportunities for women and integrate them in the national
development plan. Many women have taken advantage of
education and training, and have contributed to their
country's development. As in many other Arab nations, the
state gave the space to women, but recently the state has been
trying to push women back home.
VI. WOMEN AND THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
To encourage more women to participate politically, it is not
only necessary to increase their opportunities in education
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and in the labor force, but also to change the laws affecting
women. This legal perspective argues that Jordan's existing
laws, and especially the personal status laws and labor laws,
slow down the process of integration, and demands that they be
changed to accommodate the evolving role of women.' I will
give a brief description of the legal position affecting
Jordanian women.
1. JORDANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the 1952 constitution, Article 6 stated that "all
Jordanians will be treated the same in laws in terms of rights
and duties even though they are different in color, language,
or religion." Article 23 ensured the right of work for all
citizens and the duty of the state to make that available to
everyone. Although the election law gave a man a right to
vote and to be a candidate, women did not have rights to
either. However, this was changed in 1954, as a result of
hard work by women's organizations (as mentioned earlier) to
change Article 8 of the election law so as to give women with
elementary schooling the right to vote. However, women did
not have a chance to practice their right because parliament
was abolished. It was not until 1974 that King Husayn changed
Article 8, and finally all women gained the right to vote and
to be a candidate. Women could not practice these rights
until the election in 1989.
From the above, it is clear that the constitution does
not discriminate against women.
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2. WOMEN AND Loam LAW
In general, the legislation regarding working women in the
Arab world is reasonable by international standards. The 1960
Labor Law, Article 21, was the first attempt to regulate labor
laws for men and women in Jordan. There were specific
articles concerning women's rights. Article 46 prohibited
women from working in dangerous areas or in situations that
involved a hazard to health. Article 47 prohibited women from
working at night except in a situation recognized by the
Ministry of Social Welfare. Also, according to Article 50 (a)
women had the right to three weeks paid leave before her baby
was due, and three weeks with half pay after the baby was
born. However, Article 51 stipulated that women employees
must have worked at least for the last 180 days before they
are allowed to take maternity leave and gain protection from
dismissal because of the pregnancy. Article 45 (4) stated
that women working regularly must have two weeks paid leave
after maternity, but must have spent six months on the job and
have a report from a doctor, and that the first sick day would
be without pay.
The Labor Law did not give a woman any kind of special
right concerning her children, such as free time to breast-
feed them. However, Article 35 (3) specified that
institutions with more then 30 women employees must provide a
day care center for children under six years old. In general,
the Labor Law did not discriminate against women in terms of
wages. Article 19 (1) indicated that if a woman left her job
because she got married, she would retain rights to social
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weeks
according to the
length of service
security, if she had spent at least six months in her job.
A new Labor Law was adopted in 1980. It tackled some of
the problems of working women. For example, Article 191
prohibited women from working in certain industries, such as
those using chemicals or in any work considered dangerous to
the workers' health. Also, Article 188 said that women may
work at night if the nature of her job required it, and that
the Ministry of Labor had the authority to change Article 188
if there was a need for more women workers, for example, if
there was a war or other crisis. The new law recognized the
right of an employee mother after maternity. For example, she
had the right to feed her child for an hour with pay under
Article 195. The law again stressed, in Article 196, that
every employer who has 30 women employees must provide a nurse
at the day care center. Article 116 said that it was illegal
to fire a woman employee because of marriage.
The table below compares maternity leave in various Arab
countries as of 1984:11'
Maternity	 % of wages paid
Leave	 during leave
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
U.A.E
84 days
45 days
50 days
70 days
42 days
70 days
40 days
100 days
80 days
45 days
56 days
56 days
50-60 days
30 days
45 days
50
100
100
100
50
100
100
100
50 for 10
100
50 or 100
100
50-70
66
50 or 100
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Yemen	 60 days	 100
The table shows that there are differences in how generous
maternity leave is.
3. TREATMENT OF mom IN THE clnrm RETIREMENT Laoq
Like the Labor Law the Civil Retirement Law No. 3, 1941 had
specific rules for women. Article 17 said that a male
employee may retire if he has spent 20 years working; on the
other hand, female employees may retire after 15 years.
Article 24 said that if a retired woman has inherited two
pensions she has the right to only one of them. Article 34
specified that when a retired woman employee dies, her
retirement salary is only paid when there were people
dependent on her when she was alive. However, when a retired
man dies, the retirement salary is always paid, whether or not
the next of kin were dependent on him.
4. TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY Lam
The Social Security Law No. 30, 1978, also had specific rules
for women employees. Article 41 said that a male employee has
the right to social security when he becomes 60 years old, but
a female employee gets it when she is 55. The same article
(e) said that employees have the right to all social security
benefits when they retire, but they must have participated in
social security for at least 180 months, so that they can have
a benefits until they die.
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5. TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN THE PERSONAL STATUS LAW
The personal status laws of 1976 were derived from the
shari'ah and cover marriage, guardianships, dowries, the
rights of the wife, the rights of the husband, polygamy, al-
muhkala'ah (paid divorce), divorce, custody, and inheritances.
These issues will be examined separately. (See Appendix 5,
legislative indices of the position of women within Arab
Societies 1993).
Marriage
Article 61 (2) of the personal status laws defined marriage as
a contract between a woman and a man, like any other type of
contract. In order to be valid, there must be two men as
witnesses or a man and two women as stated in Article 17; the
law considers two women equivalent to one man. Also, Article
33 said that if a Muslim woman marries a non-Muslim her
marriage is invalid, but if a Muslim man marries a Christian
or Jewish woman it is considered valid.
Marriage Guardians
The law defined a guardian as the person who signs a marriage
contract on behalf of a woman. Article 2 said the minimum age
of marriage for a boy is 16 and for a girl 15. If the woman
is under 18, a guardian must be present. The guardian in the
marriage must be a man from the family of the bride. A woman
over 18 who has married before has the right to conduct her
marriage contract without a guardian. However, Article 22
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stated that if a woman over 18 has never married, the
guardian has the right to ask a judge to cancel the marriage
if the prospective husband is not considered to be suitable
for the woman. This same criterion did not apply to a man if
he chooses someone not considered good enough for him. It is
worth mentioning that a woman can be a marriage guardian if
there is no male in the family.
Dowries
Article 44 said that the dowry must be stated in the marriage
contract. If no amount is specified an amount depending on
the status of the woman or her relatives and friends must be
offered. This is based on the Qur'an's principle: "Marry them
with their family's permission and pay their wages"
The rights of the wife
The woman has the right to receive money from the man for
three months after a divorce. She also has the right to be
treated well as stated in Article 39•120 Also, when the man
marries more than one woman, all wives must be treated the
same and each wife must live in her own house - according to
Article 40. 121
The rights of the husband
Under Article 39, the husband can order his wife to stay at
home or to go where he goes. According to Article 81, if a
woman leaves her house without reason, or does not let her
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husband stay in the house, she loses her right to three months
money after the divorce because she is considered to be nashiz 
(literally, dissonant). Also during this three months of
'adah the husband has the additional right to annul the
divorce.
Polygamy
The man has the right to marry up to four women at the same
time, according to Article 40, but moral guidelines often
prevail based on the Surah from the Qur'an: "If you fear being
unfair it is better to have only one".122
Divorce
A man in Jordanian law has an automatic right to divorce a
woman, as is stated in Article 85. A woman must petition the
judge for divorce, and must have a reason as stated in
Articles 116, 120, 123, 126, 127, 128, 130, and 131. Article
19 said that if the woman puts such a clause in her marriage
fee
contract, she is entitled to a divorce 'ismatuha bivadiha, and
she can also put in other conditions; for example, that she
can stay in her own town, or that if he marries again she will
seek a divorce. These conditions are binding on the husband
by law. Unfortunately, many women are not aware of these
rights.
Al-Muhkala ' ah
Al-Muhkala'ah means an agreement between a man and woman in
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which the woman pays money to the man in exchange for a
divorce. This requires the consent of the man. The amount
paid is at least as much as the dowry, or the equivalent in
goods, and is covered in Articles 102-112.
Custody
In the case of divorce, the mother has the right to custody of
her children, (and the father has to pay child support), as
outlined in Article 154, until 9 years old if the child is a
boy, and until 11 if the child is a girl. The mother can have
custody of her children after that age if the father agrees,
but the father does not then have to pay further support. It
is important to mention that when a woman has custody of her
children she is not the guardian -- usually the father is in
cases of divorce. In cases of the father's death, the
guardian is any male from the father's side. In some
instances, a woman can be the guardian if no one from the
man's family protests. Also, a woman loses her right of
custody according to Article 156 if she marries again. This
right will go immediately to her mother; if her mother dies or
is too old, the mother of the father becomes the next in line
for custody.
Inheritance
The law of inheritance was based on the Qur'an, when a parent
dies, a woman will inherit half of what her brother would
inherit. If a women's husband dies, she inherits 1/4 of his
inheritance if she has no children, and 1/8 if she does. The
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rest goes to the children and their grandparents. If a man's
wife dies, he always inherits 1/2.123
CreRMUUSIM
This chapter has described the specific societal, and
political conditions in Jordan affecting women. It is clear
from this analysis that many tensions exist between
traditional and modern conceptions of the role of women.
Feminist activities in Jordan are growing in strength,
partly as a reaction to the multi-party system adopted in
1992. This system has given women the hope of participating
more fully in the political process. The effects can be seen
by the increasing number of meetings and conferences demanding
legal changes concerning women's rights. Women's
organizations are bringing to the public many new issues.
However, because of strongly differing views, it is unclear
how this debate will be resolved in the coming years.
The laws affecting Jordanian women that there is a strong
similarity with laws in neighboring Arab countries.
Constitutional laws grant women the same rights and duties as
men, but there are contradictions with other laws such as the
labor, retirement, and personal status laws.
Chapter five will present in detail Jordanian women's
opinions, based on the questionnaire which was used in field
research to test the hypotheses of this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE RESULTS OF FIELD RESEARCH TO EVALUATE JORDANIAN
WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
INTRODUCTION
Jordanian society in the last four decades has experienced
many economic, social, and political changes. One of these
changes has been an increase in women's participation in both
the economic and social spheres. However, the political
participation of Jordanian women is still limited, even though
women have the right to vote, to be candidates in parliament,
and to be members of political parties after the multiparty
system was re-introduced in Jordan.
Field research was conducted in Jordan by the researcher
in an effort to obtain new data on the role of women in social
and political life. The information obtained from this
research helps fill a gap in existing knowledge about how
Jordanian women participate in politics and the obstacles they
face in increasing their participation.
This chapter will first review the results of seven
interviews, which were conducted by the researcher with
leading Jordanian women's activists of varied backgrounds and
experiences. During the research, it was determined that it
would be beneficial to have both the views of women activists
and women at grass-roots level. For women activists, the
researcher conducted unstructured, informal interviews
concerning their personal experiences as activists, the quota
system which guarantees some seat in Jordanian parliament for
women, the problems with women's political participation, and
strategies for improving political participation. The
researcher tried to give different perspectives from women who
have worked in a variety of political roles. Interviews were
also conducted with two lawyers (a man and a woman; both
family lawyers) in order to gain different perspectives about
the how the personal status laws are administered in the
courts.
The field research methodology will then be discussed,
and how the data was collected, how the researcher presented
herself, and the general observations of the researcher. The
questionnaire used in the interview process is then described.
It was designed in five sections: the first section reviews
demographic and personal data; the second covers women's
attitudes on political participation; the third discusses
women's views on private life and the Jordanian personal
status laws; the fourth section analyzes women's views on
education and work; and the fifth section analyzes the
relationship between Jordanian women and other Arab women with
respect to political participation.
All data gathered in the interviews is analyzed using
percentage analysis and ANOVA and LSD computer analysis. The
findings of the research are presented.
This chapter concludes by relating the hypotheses to the
research findings.
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1. INTERVIEWS WITH ACTIVIST WOMEN IN JORDAN
1.1 AN INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST JORDANIAN womm
LAWYER, EMILY BISHARAT 
BIOGRAPHY 
Emily Bishar-at was the first Jordanian woman to become a
lawyer. The researcher was fortunate to be able to meet her,
as she is now retired from public life and no longer grants
interviews. Bisharat has an L.L.B (Bachelor of Law) degree
from the University of London. In 1954, she was elected
president of the Arab Women's Union.' In 1961, she joined the
Jordanian Bar Association and was active in the Union of
Lawyers' Associations from 1970 to 1980.
VIEWS ON PERSONAL STATUS LAWS AND QUOTA SYSTEM
Bisharat stressed that one of the most important steps that
could be taken to improve women's political participation was
to change the personal status laws. However, in her opinion,
this would be difficult because Jordanian women today seem to
care more about material things instead of values. Bisharat
was against a political quota system guaranteeing seats for
women in the Parliament because it would not be democratic:
"democracy can not be limited".
VIEWS ON THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
-
Bisharat thought that Jordanian women in general must be more
politically active. In her view, the status of women could
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only be improved through integration of Arab countries under
the theme of "equal rights, equal responsibilities".2
1 . 2 AN INTERVIEW WITH A MEMBER OF A POLITICAL 
PARTY, EMILY NAFA' 
BIOGRAPHY 
Emily Nafa' has been a member of the Jordanian Communist Party
since 1954, and is the president of the re-formed Arab Women's
Union. She became politically active for the first time in
1954. Because of her political views she lost her job in 1963
as personnel manager at the Ahli Bank. Because there was no
political prison for women in Jordan she was placed under
house arrest for six months. 3 After that she could not find a
job. Nafa' worked in a labor union and cooperated with Emily
Bisharat in the Arab Women's Union, until 1957 when it was
dissolved.
VIEWS ON THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS, LAWS, AND QUOTA SYSTEM
Nafa' indicated that there was a need to modify the personal
status laws, passport regulations, and labor law. 4 She also
mentioned, that in the House of Representatives from 1989-
1993, a law relating to women's inheritance was changed which
dated from the Ottoman rule (the old law allowed a woman to
have the same rights as a man in inheriting undeveloped land),
and now the new law was that a woman inherited half of what
the man inherits. This law was puplished in the Official
Journal April 1991, No. 3747. She said that the time for
feminists to take the opportunity to gain more rights was
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during the 1993 to 1997 term of the House of Representatives.
Nafa' agreed with the quota system for women to be in
parliament and municipal councils.
VIEWS ON THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
According to Nafa', a woman's involvement in her daily duties
did not leave her time to do anything else. She believed that
democracy was a temporary thing in Jordan; democracy must be
built by society.
Nafa' felt that women's political participation could
only grow if women became more politicized through political
parties.
1.3 AN INTERVIEW WITH LAYLA SHARAF, MEMBER OF THE 
JORDANIAN SENATE 
BIOGRAPHY 
Layla Sharaf was a member of the National Consultative Council
appointed in April 1978, Minister of Information briefly in
1984, and a member of the Jordanian Senate since 1989.
VIEWS ON THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS, OTHER LAWS AND THE QUOTA
SYSTEM
Sharaf recognized that there was a conservative movement which
might slow the growth of the women's movement; for example,
the conservative movement had passed the land inheritance law
(which Emily Nafa' also mentioned) and was attempting to stop
all moves to modify, 1976 the personal status laws.'
Sharaf had been in favor of the quota system for women to
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be in the House of Representatives and municipal councils, but
now she had changed her position because she thought the
conservative movement would benefit most from the quota
system.
CONTEMPORARY STATE OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
Sharaf said that the recent achievements of Jordanian women
were remarkable and were the result of much hard work. For
her, the women's movement was dynamic and growing. She felt
that women's organizations must use different tactics to
achieve their goals. She said that the women's situation
today was different from the past; the Jordanian Women's Union
and the Business and Professional Women's Club had the
responsibility to act as pressure groups and use their power
to improve the status of women. To realize this goal,
Jordanian women had to become more politically active. 6 She
also indicated that any change in Jordanian women's status
could only be achieved by women working hard for that goal
it could not be done for them.
OTHER ISSUES 
An important event occurred in March 1994 when 59 out of 62
members of Parliament refused to lift the immunity of an MP
-
who Tujan al-Faisal had accused of hurling insults - and an
ashtray - in a clash during a debate on security. Al-Faisal,
vowed to pursue him in the courts when Parliament recessed and
his immunity automatically lapses. Sharaf was asked whether
this dispute would hurt the image of women as MPs; she said it
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would not change perceptions of Jordanian women politicians.
She noted that Jordan was preparing to attend the September
1995 U.N. women's conference in Beijing with a delegation
headed by Princess Basmah. While attendance by itself would
be important, implementation of the conference's
recommendations was what really required.
1.4 AN INTERVIEW WITH NA'ILAH AL-RASHDAN, MEMBER OF 
THE JORDANIAN SENATE 
BIOGRAPHY 
••••	 of.	 ••••
Na'ilah al-Rashdan is a member of the Jordanian Senate. She
started her life as a lawyer, the third woman practising law
in Jordan. In 1976, she joined the Business and Professional
Women's Club. She has given free legal advice to any woman
who has asked for it. In April 1978, she became a member of
the National Consultative Council with Layl; Sharaf. Since
1980, Al-Rashcia'n has been a member of the Lawyers'
Association, the Consumer Protection Association, and the
Family Planning Association, and is an executive member of the
Jordanian Women's Association.'
VIEWS ON THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS AND QUOTA SYSTEM
Al-Rashd;.n believed that improvements in the status of women
must be gradual, and that pressure must be put on the House of
Representatives to change the personal status laws. She
believed that the parliamentary quota system for women was
important to improve women's status.8
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VIEWS ON THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
Al-Rashciin thought that the main problem facing Jordanian
women was that they were not economically independent, and
that they must go beyond the idea that man was the only
provider. She said that women's organizations highlighted
women's problems when there was an international conference,
for example the upcoming September 1995 Beijing Conference,
but that the issues must be constantly addressed. She
concluded that there was a need for leadership in the women's
movement.
1.5 AN INTERVIEW WITH BUTHAYNAH JARDINAH, A
DIRECTOR OF THE WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION 
BIOGRAPHY 
-
Buthaynah Jardanah has been the director of the Business and
Professional Women's Club since 1989.
VIEWS ON THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS AND THE QUOTA SYSTEM
Jardgnah supported the parliamentary quota system - at least
until such time as Jordanian women had more experience in
politics. She said that the integration of women in politics
could only be accomplished by working hand in hand with
Jordanian men.9
VIEWS ON THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
Jardanah indicated that Jordan, like other Arab countries,
faced many problems which affected women's political
participation, for example, the occupation of Palestine, the
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lack of resources, the rapid increase of population, some
social customs, and ignorance of the Islamic religion. She
added that religion was not responsible for the low status of
Jordanian women, because Islam prohibited exploitation of
people. Jordan's participation in the September 1995 Beijing
Conference was important but so was implementing the
recommendations of the conference.'
1.6 AN INTERVIEW WITH AN EX-CANDIDATE FOR THE HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES (1989 AND 1993), JANAYT AL-
MUFTI 
BIOGRAPHY 
Janayt al-Mufti was a candidate in the 1989 and 1993
elections. In 1989 she ran for the third district (Amman is
divided into eight districts), and in 1993 she lost to Tujan
al-Faisal in the fifth district, in a Circassian seat.
EXPERIENCE IN POLITICS 
=IP
Al-Mufti said that she learned from her first political
experience how to present important issues and discuss them.
She mentioned that funding for the campaign was an important
factor for her because she ran as an independent candidate;
women involved in political parties were more likely to get
help with funding. II Also, the tribal factor played a
conservative role in the Jordanian election. In her
experience, a woman did not vote for a woman and a man did not
vote for a woman.
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VIEWS ON QUOTA SYSTEM
Al-Mufti also stated that the parliamentary quota system
should be adopted for now, until Jordanian society became
accustomed to having more women in political life.12
VIEWS ON THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
Al-Mufti indicated that the political and economic situation
in Jordan affected women badly. In Jordanian politics women
were always considered marginal; to solve the problem of
unemployment women could be sent home to make jobs available
for men. Even though the political and economic situation
affected the whole society, women were affected most because
any solution always came at their expense. Unfortunately,
there was no effective leadership in the country that would
stand up for women's issues. It was important to stress, she
said, that women's organizations must be more prepared than
before.
1.7 AN INTERVIEW WITH MP TUJAN AL-FAISAL 
BIOGRAPHY
-
MP Tujan al-Faisal became known as an anchorwoman on Jordanian
television, before entering politics, in 1989.
EXPERIENCE IN POLITICS 
-
Al-Faisal said that she lost the 1989 election not because she
was a woman, but because of the way she thought about
different issues rationally. The fundamentalists were against
her. Even though the progressive forces supported her, she
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could not find a job for four years after her defeat. She
indicated that she was not sure that she was going to win in
the 1993 election and yet did. She said that women's rights
were not her main interest, but stressed that she had a
political interest in human rights that included both women
and men. She noted "I am not an MP for women, but I am for
both men and women" •13
With regard to the recent dispute discussed in section
1.3, Al-Faisal said that she was the only MP who had stood up
against MP al-Khraishah. For the first time in Jordan's
history, nine parties had cooperated to support her in this
case.
VIEWS ON THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS, AND OTHER LAWS 
said that she had had a long-standing commitment to
women's issues. When she was the anchor on Jordanian
Television she did a series in 1985 which highlighted the
personal status laws to make women aware of their
constitutional rights. She had also proposed to modify the
Law of Nationality so that a Jordanian woman married to a
foreign husband could gain Jordanian citizenship for the
husband and any children they might have.
She said that she believed in the enlightenment of
religious thought, and that any change of the personal status
laws must be gradual. To achieve this change required popular
support.
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VIEWS ON THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
Al-Faisal believed that committees and conferences were not
going to benefit women's political participation. She
criticized the attitudes of women's organizations for their
dependency on the state and for their traditional thinking. 14
She characterized her differences with the women's
leadership by saying that "women's issues are one concern and
I am concerned about Jordan as whole and changing the
-
Jordanian political system".' Al-Faisal concluded that1
democracy was the only answer for Jordan, because with
democracy the authorities would work to please the people;
"with democracy we will have dignity and human rights."
1.8 AN INTERVIEW WITH NAWAL AL-JAWHARi, A FAMILY
LAWYER 
BIOGRAPHY 
•••••
— -
Nawal al-Jawhari has been a family lawyer in Amman for five
years.
VIEWS ON BAYT AL-TA'AH (HOUSE OF OBEDIENCE) 
Nawal al-Jawhari said that the bayt al-ta'ah could not be
implemented until certain conditions were met by the husband:
1. that he provided for his wife; 2. that before he asked her
for bayt al-ta'ah he must pay all the conditions in the
marriage contract, such as for her jewellery, furniture, or
other valuables mentioned in the contract; and 3. that he
provided a house to the wife. She said that in a court of law
it was hard to implement the bayt al-ta'ah. The underlying
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idea was to make a women obedient. If the wife refused to
agree to bayt al-ta'ah, she would lose her rights for three
months on the alimony which was required by law. Al-Jawhari
indicated that the personal status laws were fair for women;
for example, if a woman left her husband because he beat her
and there was no scar or witness, then the court would
consider as evidence any statements made to a neighbor or her
family about what the woman had said that the husband may have
done. If the judge was not convinced by such statements or
other evidence, then he would ask for the woman's testimony
under oath. 16 But the main point was that if a woman was
treated badly by her husband she was allowed under law to seek
a divorce.
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS 
Al-Jawhari concluded that, in her opinion, the problem was not
the law, but the practice of the people. For example, parents
would often marry off a daughter who was under age even though
this violated the law.
1.9 AN INTERVIEW WITH 'ALI MASLAH, A FAMILY LAWYER
BIOGRAPHY
-
'Ali Maslah has been a family lawyer for twenty five years.
VIEWS ON AL-'ASAMAH AND BAYT AL-TA' AN 
Maslah said that a woman had the right to have as many
conditions in her marriage contract as she wanted. For
example, al-'asamah allowed a woman to have a divorce but the
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wording must be specific or she will lose this right even if
it said in her marriage contract that "I have the right to
divorce any time I want until the divorce is final". Maslah
said if the wording was not exact the man by law could ask the
woman to come back.'
Maslah also stated that for cases of bavt al-ta'ah a
woman would lose her rights to three months of alimony, which
was required by law, but would not lose her deferred dowry.
She had the right to protest within one week about this
decision. Maslah noted that bavt al-ta'ah was not from
-
shari'ah, rather it was originally derived from Ottoman law.
The Family Law of 1951 included bavt al-ta'ah and required
police to return a woman to her marriage and home. By
contrast, the personal status laws of 1978 asked but did not
force her to return to her husband.
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS 
Maslah also felt that the laws were fair. For example,
article 97 of the personal status laws stated that the wife
could ask for emergency alimony while the case was in court;
also in cases where the man sought a divorce for no reason, a
women had the right to alimony from three months to one year.
Based on his 25 years of experience as a family lawyer, Maslah
said that there was a need to: 1. raise the age of marriage
for both men and women; 2. clarify several articles in the
laws and allow the courts to show more flexibility in
interpreting the laws; 3. use arbiters when there are long
divorce cases, instead of the court asking for more evidence
204
which resulted in delays; and 4. take into consideration the
needs of the children in custody cases.18
1.10 
	
CONCLUS ION
The activists, have different perspectives of political life
and varied levels of experience. However, they all shared a
belief that there was a need to modify the personal status
laws, and also to politicize Jordanian women. Most agreed
that women's organizations should play more active roles as
pressure groups (with the recommendations from international
conferences being followed up). All felt that democracy in
Jordan would give women a better chance to play an active
role.
Of the two lawyers, both said the laws were fair, but one
recommended changes.
2. FIELD RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The objective of this study is to gain insights into Jordanian
women's opinions about political participation and to test the
hypotheses stated at the beginning of this study. To do this,
the researcher designed a questionnaire, which sought to fill
in gaps in the existing research. The researcher used
participant-observer interviews with a sample of 70 women.
This size sample was considered the maximum that could be
examined in the time available and within the capacity of a
single researcher. The interviews were conducted between
April 1 and June 1, 1994 in Amman, the capital of Jordan,
which is home to a diverse mix of Jordanians.
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The interview technique allowed the researcher to ask
questions the same way to each interviewee, and, importantly,
to explain the questions the same way. This technique is
important in the context of this study because it is the most
culturally acceptable form of eliciting responses from
Jordanian women.
The researcher used formal, structured interviews; formal
means that the researcher explained to each interviewee the
purpose of the study and asked permission for each interview;
structured means the researcher asked questions and wrote the
answers in a questionnaire. The questionnaire included
closed-ended question (suitable for easy codification), and
the open-ended questions (which allowed women to express their
opinions without limiting their answers or directing them to
respond in any particular way). This technique was designed
to gather as much information as possible.
2.1 THE SAMPLE 
The researcher used a "Quota Sample". This method made it
possible to include women's opinions from different classes in
Jordanian society. The research took into account the
following variables: age, religion, cultural/ ethnic group,
area of residence, profession, women's clothing, marital
status, education, occupation, and income.
The research examined the above variables and how they
related to women's opinions on political participation. These
variables should highlight differences between different
groups of women. The popular view that younger people have
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less conservative views than older people. It is feasible to
suggest that single women are more employable, and also have
-
more free time for other activities. Naydah Hijab argues that0
education is a main factor in the workforce,' and one could
expect that better-educated and professional women would be
more likely to be interested in politics. Women who wear the
hi j ab could be predicted to have more conservative views. The
Muslim section of the population would probably have stronger
views on the personal status laws, some of which do not apply
to non-Muslims. This factor is also worth examining because
the legislature reserved three seats for Circassians and
Chechens, who form 1% of the population, and nine for
Christian minorities who form 4-6% of the population.'
The sample consisted of more working women than
housewives because of the availability of the former women to
interview. The sample covered more married women than single
women, but there is no data on the actual proportions of
married and single women in Jordan.
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
AGE
The sample women were all of voting age and were categorised
as 19-25, 25-34, 35-44, or 45+
RELIGION
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Women were classified as Muslim or Christian
CULTURAL/ETHIC GROUP 
Women were classified as Arabs or Circassians
AREA
The research classified the respondents according to the area
divisions used by the Department of Census in Jordan. The
department splits Amman into 41 subdivisions.' Social
classifications of the Jordanian Department of Census were
used to relate area to social and economic ranking. For
example, as shown in the map in Appendix 9, subdivisions 83,
85, 86, and 93 are considered wealthy districts and will be
referred to in the analysis as areas 1, 2, 3, 4. Subdivisions
81, 91, 92, and 94 are middle class and are referred to below
as areas 5, 6, 7, and 8. All other areas are lower class.
PROFESSION
This category denotes a women's profession if she is working,
her husband's if she is not. This is because housewives
define their class by their husband's profession.
CLOTHING 
Women were classified as wearing the hi'D (Islamic dress), a
•
scarf (i.e. she covers her hair, but wears makeup and a
colorful dress or skirt), traditional dress (the Palestinian
traditional dress), a modern dress (Western clothes).
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MARITAL STATUS 
Women were classified as married or single.
EDUCATION
Women's levels of education were categorised as illiterate,
Tawjihi (from first grade until high school), Diploma (Tawjihi
+ two years, community college), B.S., B.A., (University
degree), M.A.(Master's degree), M.D.(Medical Doctor), and
Ph.D. (doctorate).
OCCUPATION
The researcher used definitions used by the Jordanian
Department of Census to form four classifications:
High Status Occupation
women who have a Ph.D or M.D. in medicine,
dentistry, law, journalism, engineering, or are
director of research centers or companies (private
business) or banks.
Middle Status Occupation
top civil servants in the Ministry of Education or
Health or the Justice Department.
Middle Lower Status Occupation
lower civil servants working as clerks or
secretaries, and women in small private businesses.
Lower Status Occupation
Women who are working as janitors or maids, as
laborers in the construction industry, or living on
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welfare.
INCOME 
This refers to the income from work for a working woman, but
the husband's income for housewives. For single women who do
not work, the income of the family was used.
2.3 I DESCRIPTION OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND 
PERSONAL DATA
1.AGE
Table 1
Age Number Percentage
19-25 11 15.7
25-34 26 37.1
35-44 18 25.7
45+ 15 21.4
Total 70 100
All of those in the sample were aged over 19. The categories
into which interviewees were classified in age terms are given
in Table 1. The largest group was those from 25-34,
constituting 37.1% of the sample. Those under 34 constituted
52.8% of the total, and the remainder 47.1%.
2.RELIGION
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Table 2
Religion Number Percentage
Muslim 62 88.6
Christian 8 11.4
Total 70 100
The sample was 88.6% Muslim. Christians accounted for 11.4%.
The latter percentage is higher than their relative proportion
of Christians in the population as a whole, but this may
reflect the fact that the Christian population of Jordan
mostly lives in Amman.
3.CULTURAL/ETHNIC GROUP
Table 3
Cultural/Ethnic Number Percentage
Arabs 64 91.4
Circassian 6 8.6
Total 70 100
The Circassian minority in the sample was 8.6%. This shows
that the proportion presented in the data was roughly equal to
the proportion of the population as a whole.
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4.AREA
Table 4
Area* Number Percentage
Wealthy 22 31.4
Middle-class 33 47.1
Lower-class 15 21.4
Total 70 100
*Jordanian Department of Census classifications.
The sample consisted of 31.4% from wealthy areas, 47.1% from
middle-class areas, and 21.4% from lower-class areas. The
middle-class, therefore constituted the largest percentage of
the sample.
5. PROFESSION
Table 5
Profession Number Percentage
Housewives 25 35.7
Working women 45 64.3
Total 70 100
The sample consisted of 64.3% working women, and 35.7%
housewives.
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6.CLOTHING
Table 6
Clothing Number Percentage
Hijab 9 12.9
Scarf 8 11.4
Traditional 3 4.3
Modern 50 71.4
Total 70 100
The sample consisted of 12.9% of women who wear the hi'lb,
11.4% of women who wear a scarf, 4.3% who wear traditional
clothing, and 71.4% who wear modern clothing.
7.MARITAL STATUS
Table 7
Marital status Number Percentage
Married 48 68.6
Single 22 31.4
Total 70 100
The sample consisted of 68.6% married women and 31.4% single
women. The majority is married women.
213
8.EDUCATION
Table 8
Education Number Percentage
Illiterate 5 7.1
Tawjihi 16 22.9
Diploma 15 21.4
B.S,	 B.A + 34 48.6
Total 70 100
In the sample, 48.6% had University degrees, which women
without a University degree constituted 51.4% of the sample.
Although the sample covered a wide range of educational
backgrounds, the sample shows a skew towards women with more
education.
9.OCCUPATION
Table 9
Occupation* Number Percentage
High Status 25 35.7
Middle Status 11 15.7
Middle Lower Status 21 30.0
Lower Status. 13 18.6
Total 70 100
For the definitions of these four categories, see above.
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The sample consisted of 51.4% of women in high status
occupation and middle status occupations, while women in the
lower occupational ranks are slightly underrepresented,
accounting for 48.6% of the total.
10. INCOME
Table 10
Income* Number Percentage
0-199 31 44.3
200-500 21 30.0
500+ 18 25.7
Total 70 100
*In Jordanian JD per month.
As is clear from Table 10, all income levels were represented
in the sample. There are, however, relatively few people with
lower incomes.
2.4 HOW THE DATA WAS COLLECTED 
Before the researcher started to collect the data, an outline
of the procedures to be used was developed, but there was
still a concern that some Jordanian women would not allow
themselves to be interviewed. The main issue was whether or
not Jordanian women would answer questions of a personal and
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private nature asked by a stranger, thus putting in jeopardy
the objectives of this study. The researcher believed that
being a Jordanian herself would be beneficial, but having been
educated in the West and living in the United States for
several years might raise some suspicions. Upon arrival in
Jordan, the researcher conducted a pilot study with friends to
determine if the study questions were understandable. This
same approach was used by the researcher in Durham, which
helped refine the questionnaire; however, the Durham group was
small because there were only five Jordanian women there.
An interview strategy was developed. One method was to
use a friend to invite several women to have coffee in her
house, without mentioning anything about the research. The
researcher attended several parties like this and was able to
gain access to various types of women and interview them later
with their permission. Another method was to go to government
public clinics for lower-income people and sit in the waiting
room. Usually there would be between 10-20 women in such
rooms; this allowed the researcher to meet a different segment
of women and later interview them discreetly. Another method
was to find people in specific occupations, for example a
lawyer, a medical doctor, or a pharmacist. The researcher
took all opportunities to speak with as many different women
as possible. Many of these sessions were spontaneous, which
allowed for more candid discussions.
The researcher did several interviews by going to
government ministries. For example, the researcher went to
the Department of Census to ask several questions concerning
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the research, and also took the opportunity to interview two
women. The researcher met a woman waiting in the bus station,
asked her if she would agree to be interviewed, and later went
to her office in a private institution. The researcher
interviewed her and asked her if there was anyone else who
might agree to be interviewed. The woman called an older
colleague from a different department.
A male friend working in the Housing and Planning
Development Department introduced the researcher to two women
colleagues, who were engineers, and they agreed to be
interviewed. The researcher also went to a private school and
interviewed teachers there and, separately, while conducting
private business in a bank, the researcher took the
opportunity to interview the teller and the manager of the
bank.
2.5 EKNI THE RESEARCHER PRESENTED HERSELF TO THE 
INTERVIEWEE 
As a Jordanian woman the researcher knows the culture, but
because she has lived outside Jordan for several years she was
careful about the way she dressed in order to present the
proper image. From the first three interviews she learned
that it is better to start by explaining the aim of the
research and by stating that the researcher does not work for
any particular institution or the government. Also, it had to
be stressed that the interviews were anonymous and there was
no need for the interviewee to provide her name. The
researcher said she had come from the U.K. to write about
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Jordanian women. The researcher explained to each interviewee
what her definition of politics was, and that she was not
limited to speaking about the government or political parties.
The researcher sought to learn if the interviewee was
interested or not in politics. After this introduction,
permission was asked for an interview.
2 . 6 GENERAL COMMENTS 
Generally, the women surveyed were enthusiastic, helpful, and
friendly. From the 71 women the researcher asked to interview
only one refused. The researcher interviewed every woman by
herself with no one else around. The researcher had a hard
time explaining the need for this to every person and finding
a private place for the interview, but in the end was able to.
I would like to mention one special event, which typified
the friendly response received. On one occasion, I went to
interview a woman at her office, was introduced to her
supervisor, and asked for his permission to interview her. He
agreed and we returned to her office, but the office was
shared with other employees. I asked if there was a private
place, but this could not be found, so I started to interview
the woman in the corner of the stairway. At that point, the
other employees started to ask questions and invited us back
inside; later, they emptied an office with four employees to
give us a place to work. I was touched by this event and
believe it shows the friendly environment that existed.
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3 . THE FIVE SECTIONS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire was designed in five sections, as given in
Appendix 1. The sections were as follows:
I. Demographic and personal data. Questions 1-10
ask about: age, religion, cultural/ethnic
background, area of residence, profession, clothing,
marital status, education, occupation, and income.
II. Women's attitudes on political participation.
Questions 11-25; these questions relate to a woman's
interest in politics, whether or not she is a member
of any political group, if she voted and if so for
whom, if she discusses politics, when she became
interested in politics, what event she temembers
that raised her interest in politics, what she
thinks about a woman running for public office, her
opinion of women's political activities compared to
men, and if she follows elections on television and
in newspapers.
III. Women's views of private life and the personal
status laws. Married women were asked questions 26-
40. Single women were asked questions 28-43, with
the exception of questions 31 and 36. The goal of
these questions is to assess women's opinions about
the laws and related social issues, which affect
their personal life. The questions address issues
such as the dowry, al-asmah (the right to initiate
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divorce), bavt al-ta'ah (the house of obedience),
inheritance, how parents determine the number of
children they will have, pressures on single women
to get married, and what women think about the
personal status laws in particular and Jordanian
laws in general.
Iv. Women's views on education and work. Questions
44-48 seek to determine women's opinions about
education, asking whether they agree that married
woman can work outside the home, whether women have
the same job opportunities as men, and whether all
kinds of work are available to Jordanian women.
V.	 Question 49 sought to discover if Jordanian
women are aware of Arab women's political
participation in neighboring countries.
Finally, question 50 addressed how Jordanian women define
women's liberation. This question was not included in the
statistical analysis because it was an open question. The
researcher decided that this question was for the benefit of
the overall research but not the statistical analysis.
4. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
The computer analysis was conducted in Jordan with the advice
of the Department of Census and the guidance of the Computer
Center at the University of Jordan.
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4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE STATISTICS 
The data was analyzed using the SAS computer statistical
package. The following techniques were used:
1. Frequency Distribution, to display the
percentages of each response to the 49 questions.
Question 50 was not entered into the analysis.
2. ANOVA was used to find out whether there was a
correlation between answers to every section of the
questionnaire and every independent variable (the
Demographic and Personal Data). For analytical
purposes, the section on Jordanian women's awareness
of Arab women's political participation was combined
with the section on women's education and work,
resulting in three main sections.
3. LSD (Least Significant Difference) was used to
show whether correlations between independent
variables and answers were significant at the level
of 0.05.
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2	 II. WOMEN'S ATTITUDES ON POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION
PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS 
11. Do you consider yourself interested in politics?
Table 11
Number percentage
Interested 41 58.6
Partly 19 27.1
Not interested 10 14.3
Total 70 100
Over half the respondents, 58.6%, said that they were
interested in politics, 27.1% said they were partly
interested, and 14.3% said they were not interested. This
gives an indication that, on balance, Ammani women are
interested in politics.
12. Are you a member of a group?
Table 12
Number Percentage
Yes 24 34.3
No 46 65.7
222
Total
	
70	 100
The sample showed that 65.7% were not members of an
organization or group (this question was explained to the
interviewees to mean any kind of party or other organization,
such as a religious or charity group). This response showed
that most Ammani women were not involved in an organization.
13. Have you provided any assistance to political candidates?
Table 13
Number Percentage
Yes 35 50.0
No 35 50.0
Total 70 100
This response was equally divided, which shows that more
Ammani women were active in this kind of activity than were
members of an organization. Most of the activities described
in response to this question were informal in nature, such as
telling a friend or a relative about a certain candidate.
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14. Do you think that politics affects women and men in the
same ways?
Table 14
Number Percentage
The Same 56 82.4
Man 12 17.6
Total 68* 100
*Two did not answer, so they were dropped from the analysis.
82.4% of the sample said that politics affects men and women
equally. Of the 12 respondents who did not agree that
politics affected men and women the same, eleven said that
politics affects only men, justifying their answer by saying
that "man is the provider." The other respondent said
politics affects only women, on the basis that women are
always disadvantaged and therefore feel the impact of
political decisions.
15. Did you vote in the 1989 election?
Table 15
Number Percentage
Yes 37 52.9
No 33 47.1
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Total
	
70
	
100
Over half of the sample, 52.9%, voted in the 1989 election,
which may be considered promising for a country that only
recently allowed women to vote. The researcher asked those
who did not vote why they had not done so; 15 said that their
voting registration papers were not ready, 10 were out of the
country, and 7 said they did not care.
16. Did you vote in the 1993 election?
Table 16
Number Percentage
Yes 46 65.7
No 24 34.3
Total 70 100
There was an increase in women's political participation from
the 1989 to the 1993 election. The researcher again asked the
interviewees who did not vote why? 10 said it was because they
lived too far from the polling place, 8 said it was because
they did not impressed with any candidate, and the rest did
not care.
225
17. For whom did you vote?
Table 17
Number Percentage
Woman 13 18.6
Man 41 58.6
No one 16 22.9
Total 70 100
Over half the sample, 58.6%, voted for a man. 22.9% did not
exercise their right to vote. The researcher asked those who
voted for a man why they had done so; 24 said it was because
there was no woman candidate in their districts and if there
was one they would have voted for her. The popular view is
that Jordanian women do not vote for women simply because they
are women. However, the data appears to show that this is not
the case. 14 said the male candidate was a relative or
friend, while 3 said that the woman candidate's programs were
not convincing.
18. Did you think that the programs of women candidates were
different from those of men candidates?
Table 18
Number Percentage
Yes 43 61.4
No 18 25.7
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Do not know 9 12.9
Total 70 100
In this response, 61.4% of the sample said there was a
difference between the programs of women and men candidates,
25.7% said the programs were the same, and 12.9% did not have
an opinion. The researcher asked those who saw a difference
what the key differences were. The respondents said that the
women candidates had special programs for women and children,
and the men candidates mentioned did not have any specific
programs directed toward women.
19. Should women be running for public office?
Table 19
Number Percentage
Yes 64 91.4
No 6 8.6
Total 70 100
An overwhelming majority, 91.4%, said that women must be
represented in the parliament and on the municipal council.
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20. Did you talk with others about the election campaign?
Table 20
Number Percentage
Yes 61 87.1
No 9 12.9
Total 70 100
87.1% of the sample said that they talked about the election
campaign. The researcher explained to the interviewee what
was meant by "talk", which was discussing the election with
friends or family or with colleagues at work.
21. Do you think your conversations with women about the
election differed from your conversations with men?
Table 21
Number Percentage
Differed 56 80.0
Same 7 10.0
Do not know 7 10.0
Total 70 100
80.0% of the sample said that their conversations with women
were different. The researcher asked those people in what
way they were different? 38 answered that women are more
enthusiastic about elections and women's issues. Men on the
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other hand were seen to be interested in politics in general,
and 18 were against women candidates, criticizing even the
fact that women have the right to vote.
22. At what age were you first interested in politics?
Table 22
Number Percentage
13-20 53 75.7
20-30 17 24.3
Total 70 100
In this response, 75.7% of the sample became interested in
politics when they were between 13 and 18 years old, is not
surprising. The Middle East has faced several wars and there
have influenced the political thinking of young women.
23. What was the first political event that made you
interested in politics?
Table 23
Number Percentage
1956 war 9 12.9
1967 war 12 17.1
1970 war 10 14.3
1982 war 6 8.6
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1990 war 8 10.0
Land day 10 14.3
Others events 15 21.4
Total 70 100
The researcher received a variety of answers, which were later
classified into the above categories for statistical purposes.
A relationship was evident between the age of the interviewee
and an event that happened in her teens. This agrees with
question 22 indicating that events shape the interest of the
sample in politics at an early age.
24. How does women's political activity differ from men's?
Table 24
Number Percentage
Men have more freedom 35 53.0
Women are busy at home 14 21.2
Women are novices in
politics
7 10.6
Other 10 15.2
Total 66* 100
*4 from the sample did not answer the question.
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The researcher asked this question as an open question and for
the statistical analysis coded the answer into the above
categories. 74.2% of the sample said either that men had more
freedom or that women were busy at home. The researcher was
told that men had more opportunities to attend meetings and
had more freedom to go out. Women, on the other hand, have to
take care of the children. Some interviewees also said that
Jordanian women are not experienced in politics, and some said
that men know more about politics than women.
25. In which way did you follow the election campaign, by
newspapers and/or television?
Table 25
Number Percentage
T.V.&
Newspapers
60 85.7
T.V. only 10 14.3
Newspapers 0 0
Total 70 100
A strong majority of the sample, 85.7%, followed the election
in newspapers and a television. It seems clear from this
response that the media plays an important role. A small
portion of the sample, 14.3%, received their information only
by watching T.V., which suggested to the researcher that women
with a lower education level usually follow the news on T.V.
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4 . 3 III.	 WOMEN'S VIEWS ON PRIVATE LIFE
AND THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS
PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS 
26. How did you meet your husband?
Table 26
Number Percentage
Chose husband 26 54.2
Traditional way* 16 33.3
Married a relative 6 12.5
Total 48** 100
*"Traditional way" means that the marriage, was arranged
through the family.
**Omits 22 single women.
In this response, 54.2% of the sample chose their husband,
which illustrates the decline in the traditional practice of
arranged marriages. The researcher learned that even when the
traditional way of meeting a partner is used, the woman's
opinion often determines the acceptability of the future
husband.
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27. How old were you when you got married ?
Table 27
Number Percentage
-20 15 31.3
20-30 30 62.5
30+ 3 6.3
Total 48* 100
*Omits 22 single women.
62.5% of Jordanian women in this sample married between the
ages of 20 and 30. In earlier times most women would marry
before 20. This suggests that women are marrying later and
provides further support for the view that women are
increasingly selecting their marriage partners. The rising
marriage age illustrates how much Jordanian society is
changing.
28. Do you agree with the "prompt dowry" (the money paid in
the marriage contract)?
Table 28
Number Percentage
Yes 25 40.3
No 37 59.7
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Total
	 62*	 100
* These figures omit 8 Christian women, because Islamic laws
do not apply to them. (same for questions 29, 30, 32, 33, 37-
39).
59.7% of the sample said that the prompt dowry is not
necessary, which shows that women are moving away from the
traditional large dowries. In Islamic law the prompt dowry is
usually a small amount of money, but in current practice
larger amounts of money are involved. The researcher learned
that 40.3% of the sample thought that if the man pays money to
the wife, he will not be able to get out of the marriage
easily because of this "investment". Some believed that
because the dowry is an integral part of Islam, it should not
be questioned.
29. Do you agree with the "deferred dowry" (the money paid
after the divorce is final) ?
Table 29
Number Percentage
Yes 30 48.4
No 32 51.6
Total 62* 100
*Omits 8 Christian women.
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51.6% of the sample said that they disagree with the need for
a deferred dowry, while 48.4% supported it. This result
suggested to the researcher there were mixed opinions about
this issue. The justification for women who said yes was that
they see it as security in case of divorce. Some said that a
deferred dowry may make a man think twice before he opts for
divorce. Deferred dowry is important for a woman because, in
case of a divorce, it is the only money she will have, except
for three months' alimony. The women who said that deferred
dowry was not necessary argued that if a man wants a divorce
he will do everything in his power to make a woman unhappy, so
that she will leave and ask for a divorce, which automatically
leads to a loss of any right to the deferred dowry. All too
often in real life, women choose freedom over the deferred
dowry.
30. Should a woman have the right to initiate a divorce
called (al-'asmah)?
Table 30
Number Percentage
Yes 18 29.0
No 44 71.0
Total 62* 100
*Omits 8 Christian women.
71.0% of the sample said women should not have the right to
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initiate divorce proceedings. Most of the women who said no
cited a view that women are emotional and men are rational;
the emotion makes their judgment less clear. Surprisingly,
even women with higher education levels expressed this
opinion.
31. Who determined how many children you would have?
Table 31
Number Percentage
Both* 30 62.5
Husband alone 5 10.4
No planning 13 27.1
Wife alone 0 0
Total 48** 100
*Both means husband and wife decided.
**Omits 22 single women.
62.5% of the sample said that both they and their husbands
decided on the number of children, which is a very important
indicator with respect to the changing relationship between
Jordanian women and men.
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32. What do you think of polygamy?
Table 32
Number Percentage
Agree 1 1.6
Disagree 61 98.4
Total 62* 100
*Omits 8 Christian women.
Overwhelmingly, 98.4% of the sample said they disagree with
polygamy (the right of a man to have more than one wife).
There were no differences between women who wear the hi'ab and
women who wear modern clothing in their answers, which can be
summarized as "I do not want to share my husband with another
woman".
33. What do you think of bavt al-ta'ah (the house of
obedience)?
Table 33
Number Percentage
Agree 4 6.5
Disagree 58 93.5
Total 62* 100
*Omits 8 Christian women.
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A solid majority, 93.5%, said they do not agree with the
concept of bavt al-ta'ah; most Jordanian women said it is
unjust for a woman to be treated in this way. 22
34. Do you agree that a woman should inherit half of a man's
inheritance?
Table 34
Number Percentage
Agree 39 56.5
Disagree 30 43.5
Total 69* 100
*One refused to answer the question.
56.5% of the sample agreed that a woman should inherit half of
the man's share. Some women said that this concept is
embodied in Islam and there is no question that it is God's
will. They also justified their answers by saying that a man
has more responsibility than a woman and he is the provider;
to fulfil this obligation he must have more than the woman.
Some of those who disagreed said that a woman is also the
provider for her family; the old role of men's responsibility
is different now. It is obvious that Jordanian women have
conflicting ideas about the matter of inheritance.
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35. Would you obey a law that equalized inheritance between
men and women?
Table 35
Number Percentage
Agree 46 66.7
Disagree 23 33.3
Total 69* 100
*One refused to answer the question.
All of the 33.3% that answered no said that God's Qura'anic
laws could not be changed. This issue is very complicated and
the researcher found that, taken together with Question 34,
some respondents would comply with a new inheritance law.
Even if it was contrary to their religious views.
36. Who makes the decisions concerning your daughter's
marriage?
Table 36
Number Percentage
Daughter 33 71.7
Parents 8 17.4
Parents and daughter 5 10.9
Total 46* 100
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*Omits 22 single women and 2 others who refused to answer the
question.
71.7% of the sample said that the daughter decides, while
17.4% said that the parents decide. 10.9% said they think
that the parents must be consulted, which indicates that these
women have more freedom in their private lives than before.
37. Did you know that a woman has the right under the
Jordanian personal status law to put conditions on her
marriage certificate?
Table 37
Number Percentage
Yes 52 83.9
No 10 16.1
Total 62* 100
*Omits 8 Christian women.
83.9% of the sample were aware of their rights, but in
practice most women do not in fact use such conditions.
38. Do you believe that the Jordanian personal status laws
are fair for women?
Table 38
Number	 Percentage
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Yes 22 35.5
No 34 54.8
Do not know 6 9.7
Total 62* 100
*Omits 8 Christian women.
54.8% of the sample said that the personal status laws are
unfair to women, 35.5% believed they are fair, and 9.7% had no
opinion about the laws. This result suggests that the women
in the sample women are looking for change.
39. Do you think women can participate fully in politics
under the current personal status laws?
Table 39
Number Percentage
Yes 19 30.6
No 40 64.5
Do not know 3 4.8
Total 62* 100
*Omits 8 Christian women, who were not familiar with the
personal status laws.
64.5% of the sample saw the current personal status laws as
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restricting women's participation.
40. Who do you blame for women's lesser status compared to
men: Our laws or our society?
Table 40
Number Percentage
Laws 1 1.4
Society 26 37.1
Laws and society 43 61.4
Total 70 100
A majority of the sample, 61.4%, believe that both laws and
society are responsible for the low status of women in Jordan.
41. Do you face various forms of pressure to get married?
Table 41
Number Percentage
Yes 11 50
No 11 50
Total 22* 100
*Omits 48 married women.
Half of the single women in the sample are under some pressure
from family and society with regard to marriage.
242
42. Why do you choose to remain single?
Table 42
Number Percentage
To be free 3 13.6
Have not met the right person 17 77.3
Other 2 9.1
Total 22* 100
*Omits 48 married women.
Of the single women in the sample, 77.3%, were thinking about
marriage.
43. Would you like to be consulted about who you marry ?
Table 43
Number Percentage
Yes 22 100
No 0 0
Total 22* 100
*Omits 48 married women.
All the single women in the sample said they wanted to have a
say in who they marry.
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4.4 IV. WOMEN'S VIEWS ON EDUCATION AND WORK
PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS 
44. Do you think all women are entitled to an education?
Table 44
Number Percentage
Yes 70 100
No 0 0
Total 70 100
All the women in the sample supported a woman's right to an
education. The researcher noticed that when she asked this
question, the interviewees were surprised that the education
of women would be an issue.
45. Do you think all kinds of work are open to women?
Table 45
Number Percentage
Yes 29 41.4
No 41 58.6
Total 70 100
A slight majority, 58%, said that Jordanian women did not have
access to all types of obs. The researcher noticed that
working women seemed m -e realistic in terms of what jobs are
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available to women, whereas those women who did not work did
not feel there were any limits on women in the job market.
46. Should married woman be able to work?
Table 46
Number Percentage
Yes 64 91.4
No 6 8.6
Total 70 100
Most women in the sample, 91.4%, supported the idea that
married women should be able to work, suggesting that the
economic situation in Jordan does not give a woman the option
not to. But some of them said that work should not come at
the expense of the marriage, particularly if there is no-one
to take care of the children. Even though Jordanian women
want married women to work, they are still concerned about
basic family values.
47. Would an employer give preference to a man or a women ?
Table 47
Number Percentage
Men 51 72.9
Women 13 18.6
Other 6 8.6
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Total
	 70	 100
The researcher explained this question as follows: if a woman
and a man have the same qualifications in terms of education
and experience, and the job they are applying for does not
specify either a woman or a man, who do you think will be
offered the job?. 72.9% of the sample said that the man would
be given preference indicating that Jordan is a male-dominated
society. Some noted that many employers are afraid that a
woman will be absent more from work because of her family
responsibilities. 18.6% of the sample said that a woman would
be chosen because she is more patient and has a better
attitude toward people than a man. The remaining 8.6% said it
depends where the job is; for example, the government selects
more men, but private businesses will tend to employ woman.
The sample result shows that, as regards equal employment,
Jordanian society remains a man's society.
48. Are you aware of women's organizations?
Table 48
Number Percentage
Yes 70 100
No 0 0
Total 70 100
Jordanian women seem to be knowl ,dgeable about women's
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organizations.
4 . 5 V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JORDANIAN WOMEN AND 
OTHER ARAB lAn= WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
49. What do you think is the difference between the
experiences of Jordanian women and those of other Arab women
with respect to political participation?
Table 49
Number Percentage
More experienced 21 30
Less experienced 27 38
The same 17 24.3
Do not know 5 7.1
Total 70 100
This question was an open question, and later categorized by
the researcher. It was explained to the interviewees that
Arab countries meant Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Palestine -
areas where the movement is much stronger. 38.6% of the
sample said that the Jordanian woman are less experienced than
their foreign counterparts in terms of political
participation. The rest of the sample seemed to be unaware of
the higher level of women's political participation in the
neighboring Arab countries.
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4 . 6 VI. HOW DO JORDANIAN WOMEN DEFINE WOMEN' S 
LIBERATION? 
50. How do you define women's liberation with respect to
yourself?
This was another open question. Most of the women's answers
related to decision making at home, freedom of choice, the
right to work, the right to education, and some combination of
all of the above. Most Jordanian women provided similar
answers, which reflected the norms of the society.
5. THE FINDINGS OF THE FIELD RESEARCH RELATIVE TO 
ANOVA AM LW STATISTICAL ANALYSIS USING THE
CORRELATION SIGNIFICANT  Kr 0.0 5 (WITH THE 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES) 
ANOVA and LSD are tools for examining statistical data. The
questions were combined into three groups, and Anova was used
to show where there is a correlation with the independent
variables.
5 . 1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVERY INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE AND WOMEN'S ATTITUDES ON POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
For the independent variable Age, there are differences in
answers about women's attitudes on political participation
between women aged 19-25 and those aged 35-44, and also
between those aged 19-2 and those aged 45+, but there are no
248
differences in answers between the 19-25 group and the 25-35
group or between the 35-44 group and the 45+ group. Women
under 35 participate more in politics.
The independent variable Religion shows that there are no
differences in women's attitudes on political participation
between different religions. There is also no correlation for
the independent variable of cultural/ethnic group.
For Area, there is a significant difference between
answers of women in wealthy areas and others. Women from
wealthy areas more politically active.
For the independent variable Profession, there are no
differences in women's answers between housewives and working
women.
For the independent variable Clothing, there is a
significant difference between women who wear the hijab and
women who wear modern clothes. The latter are more
politically active.
For the independent variable Marital Status, there is no
difference between married women and single women.
For the independent variable Education, there are
differences between women who have Tawjihi or less and women
who have higher education. Women with less education
participate less. There are no differences in women's answers
between women who have more than high school education and a
university degree.
For the independent variable Occupation, there are
differences between the answers of women in lower status
occupations and those in higher status occupations, and the
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middle status occupations and high status occupations, but not
between the middle status occupations and the lower status
occupations. Women with high status occupations are more
politically active.
For the independent variable Income, there are
differences between answers from women from lower incomes and
higher incomes, and between lower incomes and middle incomes.
Women in the lower income group are less likely to participate
in politics.
In summary, the ANOVA and LSD research found that, with
regard to views about "women's attitudes on political
participation in politics", the answers did not depend on
cultural/ethnic group, profession, or marital status.
However, the views were correlated with age, religion, area,
clothing, education, occupation, and income.
5.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVERY INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE AND VIEWS ON THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS 
AND SOCIAL LIFE 
The views on the personal status laws and social life were not
correlated with age. Thus, older women are not necessarily
more conservative than younger women, which is another
commonly held view.
The independent variable Area shows a difference between
women who live in wealthy or middle-class areas and those in
poorer areas. Women in the wealthy areas were more in favor
of changing the personal status laws.
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The independent variable Profession shows no difference
in women's answers between working women and housewives. The
independent variable Clothing also shows no differences. This
runs against the popular view that women who wear the hi-lab
have conservative views.
The independent variable Marital Status shows that there
is a difference between answers of married and single women.
Married women were more in favor of changing the personal
status laws. But the independent variables Education,
Occupation and Income show no differences. The independent
variable Cultural/Ethnic Group showed no differences.
Women's views on private life and the Jordanian personal
status laws do not appear too vary with age, cultural/ethnic
group, profession, clothing, education, or income.
5.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVERY INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE AND VIEWS ON EDUCATION AND 1/VOIRR 
With respect to women's views on education and work, the
independent variable Age shows that there is a difference
between the respondents aged 19-25 and 45+; also between 35-44
and 45+, but there are no differences between 19-25 and
25-34. Younger women saw fewer obstacles in the workplace.
The independent variable Religion shows no differences
between women's answers. Similarly, the independent variables
Cultural/ Ethnic Group, Area, Profession, and Clothing show no
differences between women's answers. However, the independent
variable Marital Status shows differences in women's answers.
Married women saw more discrimination at work.
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The independent variable Education also shows differences
between women in group 1 (Tawjihi) or group 2 (Tawjihi+ two
years), and those in group 3 (University degree) or group 4
(Ph.])). Women with more education think there are more
obstacles in the workplace.
The independent variable Occupation shows that there are
differences in answers between women who have lower or middle
status occupations and women in higher status occupations, who
felt more discrimination at work.
In summary, the ANOVA and LSD analysis show that, with
respect to women's views on education and work, there are
differences according to age, education, and occupation.
Religion, cultural/ethnic group, area, profession, and
clothing do not have a significant effect on women's views
about education and work.
6. CONCLUSION OF THE FINDINGS ACCORDING TO ANOVA
AND LSD ANALYSIS 
The ANOVA data analysis shows the correlation between every
section of the questionnaire and every independent variable.
Below is a summary of how each of the variable affects the
answers:
Younger women are more politically active, and saw
fewer obstacles at work.
Women from wealthier areas participate more in
politics and were more in favor of changing the
personal status laws. Also saw more obstacles at
work.
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Women wearing hi'ab were less politically active.
•
Married women were more against the personal status
laws, and saw more discrimination in work.
More educated women were more politically active and
saw more obstacles at work.
Women with higher occupations were more active and
felt there was more discrimination at work.
Religion, cultural/ethnic group and profession were
not correlated with women's answers.
7. THE FINDING OF THE RESEARCH WITH RELATIONSHIPS 
TO THE HYPOTHESES 
The field research has provided information on Jordanian
women's opinions about political participation, which enables
us to determine if the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 1 are
valid. There will now be examined.
7.1 TIME AVAILABLE FOR WOMEN TO PARTICIPATE IN
POLITICS 
HYPOTHESIS 1: As women are able to have others take care of
their children, they have more time to spend doing other
things - including participating in politics.
This hypothesis argues that most women have the burden of
domestic duties,' that a woman belongs in the house, and that
politics is a man's domain. This topic was discussed in
Chapter 4.
Evaluation of the data gathered for this research
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supports the view that responsibilities at home stop women
from participating in politics. The data shows that most
Jordanian women said that men participate more because they
have the freedom to go out of the home at any time, but women
have to stay home and take care of the children and the house
(Table 24).
This agrees with the points made by Jordanian women
activists, to the effect that the absence of women from
political life is partly the result of their busy daily
lives.'
The conclusion is that the hypothesis is valid.
7.2 THE PLIE OF EDUCATION 
HYPOTHESIS 2: As the education rate of Jordanian women
increases their political participation will increase.
This hypothesis assumes that if a woman has more
education she will be better equipped to participate in
politics. The data shows convincingly that, with respect to
the Education variable, women's attitudes to political
participation vary with their levels of education; those with
more education are far more active than those with less
education.
This view is supported by Jordanian women activists, who
also noted that education is important if women are to improve
their levels of political participation and enhance their
overall economic status.
The finding are that whereas women have accepted
education (Table 44) have been reluctant to became active in
254
politics. Thus, hypothesis 2 can not be supported.
7.3 THE F.= OF WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE 
HYPOTHESIS 3: As Jordanian women enter the labor force, they
will be more interested in politics and will increase their
political participation.
This hypothesis suggests that if women are economically
free, they will protect their interests as working women, and
that an economically independent woman is more likely to take
independent political decisions.'
The data shows that most Jordanian women see obstacles to
joining the labor force. They believe that not every kind of
work is available to women (Table 45). Also they believe that
discrimination against women in the workforce exists (Table
47). Nevertheless, women feel they must work for economic
reasons (Table 46). The data also shows that there are
differences between the views of working women and housewives
on some work-related matters.
The Jordanian women activists emphasized the need for
women to be economically independent. Clearly, women see
obstacles to getting into the labor force, and it is thus
difficult to prove or disprove the hypothesis.
7 . 4 WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS 
HYPOTHESIS 4: As women's organizations bring issues about
women to the government, and into public attention, this will
help increase women's political participation.
This hypothesis assumes that these political
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organizations are effective and will help women to present
important issues to government officials and decision-makers
and that they will lobby to gain more rights for women.26
Evaluation of the data gathered for this research
suggests that the majority of Jordanian women know about
women's organizations (Table 48). But (Table 12) shows that
only a quarter of the sample participate in any organization,
which indicates that organized activities have not yet
attracted meaningful levels of popular support.
The reluctance of women to join mass organizations leads
to the organizations being seen an unrepresentative and
powerless.
The women activists had mixed views about the roles and
effectiveness of women's organizations; some praised these
groups for bringing key issues into the public domain, while
others stated that there is a need to change the leadership
and outlook of these groups.
In conclusion, hypothesis 4 cannot be supported.
7.5 THE STATE AS AGENT OF CHANGE 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The state plays a role in promoting women's
political participation.
The data shows that Jordanian women are interested in
politics (Table 11), and have participated in some fashion,
for example by helping campaigns for political candidates
(Table 13). An increase in women's voting rates occurred from
1989 to 1993 and is shown in the data (Tables 15 and 16).
Women follow campaigns and candidate programs closely and
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support the notion that women have the right to run for public
office (Table 19).
All these activities derive from decisions taken by the
state since 1974, when women were first given the right to
vote, and they have created new opportunities for women to
participate in politics. Thus, this hypothesis seems valid.
7.6 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Some laws discriminate against women, and women
feel they are not a part of the political process.
This hypothesis assumes that if a woman faces
discriminatory laws that restrict her rights and treat her as
a second class citizen, that such an environment will limit
women's political participation.'
The data shows that many women believe that there is a
need to modify Jordanian laws to enable them to participate
more in politics (Tables 39 and 40). Women activists agreed
with this. This hypothesis seems to be justified.
7.7 THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS AND SOCIAL LIFE 
HYPOTHESIS 7: The personal status laws restrict a women's
private life and as a result discourage public activities such
as political participation.
This hypothesis is not new in that there are many
activists in the Arab world (for example Nawal al-Sa'adawi,
Fatamah al-Mernisi, and the Jordanian women activists"), who
have asked the state to modify the personal status laws and to
improve the status of women.
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The data shows that over half of the sample believes the
personal status laws are not fair to women (Table 38). The
women disagree with the concept of prompt dowry (Table 28),
and have mixed opinions about the deferred dowry (Table 29).
The data shows beyond a doubt that women disagree with the
bayt al-ta'ah (Table 33) and polygamy (Table 32), and that
they would support a law to equalize inheritance between women
and men (Table 35). Jordanian women are aware of their rights
in marriage contracts (Table 37) and they blame both the law
and society for the lower status of women (Table 40).
The data also shows several results that suggest some
societal changes which relate to the personal status laws.
For example, Jordanian women appear to have freedom in terms
of choosing their husband (Tables 26 and 36). Also, the
marriage age is rising (Table 27) and the discussion of the
number of children a couple will have seems to be a decision
for both the husband and wife (Table 31). Similarly, single
women say their opinion counts in who they will marry (Table
43).
The Jordanian women have conflicting opinions about al-
'asmah (Table 30). Many see themselves as emotional and not
entitled to the right to divorce.
Table 39 shows that many women see the personal status
laws as restricting their political activity, which supports
Hypothesis 7.
Chapter Six constitutes the conclusion of this study. It
will describe the scope of women's participation in politics
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in Jordan. It will also discuss the key societal attitudes
and factors that affect women's political participation. The
chapter will offer concluding observations on strategies for
empowering women to achieve greater levels of participation in
the future.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
It is beyond doubt now that Jordanian women are capable of
performing important political, economic, and technical tasks.
While the evidence shows that women can do these jobs, there
are still some who believe that the role of women should be
limited and, as a result, the public role of women has become
more controversial rather than less.
In order to assess the future prospects for Jordanian
women's political participation, it will be helpful to
consider the issues in the context of the research questions
identified in the Introduction. The purpose of this chapter
is threefold. First, it summarizes the main themes and
conclusions of the study. Second, it offers future strategies
for empowering women in order to further their political
participation. Third, it suggests some directions for future
research.
1. SUMMARY OF !WEN THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this study was to examine the changing
political status and political participation of Jordanian
women over this century. The study defined political
participation broadly as "political activity, including
informal and indirect action, and any activity to
intentionally influence public policy". This definition
covers a wide range of activities, such as ad hoc political
campaigns, food riots, protests in support of liberation
movements, and anti-war demonstrations. It is clear that any
serious effort to analyze women's political participation in
Jordan needs to take into account many non-traditional
activities which involve a broader range of actual
participation.
A theoretical framework was developed to examine the
interplay of three major factors influencing women's political
participation in Jordan: Islam, the state, and feminism. As
in other Arab countries, women's political participation in
Jordan in the early 20th century has been strongly affected by
these three factors.
The early feminists were affiliated with Arab
nationalists who placed priority on liberation from colonial
domination. The nationalists used tradition as the embodiment
of cultural authenticity and manipulated traditional ideology,
a prominent mobilizing force. The involvement of Arab women in
politics during the struggles for independence was illustrated
in the case of Egypt, Algeria, and Palestine. Arab women
crossed traditional boundaries and engaged in militancy; but
once the wars ended, women returned to predominantly domestic
roles.
After independence, most Arab countries did not have a
clear ideological position about the role of women. The new
Arab states were seeking to industrialize in order to
modernize, and there was a need for female labor. For this
reason, most Arab states planned to integrate women into
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economic development. This was a very pragmatic response
based on economic needs; it was not reflective of any specific
policy to improve the status of women.
With regard to legal issues, each government in the Arab
world has interpreted the shari'h laws regarding women in its
own way. For example, the implementation is conservative in
Algeria and Egypt and more progressive in the Democratic
Republic of Yemen and Tunisia. In Kuwait, the Gulf states,
and Saudi Arabia women and men are still fighting for the
right to vote, and women's suffrage movement has been attacked
by conservatives and the state by rasing questions about the
morality of the women who engage in politics. Clearly,
leaders can use their claim to be protecting the family and
public morality to restrict women's political activities. In
the end, the way the state defines women's roles depends
heavily upon the way it defines its mission.
Official Islam has been controlled by Arab states.
Fundamentalist Islam, however, has confronted the state with
its conservative codes of gender relations. State leaders
have thus had to defend their social and political changes as
being compatible with Islamic values.
Women's organizations have been supervised by the state
in most Arab countries. Nevertheless, the feminist movement
in the Arab world can be credited with bringing women's issues
to public attention.
The analysis undertaken in this study would seem to show
that the state is the most influential of the three major
factors which influence women's political participation; it is
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apparent that both Islam and feminism have yielded in many
important respects to the overall power of the state.
1.1 THE FACTORS THAT SHAPE WOMEN'S POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION
There are three essential elements of Jordanian society: the
bedouin tribe, the village, and the city. Jordanian society
has maintained many bedouin ideas. Jordanian rural society is
fundamentally a man's society. Men are the providers and the
decision makers. A woman's position is marginal, even though
women work alongside men. There is high illiteracy among
women, and an acute shortage of women's organizations capable
of rendering advice and assistance.
The position of Jordanian urban women is better; they
have a better chance of a college education, as most
universities are in cities. There is also more work outside
of the home. Palestinian women immigrating into cities in
Jordan after the 1948 and 1967 wars imparted their knowledge
to Jordanian society.
The field research shows, however, that Jordanian women
of all backgrounds are held back from greater political
participation by not having sufficient free time.
There remain wide differences between the bedouin tribe,
the village, and the city, which can be seen in terms of
women's educational levels and economic status. However, the
field research sample shows that Jordanian women across
society believe that they have many choices and options in
their private lives. One of the findings of this study is
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that an analysis based solely on societal structure does not
present a complete picture of the reality of how Jordanian
women view their roles.
1.2 JORDANIAN WOMEN IN POLITICS 
Jordanian women have been indirectly influenced by Arab
feminist struggles. Women like Huda Sha'arawi were role
models for Jordanian women, and the struggles of Palestinian
and Algerian women were often cited as an example for Arab
women generally. The feminist movement in Jordan was started
by women working in the political opposition and dates from
1950-1957 when Jordan had political parties. It gained
momentum when King Husayn signed election law No. 8 in 1974,
which encouraged women to engage in the political process by
giving them the right to vote and run for public office.
However, there were no elections until November 1989 and no
women were elected to parliament at that time. After 1989,
feminists were able to raise women's issues at several
conferences in Amman.
In the 1990s, feminists have been more demanding and
specific about their concerns than the early feminists, who
tended to concentrate on the Palestinian issue. An important
milestone for the women's movement was the election of Tujan
Al-Faisal, the first woman ever elected to the Jordanian
parliament.
Jordanian women's associations have helped to advance the
status of women by helping needy families and bringing women's
issues to the public. The associations were first started by
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elite women as social welfare agencies for the poor and for
children. These organizations started calling for more
political rights for women. However, the field research shows
that women's organizations have still not attracted much
popular support.
Economically, the state needs women in order to
successfully pursue development. To do so, the state created
opportunities for women and integrated them into the national
development plan. Many women have taken advantage of
education and training. However, to solve recent unemployment
the state has been trying to push women back into home to make
more opportunities for men. The field research also shows
that Jordanian women believe that discrimination exists
against women in the workforce.
It is clear that the laws affecting Jordanian women
bear a strong similarity to laws in neighboring Arab
countries. For example, constitutional laws grant women the
same rights and duties as men, but the Labor and Retirement
Laws are not equal. Moreover, the personal status laws treat
women as minors and discriminate against them. The field
research confirmed that, in the opinion of Jordanian women
the personal status laws are not fair to women. It also
revealed that there is a need to modify Jordanian laws to
enable women to participate more in politics. These views
were shared by women across the social spectrum of views.
Although the state first encouraged women to work, it had
no long-term policy towards women, and thus could later adopt
an unofficial policy to solve unemployment by not employing
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women in government service.
The state has played a crucial role in promoting women's
political participation. The field research shows that there
has been an increase in women's political participation from
1989 to 1993. It also confirms that women are interested in
politics and have participated in some fashion by helping
political candidates. Women follow campaigns and candidate
programs closely and support the notion that women have the
right to run for public office. Women's attitudes on
political participation vary with their levels of education;
those with more education are far more active than those with
less education.
Women in the Arab World have not been strangers to
political activity, including street demonstrations and active
participation in struggles of national liberation. Throughout
the region, there are many common experiences, yet each
country has had its own unique circumstances, which have
affected the development of women's political participation.
This development, however, does not necessarily match the
Western framework, primarily because of the interplay between
Islam, the state, and feminism found in the Arab world.
2. A STRATEGY FOR EMPOWERING WOMEN' S POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION IN OtUUMN
In Jordan, the state has promoted new roles for women for
practical and ideological reasons, but it can be argued that
it has often attempted to solve the country's economic
problems at the expense of women. Today's reality is that
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women have more activities outside the home and family,
although there is little reason to doubt that family relations
still remain central to their lives. The challenge for the
state is to recognize these evolving patterns of behavior and
develop policies that address the needs of modern Jordanian
women. Issues of cultural identity and related questions of
who can speak for and represent women also remain unsolved and
require further development that will only come with increased
political participation.
A strategy for improving the political participation of
Jordanian women is presented. This proposal is general in
nature and covers five broad areas: legislation, politics,
economics, social issues, and education.
2 . 1 LEGISLATION
The research has shown that there is a need to modify the laws
concerning Jordanian women to abolish discrimination against
women. For example, the personal status laws could be
modified in a way which does not conflict with Islam but uses
i'tihad (interpretation) to suit the needs of the 21st
century. Changes also need to be made to the Labor Laws, the
Civil Retirement Law, the Social Security Law, and the Law of
Nationality.
2 . 2 POLITICS 
The research has helped to answer many questions about women
in politics. There is a critical need for more women to
participate in the decision-making of the country. This could
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be accomplished, for example, by using the media to change the
image of Jordanian women. Women need to be portrayed more
frequently as capable of taking important decisions. Also
there is a need for more discussion about women's issues and
the problems facing women, and to move away from ivory tower
assertions that Arab women are "powerful" and already have
full rights.
Women must use the multiparty system and the democratic
process to advance their participation. Women need to be
encouraged to become active in political parties and women's
organizations, such as the municipal council and the
Professional Union. Also, these organizations should work
more efficiently with the grass-roots level and move from
Amman to the villages. It is important also for women's
organizations to use their position to pressure for change.
There is a lack of independent women's research centers.
In addition to conducting research on women's conditions and
offering policy recommendations, such centers could give women
training in political and other skills. They also could serve
as independent sources of information not under the influence
of the state.
2 . 3 ECONOMICS 
To improve women's political participation, there is a need to
increase the number of women in the workforce and to abolish
any kind of discrimination against working women. One way to
do this is to encourage women's participation in professional
organizations and unions. Reliable day-care centers and
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kindergartens for young children are also required. There is
also a need to make women more aware of sexual harassment in
the work-place. Currently, sexual harassment is not
acknowledged as a problem situation. There is also a need to
improve the work situation of women in rural areas by making
training available and enabling them to learn new skills. In
general, women should have more opportunities beyond
traditional work such as typing, handicrafts, and sewing,
which have had the long-term effect of marginalizing women.
There is an urgent need to counter the argument that to
solve the country's severe unemployment problem women should
return to the home. The government must be realize that the
economic potential of women not only affects the women, but
their families, and ultimately national development.
2 . 4 SOCIAL ISSUES 
To improve the social life of Jordanian women, a number of
steps can be taken. For example, there is a need to recognize
that the role of the family is changing. Women should seek
more opportunities outside the home. In addition, the reality
today is that some women are the sole providers for their
families but society has generally not recognized this fact.
Women also need more information concerning domestic
violence, including legal remedies and centers for women who
need such services. The media should work to change the image
of Jordanian women so as not to portray them only as victims
or manipulators, but equal to men, because perceptions are
important and stereotypes should not be reinforced.
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2.5 EDUCATION 
To empower women, there is a need to improve education, mainly
through curriculum changes, and also by removing images of
women in educational materials that depict them as emotional
or incapable of making important decisions. There is also a
need to encourage women to take advantage of vocational
education training; currently, such training is limited and
men tend to receive more and better vocational schooling.
3. CLOSING THOUGHTS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RIMEAJUIR 
Overall, there is a need for indigenous women to do more
research about the issues concerning and problems facing
contemporary Arab women. There is a lack of information on
the role of women, and much more basic research could be done
to fill the void in the literature. Building on the themes
developed in this study, it is clear that further micro- and
macro-level research on the political participation of women
in Jordan is needed.
Several specific topics merit attention for future
investigation. For example, it would be helpful if the
research methodology and scope used in this study were
expanded beyond Amman to cover the rest of Jordan. This would
show whether the consensus for change seen in Amman is
reflected in the rest of the country. Another important
question concerns attitudes of men with regard to the role of
women, and research aimed at both sexes could be useful show
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whether male society is willing to question its attitudes and
share power more equally. Finally, comparative studies of
women in other Arab countries in circumstances similar to the
women examined in this study would be especially helpful in
showing how different governments have influenced women's
status in society.
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APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
WOMEN'S CHANGING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
IN JORDAN
BY
BARI'AH NAQSHABANDI
1 Demographic and Personal data 
1.	 Age: a. 19-25
b. 25-34
c. 35-44
d. 45+
2.	 Religion: a. Muslim
b. Christian
3.	 Cultural/Ethnic Group: a. Arabs
b. Circassian
4.	 Area: a. Wealthy area
b. Middle class area
c. Lower class area
	
5.	 Profession: a. Housewives
b. Working women
	
6.	 Clothing: a. Vijg.b
b. Scarf
c. Traditional
d. Modern
7.	 Marital Status: a. Married
b. Single
8.	 Education: a. Illiterate
b. Tawjihi
c. Diploma
d. B.S, B.A
e. M.A
f. M.D
g. ph.D
9.	 Occupation: a. High Status Occupation
b. Middle Status Occupation
c. Middle Lower Status Occupation
d. Lower Status Occupation
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10. Income:	 a.	 0-99
b. 100-199
c. 200-299
d. 300-499
e. 500-700
f. 700+
11 Women's attitudes on political participation
11. Do you consider yourself interested in politics?
a. Interested
b. Partly interested
c. Not interested
12. Are you a member of a group?
a. Yes	 b. No
13. Have you provided any assistance to political candidates?
a. Yes	 b. No
14. Do you think that politics affects woman and man in the
same way?
a. Same
b. Men
15. Did you vote in the 1989 election?
a. Yes	 b. No
16. Did you vote in the 1993 election?
a. Yes	 b. No
17. For whom did you vote?
a. Woman
b. Man
c. No one
18. Did you think that the programs of women candidates
were different from these of the men candidates?
a. Yes	 b. No
19. Should women be running for public office?
a. Yes	 b. No
20. Did you talk with others about the election campaign?
a. Yes	 b. No
21. Do you think your these conversations with women about
the election differed from your conversations with men?
a. Differ
b. Same
c. Do not know
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22. At what age were you first interested in politics?
a. 13-20
b. 20-30
23. What was the first political event that made you
interested in politics?
a. 1956 war
b. 1967 war
c. 1970 war
d. 1982 war
e. 1990 war
f. Land day
g. Other events
24. How does women's political activity differ from men's?
a. Men have more freedom
b. Women are busy at home
c. Women are novices in politics
e. Other
25. In which way did you follow the election campaign by
newspaper and/ or television?
a. Both
b. T.V. only
c. Newspapers
III Women's views on private life and the "Personal 
Status Laws" 
26. Haw did you meet you husband?
a. Chose husband
b. Traditional way
c. Married a relative
27. How old were you when you got married?
a. -20
b. 20-30
c. 30+
28. Do you agree with the in "prompt dowry" (the money paid
in the marriage contract)?
a. Yes	 b. No
29. Do you agree with in "deferred dowry" (the money paid
after the divorce is final)?
a. Yes	 b. No
30. should a woman have the right to initiate divorce called
(al-'asmah)?
a. Yes	 b. No
31. Who determined how many children you would have?
a. Both
b. Husband alone
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c. Wife alone
d. No planning
32. What do you think of polygamy?
a. Agree
b. Disagree
33. What do you think of bavt al-ta'ah (the house of
obedience)?
a. Agree
b. Disagree
34. Do you agree that a women should inherit half of a
men's inheritance?
a. Agree
b. Disagree
35. Would you obey a law that equalize inheritance between
men and women?
a Agree
b. Disagree
36. Who makes the decisions concerning your daughter's
marriage?
a. Daughter
b. Parents
c. Parents and daughter
37. Do you know that a woman has the right under the
Jordanian personal status laws to put conditions on her
her marriage certificate?
a. Yes	 b. No
38. Do you believe that the Jordanian personal status laws
are fair for women?
a. Yes	 b. No	 c. Do not know
39. Do you think women can participate fully in politics
under the current personal status laws ?
a. Yes	 b. No
40. Who do you blame for women's lesser status compared to
men: our laws or our society?
a. Laws
b. Society
c. Laws and society
41. Do you face various forms of pressure to get married ?
a. Yes	 b. No
42. Why did you choose to remain single?
a. To be free
b. Have not met the right person
c. Other
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43. Would you like to be consulted about who you marry ?
a. Yes	 b. No
IV Women's views on education and work 
44. Do you think all women are entitled to an education?
a. Yes	 b. No
45. Do you think all kinds of work that are open to women?
a. Yes	 b. No
46. Should married woman be able to work?
a. Yes	 b. No
47. Would an employer give preference to a man or a women ?
a. Men
b. Women
c. Other
48. Are you aware of women's organizations?
a. Yes	 b. No
V Relationship between Jordanian women and other 
Arab women with respect to political 
participation 
49. What do you think is the difference between the
experiences of Jordanian women and those of other Arab
women with respect to political participation?
a. More experienced
b. Less experienced
c. The same
d. Do not know
VI How do Jordanian women define women's 
liberation? 
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APPENDIX 2,
HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN
SEVENTH EDUCATION PROJECT
Enrollments by Level and Type of Education, 
Sex and Administering Authority
(1986/87)
Level and
of Education MOE
Other
Government a/ [WAWA Private Total
Kindergarten 582 31,245 31,827
Male 310 17,343 17,653
Female 272 13,902 14,174
L'Ili211X - 403,641 3,544 91,434 43,900 542,519
207,110 2,802 46,522 25,027 281,461Male
Female 196,531 742 44,912 18,873 261,058
Preparatory 161,710 44,162 7,329 214,743
Male 85,420 1,340 22,568 3,948 113,276
Female 76,290 202 21,594 3,381 101,467
Secondary General 91,807 841 6,138
Male 43,440 680 3,844 47,964
Female 48,367 161 2,294 50,822
Secondary
Vocational 26,164 4j 527 319 31,770
Male 14,058 4,599 458 213 19,328
Female 12,106 161 69 106 12,442
Community
Colleges b/ 27,042 c/
Male 13,283
Female 13,759 56,-ct
Universities 26,711	 c/
Male 16,308 61.1
Female 10,403 3/-9
a/ Ministry of Defense, VTC and MOHE.
b/ Including nursing colleges.
c/ 1985/86 data.
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Appendix	 8
Area	 Units Social and Economic Ranking
83
85
86
93
1
2
3
4
94 5
81 6
91 7
92 8
33 9
14 1U
21 11
61 12
52 13
'Abdun
Al-Suiyfyyah
Amm 'Aziynah
Al-Shimasani
Al-Madiynah al-
Riydiyan
Jabal Amman
Al-Wabiydah
Jabal al-Husyan
MarkahI
Wasat al-Balad
Al-Mizha
Jabal al-Naziyha
Mukhum al-Wandat
wealty class
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